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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
November 23, 1983 Conference
List 3, Sheet 4
No. 83-712-CSY

/

v.

Cer t to Supreme Court of New
Jersey
(Wilentz,
Clifford
Handler,
Pollock,
O'Hern'
Schr~ib~r. (.dissenting), Gari~
bald1 (JOlnlng dissent))

T.L.O., a Juvenile

State/Criminal

New Jersey

Timely

1.
dence

SUMMARY:

seized

by

a

The State contests the exclusion of evi-

public

school

official

from

a

pup
......_ i 1 d u r in g

school hours and on school property.

2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

In March 1980, a teacher

at Piscataway High School in New Jersey saw 14 year old T.L.O.
v
(Resp) and some other girls smoking in the girls' restroom in
violation of school rules.

She demanded~that the girls accom-

pany her to the principal's office.
pal asked

the girls

if

they had

There, the assistant princibeen smoking

in the

restroom.

All admitted that they had except for T.L.O., who said that she
had not been smoking and that she did not smoke at all.

The as-

sistant principal then asked T.L.O. to accompany him to his pri(

vate off ice.
him,

he opened

top.
the

There he v{sked to see her purse.

it and saw a package of Marlboro cigarettes on

When he took them out of the purse to confront T.L.O. with
evidence,

he

saw

rolling papers

in the purse and began to

search for other evidence of illegal drugs.
j~a,

ed

She gave it to

He found some mari;~

4 ~bills, and some index cards that indicat- ~-

t~tv;~d bee~

~

selling marijuana to other students.

The assistant principal called T : L.O. 's mother and the /~?t--:
police.
1 ice

T.L.O., accompanied by her mother, was taken to the po-

station where

she was

read

her Miranda

rights.

She then

allegedly confessed to selling marijuana to other students. 1

{

1 T.L.O. y(ater denied that she ever confessed to selling
marijuana. Her m~her al ~ nied that T.L.O. made any sort of
Footnote continued on next page.

In

~

~~~~~

seized ~

Juvenile Court, T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence
her purse and her confession.
t ion to suppress.

It

found

The ~uvenile

Court denied the mo-

the Fourth Amendment exclusionary

rule applicable to school searches, but found the standard applicable to such a search to be "reasonable cause to believe that
the search is necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce
school policies." 178 N.J. Super. at 341

It concluded that the

assistant principal was justified in opening the purse because he
had reason to believe that smoking, a violation of school policy,
had occurred.

Once he had opened the purse, the other contents

of the purse were in "plain view."

The Juvenile Court adjudicat-

ed T.L.O. a delinquent.
On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of
I

the suppression motion.
delinquency
whether

the

and

However, it vacated the adjudication of

remanded

juvenile

for

had

further

knowingly

rights before making the confession.

proceedings
waived

her

to determine
constitutional

T.L.O. appealed the denial

of her motion to suppress to the N.J. Supreme Court.

/

That court

reversed the evidentiary ruling of the Juvenile Court.
first
rights

that
while

public
at

school

school

st ~ fficials subject
~

students

and

retained

Fourth

It held

Amendments

that public school officials were

to the Fourth Amendment ban against un-

reasonable government intrusions.

It then held that pursuant to

duties under state law, public school officials may conduct rea-

confession.

sonable warrantless searches.

---------··reasonable
is not

under

Finally it held that if the search

the Fourth Amendment,

the evidence is

subject to the exclusionary rule and may not be used in any criminal proceeding against the pupil.
the

~ate

On the facts of this case,

supreme court found that the search of T.L.O. 's purse

was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and thus that the
- ----evidence seized must be excluded. 2
...._,_____- -

3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr

does

not

take

issue with

the

state court's determination that the Fourth Amendment applies to
protect public school students from unreasonable searches by publie school officials or its determination that the search in this
case was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

It argues only

that the exclusionary rule should not apply to remedy such constitutional violations where the search is performed by a public
school official.

Petr argues that because the school official is

primarily interested in maintaining school discipline and not in
securing criminal convictions,

application of

the exclusionary

2 In state court,
case r nvolv f ng a searc
- New Jersey v.
Jeffrey Engerud. In that case, school officials were notified by
the police that a father of a student had told them that Engerud
was selling drugs to other students. School officials used a
pass key to gain access to Engerud's locker. Their search of the
locker revealed illegal drugs. The police were notified and
criminal proceedings were begun. The lower courts denied the
motion to suppress the evidence seized from the locker. In one
opinion, the state supreme court reversed the evidentiary rulings
made in both this case and the Engerud case. Jeffrey Engerud was
killed in a motorcycle accident shortly after the state court
handed down its opinion. Thus, his case is not currently before
this Court.
I

rule will have no deterrent effect.

Petr argues that in recent

years this Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule unless it will further the goal of deterrence.
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433

See, e.g., United

(1976) (additional marginal deter-

renee provided by forbidding use in federal civil proceeding of
evidence illegally seized by state officials does not outweigh
cost to society of applying rule) •

Petr argues that there is a

conflict in the . state courts over application of the exclusionary
rule to searches by public school officials and that this Court
should grant cert. in this case to resolve that conflict.
Resp argues that adequate and independent state grounds
justify the decision below and thus that this Court lacks jurisdiction.

She argues that under N.J. law juveniles are guaranteed

the same right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures

as

are

juvenil~e

adults.

If

this

Court

should

determine

that

not entitled to the same protections under the Fourth

Amendment as adults, the decision in this case would be unaffected because state law requires equal treatment.

4.

DISCUSSION:

Petr is correct that there is a con-

flict concerning application of the
cially the exclusionary rule,
school officials.

Fo~rth

Amendment, and espe-

to searches conducted by public

The state cases generally reflect four differ-

ent approaches to the subject:

( 1) the Fourth Amendment does not

apply because a public school official stands in loco parentis
and any search by the official in this capacity is a search by a
private party rather than a government official:

(2) the Fourth

Amendment applies but the exclusionary rule does not because application of

that

rule has no deterrent effect;

(3)

both

the

Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule apply but the standard
of reasonableness is lowered from probable cause to reasonable
suspicion to allow school officials to perform their responsibilit ies of enforcing school discipline;

( 4)

the Fourth Amendment

and the exclusionary rule apply and the standard of reasonableness is probable cause.

v

In this case, the N.J. court took the third option.

It

held that "w~ school official has reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity or
activity that would interfere with school discipline and order,
the school official has the right to conduct a reasonable search

(

for such evidence."

It found that the search conducted in this

------

case was unreasonable and applied the exclusionary rule.
~-------

------

There

are some strong arguments that application of that rule is inappropriate in cases such as this.

The primary if not the sole

purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence.

Before applying

::!.

that deterrent sanction·, it is important to identify the conduct
sought to be controlled.
school officials

in

In this case,

carrying out

their

it is the actions of
responsibilities under

state law to preserve and enforce school discipline.

....____.

School of-

ficials are not responsible for enforcing the law through criminal proceedings.

Thus, exclusion in criminal proceedings of evi-

dence seized by school officials in performance of their duties
will do little to deter their conduct.

Such conduct is better

deterred by carefully drawn state laws establishing the authority

of

school officials

split among

in carrying out

their

duties.

the state courts on this issue.

There

is a

However, Petr has

cited only one case besides this one in which the exclusionary
rule has been applied.

This Court denied cert. in that case.

In State v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317 (La. 1975), the La. Supreme

Court

discovered

applied
by

school

the

exclusionary

officials.

rule

This

to

Court

exclude
granted

evidence
cert.

and

then vacated and remanded for the state court to clarify whether
its decision was
Mora,

423

u.s.

based on

1976

state or

federal

law.

Louisiana v.

On remand, the state court held that under

state law the school officials who had made the search were functioning as governmental agents;
t ional under

i

that the search was unconstitu-

the Fourth Amendment of

the U.S.

Constitution and

its equivalent in the state constitution; and that exclusion of
the

evidence

(1961).

was

required

under

Mapp

This Court then denied cert. 429

v.

Ohio,

u.s.

367

u.s.

643

1004 (1976)

It seems clear from the opinion below that the decision
on

the only

issue presented

in this case was based on federal

-

law: the state supreme court found that the search by the school

o fficial violated the Fourth Amendment and that the exclusionary
rule should apply under
argument

this Court's decision

that the decision

in Mapp.

Resp's

is based on state law is misplaced.

The relevant state law does not provide that juveniles will be
treated the same as adults for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
It merely provides that

if

the defendant in a state proceeding

has a Fourth Amendment claim, it will be enforced regardless of

whether he is being tried under the state's criminal code or its
juvenile code.

See Cert. Petition Appendix A at 6a n.5

There is a conflict in state courts concerning the proper application of Fourth Amendment law to searches performed by
school officials. Compare State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d
586

(Ga.

197 5)

(Fourth Amendment applies but exclusionary rule

does not), with In re

w.,

29 Cal. App.

3d 777

(1973): State v.

Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. 1971) (Fourth Amendment & exclusionary
rule apply but searches may be reasonable on lesser showing than
probable cause) .

However,

only one other case has applied

the

exclusionary rule to exclude evidence seized in such a case from
criminal proceedings.

See Mora,

supra.

wait this controversy out a little

(

longer.~

If not, this case is

L.fe ~ ~

as good as any to take.
I

The Court may want to

f'

v--.--/.d../4, .AL,__~~-

recommend granting Resp's motion to proceed

inforrna

pauperis.

5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I tentatively recommend a grant.

There is a response.
November 14, 1983

Robinson

Opin in petn
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lstDRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-712

NEW JERSEY, PETITIONER v. T. L. 0.

~"'

-~ ~

4;~

~~~

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW JERSEY
[April - , 1984]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a question concerning the admissibility 1
in juvenile-delinquency proceedings of evidenc~ illegally ob1
tained in an in-school search by a public-school official. Because t at official was engaged in enforcing a school disciplinary rule and was not acting with the participation of
law-enforcement authorities, we hold that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule does not require suppression
of the evidence he obtained.
I

On March 7, 1980, a teacher in Piscataway High School in
Middlesex County, N.J., observed 14-year-old T. L. 0. and
another student smoking cigarettes in the girls' lavatory in
violation of school regulations. The teacher escorted the
girls to the vice-principal's office and accused them of violating the regulation prohibiting smoking in lavatories. In response to the vice-principal's questions, T. L. O.'s companion
admitted the infraction and was assigned to a three-day
smoking clinic. T. L. 0., however, denied smoking in the
lavatory and declared that she "didn't smoke at all."
The vice-principal took T. L. 0. to a private office, closed
the door, and requested her purse. He opened the purse
and observed a package of cigarettes plainly visible. Saying
that T. L. 0. had lied to him, he reached into the purse to
remove the cigarettes and saw rolling papers, which in his

aLLuj ,;./.,. .1
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experience indicated that marihuana was probably involved.
He then looked further into the purse and discovered marihuana, marihuana paraohernalia, a number of one-dollar
bills, and index cards and papers containing language clearly
indicating drug dealing by T. L. 0.
The vice-principal notified T. L. O.'s parents. He also
summoned the police and gave them the marihuana and paraphernalia. In her mother's presence at police headquarters,
T. L. 0. was advised of her rights and admitted to selling
marihuana in school. T. L. 0. was suspended from school
for three days for smoking cigarettes in a nonsmoking area
and seven days for possessing marihuana. On T. L. O.'s motion in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, the latter suspension was set aside on the ground that the suspension resulted from evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. [T. L. 0.] v. Piscataway Board of Education,
No. C.286&-79 (Super. Ct. N.J., Ch. Div., Mar. 31, 1980).
The validity of that judgment is not before us.
T. L. 0. was also charged in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, Middlesex County, with delinquency based
on possession of marihuana with the intent to distribute.
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:4-44; 24:21-19(a)(1); 24:21-20(a)(4)
(West Supp. 1983). T. L. 0. moved to suppress the physical
evidence obtained in the search of her purse; she also sought
suppression of her confession on the ground that it was
tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. The juvenile court
denied T. L. O.'s motion to suppress. State in Interest of
T. L. 0., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 428 A. 2d 1327 (1980). The
court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to school
searches, but declared that
"a school official may properly conduct a search of a student's
person if the official has a reasonable suspicion that a crime
has been or is in the process of being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain

83-712-0PINION
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3

school discipline or enforce school policies." Id., at 341, 428
A. 2d, at 1333 (emphasis in original).
Applying this standard, the court concluded that the viceprincipal had reasonable cm . <:~e ~.o ;:Jelieve tl:Jat r!.' . .u. v. had
violated the school's smoking regu.~ations. Once he had
opened the purse, the court held, its contents were subject to
the plain-view doctrine; having found marihuana and paraphernalia, the vice-principal justifiably continued his search
to determine the extent ofT. L. O.'s criminal activity. I d.,
at 343, 428 A. 2d, at 1334.
A divided Appellate Division affirmed the denial of
T. L. O.'s suppression motion with respect to the contents of
the purse on the basis of the Juvenile Court's opinion, but vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether T. L. 0. had knowingly waived her constitutional rights before confessing.
State in Interest ofT. L. 0., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A. 2d
493 (1982) (per curiam). The Supreme Court of New Jersey
reversed the Appellate Division's judgment and directed that
the physical evidence be suppressed. State in Interest of
T. L. 0., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934 (1983). In response to
I the c~ot tion that the exclusionary rule, which was applied
to the tates in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), should
not g ern searches by school officials since its primary purpose is to deter violations of constitutional rights by law-enforcement officials, the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared that "the issue is settled by the decisions of the
[United States] Supreme Court" and "accept[ed] the proposition that if an official search violates constitutional rights, the
evidence is not admissible in criminal proceedings." 94
N.J., at 341, 463 A. 2d, at 939 (footnote omitted). 1
1
Although the court indicated that "[o]ur code of Juvenile Justice buttresses this conclusion," 94 N.J., at 342, n. 5, 463 A. 2d, at 939, n. 5, we
agree with the State that the decision below concerning the admissibility of
illegally obtained evidence in juvenile-delinquency proceedings does not
rest on adequate and independent state grounds. It bears mentioning

83-712-0PINION
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey then held that school
officials could conduct warrantless searches without violating
the "Fourth Amendment, a.11d that, in the absence of police
par'.,~dpatw.'l, suc>'h ::;.;d.rches should be assessed under a
standard less stringent than probable cause. Like the Juvenile Court, the SupreJ1!e Court was
"satisfied that when a school official has reasonable grounds
to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity
or activity that would interfere with school discipline and
order, the school official has the right to conduct a reasonable
search for such evidence." !d., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 941-942.
The court concluded, with two justices dissenting, that the
vice-principal's search could not pass muster under this
standard. The contents of the purse had no direct bearing
on T. L. O.'s infraction since mere possession of cigarettes
did not violate the school's rules, and a desire to gather evidence to impeach T. L. O.'s credibility could not justify the
search. In any event, the vice-principal had no reasonable
grounds to believe that T. L. O.'s purse contained cigarettes,
but rather was acting on, "at best, a good hunch." !d. at
347, 463 A. 2d, at 942.
We granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1983). State and federal courts have
disagreed on whether the Fourth Amendment applies to inschool searches and seizures by public-school officials and
teachers. 2 For present purposes, however, the State does
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied T. L. O.'s motion-filed
after this Court had granted a writ of certiorari-for clarification of its decision to make clear that it was based on state law. State in Interest of
T. L. 0., M-422 Q"an 17, 1984).
2
State and federal courts have struggled to accommodate the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment and the interest of the States in providing a safe environment conducive to education in the public schools.
Some courts have resolved the tension between these interests by giving
full force to one or the other side of the balance. Thus, in a number of
cases it has been held that school officials conducting in-school searches of
students are private parties acting in loco parentis who are not subject to

•
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not contest the holding that the Fourth Amendment protects
students like T. L. 0. from being unreasonably searched by
school principals or teachers, the standard of reasonableness
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., D. R. C. v. State,
646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In reG., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220
(1969); People v. Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (1970);
R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450
S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See also State v. Kappes, 26 Ariz.
App. 567, 550 P. 2d 121 (1976) (student advisers in dormitory search); State
v. Wingerd, 40 Ohio App. 2d 236, 318 N. E. 2d 866 (1974) (same); State v.
Keadle, 277 S. E. 2d 456 (N.C. App. 1981) (same). At least one court has
held, on the other hand, that the Fourth Amendment applies in full to inschool searches by school officials and that a search conducted without
probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.),
vacated, 423 U. S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976), and
others have made clear that the probable-cause standard applies where
there is police involvement, seeM. v. Board of Education Ball-Chatham
Community Unit School District No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill.
1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State
v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, - , 216 S. E. 2d 586, 594 (1975), or where the
search is highly intrusive. SeeM. M. v. Anker, 607 F. 2d 588, 589 (CA2
1979). Other courts have struck the balance by holding that the Fourth
Amendment applies, but that the exclusionary rule developed to remedy
violations of the Amendment does not. See, e. g., State v. Lamb, 137 Ga.
App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976); State v. Young, supra. See also United
States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (Maine 1969) (exclusionary rule would not
deter search by administrative officer at Job Corps Center).
The applicability of the exclusionary rule, however, is discussed in very
few of the cases, for most courts that have considered challenges by students to in-school searches or seizures by school officials have held that the
officials' activity did not violate the Fourth Amendment. But see In re
J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); People v. D., 34 N.Y.
2d 483, 358 N. Y.S. 2d 403, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974). These courts have
rejected the view that school officials conducting in-school searches act as
private individuals to which the Fourth Amendment does not apply.
E. g.,Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F. 2d 470,
480 (CA5 1982); Jones v. Latexo Independent School District, 499 F. Supp.
223, 229 (ED Tex. 1980); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 51 (NDNY
1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-1218 (ND Ill. 1976); State
v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976); People v. Ward, 62
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against which the state court held that school officials' conduct is to be judged, or the state court's conclusion that
T. L. O.'s purse had been searched contrary to the Fourth
Amendment. The sole ue:sdo:u pre&t!uGb.J. uy v•le petition is
whether the exclusiona rule shoul e app e so as o bar
e use in · enile-delin uenc rocee mgs o evidence that
has be_en_illegally seize-d by a school teacher 'thout...participation by law-enforcement officers. The State submits that
tlie ru e s ould not apply in such circumstances. We agree
with this submission and reverse the judgment of the New
Jersey Supreme Court. 3

+t

Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State,-- N. M. - - , 540
P. 2d 827 (1975); State v. Walker, 19 Or. App. 420, 528 P. 2d 113 (1974).
But they typically have held that school officials may act without a warrant, e. g., Bilbrey v. Brown, 481 F. Supp. 26, 27-28 (Or. 1979); In reG.,
11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970), and have relaxed the standard of suspicion necessary to justify in-school searches by school officials
acting without the participation of law-enforcement officials. E. g., Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, supra; Stern v. New Haven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31 (ED Mich. 1981); Jones v. Latexo
Independent School District, supra; Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012
(ND Ind. 1979); Bellnier v. Lund, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105
Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971);
State v. Young, supra; In re J. A., supra; People v. Ward, supra; People
v. D., supra; State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P. 2d 781 (1977); In
re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979). In assessing the
reasonableness of searches and seizures by school officials, the courts have
looked to such factors as: (1) whether the officials acted alone or in concert
with the police; (2) whether the search was undertaken to promote school
discipline or to facilitate criminal prosecution; (3) the nature and extent of
the search; (4) the child's age and disciplinary record; (5) the seriousness of
the problem to which the search was addressed; (6) whether the official
acted under exigent circumstances; and (7) the probative value and reliability of the evidence on the basis of which the search was undertaken. See
e. g., Bellnier v. Lund, supra; Doe v. State, supra; People v. D., supra; In
re L. L., supra; Schiff, The Emergence of Student Rights to Privacy
Under the Fourth Amendment, 34 Baylor L. Rev. 209, 213 (1982).
3
In United States v. Leon,-- U. S. - - (1984), and Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, - - U. S. - - (1984), we held that the exclusionary rule
should not be applied where, judged objectively, it cannot be said that offi-
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II

Since the Fourth Amendment "has never been interpreted
4-" ~r<'""~rii'" +~f' ~ .... t;r .... ~u~tion of illegally seized evidence in all
proceedings or against all persons," Stone v. Powell, 428
U. S. 465, 486 (1976), the State's concession that the viceprincipal's search of T. L. O.'s purse violated the Fourth
Amendment only begins the inquiry in this case. We have
repeatedly stressed that the Constitution itself does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, United States v. Leon, - - U. S. - - ,
- - (1984), and have emphasized that whether the judicially
created exclusionary rule is appropriately applied in a particular case or class of cases is "an issue separate and apart
from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of
the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police
conduct." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. - - , - - (1983).
The remedial question before us in this case, our decisions
make clear, must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of excluding from juvenile.:aelinquency proceedin s evidence illegal y o tame b a scho 1 official who sou ht to enforce sc oo 1sc1p mary rules and who acted without the
paftlcipabon o aw-enforcement authorities. See United
States v. Leon, supra, at - - ; United States v. Calandra,
414 U. S. 338, 347-352 (1974). The primary, if not the only,
justification for suppressing the fruits of illegal searches and
seizures is the belief that the imposition of that severe remedy will reduce the incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment and deter future illegality. United States v. Leon,
supra, at--; Stone v. Powell, supra, at 486; United States
cers should have known that they were violating the Fourth Amendment.
Here, as stated in the text, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the
vice-principal had "no reasonable grounds" to believe that T. L. O.'s purse
contained cigarettes. Hence, there is no occasion to vacate the judgment
of the New Jersey court and remand the case for reconsideration in light of
Leon and Sheppard.
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v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 446 (1976). Accordingly, in light of
the "substantial cost [imposed] on the societal interest in law
enforcement by ... [excluding] ... what concededly is
relevant evidence," United States v. JaMs, id., at 44~~:.,,
we have restricted "the application of the [exci.usionary] rule
... to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought
most efficaciously served." United States v. Calandra,
supra, at 348. Furthermore, in determining the applicabili~ of the exclusionary rule, we must be convinced that_an
Vappreciable deterrent effect has been shown. Speculative
benefits do not warrant the ''strong medicine" of the exclusionary rule. United States v. Janis, supra, at 453; United
States v. Calandra, supra, at 351-352.
On the strength of this balancing test, we have held that
the exclusionary rule does not apply in certain types of judicial proceedings, see United States v. Janis, supra; United
States v. Calandra, supra/ and does not prevent all possible
uses of illegally obtained evidence in proceedings to which it
is generally applicable. See, e. g., United States v. Havens,
446 U. S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62
(1964). We also have concluded that the rule constitutes an
inappropriate remedy for certain types of objectively reasonable errors by law-enforcement officers. United States v.
Leon, supra; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, - - U. S. - (1984).
We have not had occasion to consider the applicability of
this approach to evidence obtained in unlawful searches or
seizures conducted by state or federal governmental employees who do not work for law-enforcement agencies and who~e
4
Although this Court has never addressed the question whether the exclusionary rule applies in juvenile delinquency proceedings and we need
not do so to resolve this case, state courts that have considered the issue
have consistently held that the rule is applicable. E. g., In re K., 24 Cal.
3d 395, 595 P. 2d 105, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 973 (1979); In re J. A., 85 Ill.
App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); State v. Doe, 93 N. M. 143, 597 P. 2d
1183 (App. 1979); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App.
1979).

,.
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·ons do not fall within the realm of law enforcement.
We are now confronted with such a case: assuming that there
has been a Fourth Amendment violation-because the case
comes to us m C.C~." position-th~ t:tut..,don is whether the evidence seized from T. L. 0. by the vice-principal may be used
against T. L. 0. in her juvenile-delin uency proceedings.
In making this deternfination, tliere 1s no reason to epart
from the general pr~nciples that have emerged in cases decided over more than a decade. Guided by these principles,
we conclude that applying the exclusionary rule, in the context of juvenile-delinquency or criminal proceedings, to exclude the fruits of in-school searches and seizures, made without the participation of law-enforcement officers, 5 is unlikely
to "result in appreciable deterrence ... [and that] . . . its use
in the instant situation is unwarranted." United States v.
Janis, supra, at 454.
It goes without saying that a duty to exercise care in promoting the health and physical development of students and
to maintain order and discipline is inextricably tied to a
school's mission to educate. Although, as they were in this
case, school authorities may be required to report to the po- ?
lice what they perceive to be violations of the state or local
criminal law, these officials cannot generally be classified as
law-enforcement authorities. The unique relationship between schools and students gives rise to concerns that are
largely unrelated to desires to obtain criminal convictions or
adjudications of delinquency. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400
U. S. 309, 322-323 (1971). In-school searches ordinarily fur-

r

• There is no evidence in this record that the vice-principal searched
T. L. O.'s purse at the behest of or in cooperation with law-enforcement {_.A) W ~ ~
authorities. The latter's participation in this case began only after the sei0
~
zure had been made. The state agrees that suppression would be appro- w~ .&L . 'f-"priate if a school official had acted as an agent of the police. Brief for Peti- ~ fL ~
tioner, 16-17.
6
We emphasize that the propriety of that decision is not before us in this
~ t:..L ?
case and that our opinion is not intended to intimate any view concerning
'
whether the exclusionary rule applies in school disciplinary proceedings.

l

83-712-0PINION

10

~

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

ther purposes or interests entirely separate and distinct from
those served by the criminal-justice system; prohibiting the
use in the criminal-justice system of evidence obtained in
such se&•:cues may well have none of the behavioral effects on
either school officials or school boards that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions generally is
thought to have on the typical law-enforcement official.
Whether viewed from the perspective of individual school
officials or of school boards, "[t]he enforcement of school
regulations, the safeguarding of students during school hours
through confiscation of weapons and other contraband, and
the maintenance of a drug-free learning environment ,12rovide
substantial incentives to search that would not be lessened by
~ SUppressiOn of evillence at a subsequent delinquenc;y procee mg. tr:R. C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 252, 258 (Alaska App.
1982). School officials may search frequently enough to develop an understanding of state and federal constitutional
standards, and school boards may and should have bot~ th~ ..., ~0
incentive and the means o s e uch an un erstandip.g~) ~
But a persuasive case can be made for the propositwri that
local school officials are "primarily concerned with maintaining internal discipline rather than obtaining convictions," id.,
at 258, n. 10, and that the admissibility of the evidence in a
juvenile court or criminal proceeding is not a substantial concern to them and hence will not appreciabl control their con<\u>t. See, e. g., United ta es v. oles, 30
. upp. 99,
102-103 (1969); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 489-494, 216
S. E. 2d 586, 588-591 (1975).
It should also be recalled that, in reviewing the propriety
of the disciplinary sanction imposed on T. L. 0. by her
school, the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division,
at she Q1L no uspended from school on the basis of 3ee~. ~ol~
_ el
;..::------- the evidence seized from her purse';-a holding consistent with
the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision on the scope of i~~~
u
the Fourth Amendment in the case now under review. To ~~~Hu.
the extent that school officials may be deterred by the e~clu-

~~~~/
)r- G_.._L.) ~
w.;u
~.dt.
,..-.

~~--~

Ll'\..

u.J~fi.A
"'- ~.__!} ~
'#f--t:-1---!:;.. !_ ~ .
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sion of evidence, that result will be effected by forbidding the
use of the fruits of their searches in school disciplinary proceedings. lt is in those proceedings th~he acceptability of
school officials' conduct will, in effect, be
., and 1t is in
tneou come o t ose procee mgs t at they presumably are
most interested. As long as the Chancery Division's ruling
on T. L. O.'s suspension continues to govern the high
school-and particularly if it is or becomes the general rule in
New Jersey-illegal searches and seizures by school oficials
will be adequately deterred.
We are quite convinced that
also excluding the evidence from juvenile-delinquency proceedings, which fall "outside the offending [officials'] zone of
primary interest," United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 458,
would roduce only marginal deterrence, insufficient to justify the cost to law-enforcement efforts. Cf., id, at 453-454;
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 493-495; United States v.
Calandra, 414 U. S., at 350-352.
On the other hand, if in the long run, the Chancery Division's holding that forbids the ·use of illegally seized evidence
in school disciplinary proceedings does not retain its authority, we have substantial doubt that teachers and other officials will be appreciably restrained in the future by a decision
that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of probative
but illegally obtained evidence in juvenile-delinquency proceedings. In such circumstances, school authorities would
have little reason or incentive to forgo searches insofar as the
utility of the evidence in school disciplinary proceedings is
concerned. It may be that a teacher would be deterred from
searching by school rules and policies governing such
searches, violation of which may affect the assessment of his
performance by his superiors, or even result in charges being
filed against him. But if the evidence is admissible in inter-l
nal proceedings against the student, it seems unlikely that
suppressing the evidence in juvenile-delinquency or criminal
proceedings would produce the appreciable deterrent consequences necessary to outweigh society's interest in sanction-

1

J

·
r .cu,c~()

~~-D.J.-

~....Jl--f/'-

c._.._--
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ing crimes by students that unquestionably have been exposed by school officials, albeit by officials acting contrary to
the applicable constitutional, statutory, or administrative
rules g<'" l'11ino- the ~arf"~""n.f' of the tasks for which they
have been hired.
Assuming, as we do, that the vice-principal violated
T. L. O.'s Fourth Amendment rights, we do not hold that
she should not have a remed for this violation, but only that
e is not entitled to have the evidence suppresse m er juvem e- e mquency procee
· ary ru e 1s designeo to deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment,
particularly infringements on the rights of the innocent who,
without the rule, might be subjected to an unacceptable regime of unjustified searches. Under the rationale of the exclusionary rule as it has developed, T. L. 0. herself, about
whom reliable evidence has come to light showing that she
was illegally selling drugs to her classmates, has little entitlement to claim that the evidence should not be used against
her. The violation, if it occurred, has already been completed. The admission of the evidence against T. L. 0. is
not itself a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and excluding it would be a remedy designed not to benefit her, but to
forestall similar lawless invasions of the rights of others.
We do not leave T. L. 0., others like her, or wholly innocent persons without remedies to vindicate their Fourth
Amendment rights. T. L. 0. soug t judicial review of her
suspension and successfully urge that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violate
We assume that resort to
the courts will continue to be available to enforce any local,
state, or federal standards applicable to searches and seizures carried out by school authorities. Public-school teachers and administrators who know or should have known that
their conduct is contrary to the Fourth Amendment will also
be subject to liability under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and they may
be subject to action under state law as well. We do not,
however, discern any satisfactory predicate for excluding
0
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from state juvenile-delinquency or criminal proceedings the
product of in-school searches carried out by school authorities
without participation by law-enforcement personnel.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of New .J P.rsev iR ::\rcoroingly reversed.
So ordered.

j
lfp/ss 04/20/84
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On p. 10, I suggest a revision of language in
the middle paragraph, commencing with "School officials" as
follows:
"School officials may search frequently
enough to develop some understanding of the
importance and purpose of the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. It
cannot reasonably be expected, however, for
them to be familiar with the application by
the courts of the exclusionary rule. As the
cases decided at almost every Term of this
Court illustrate, this is not an area of the
law in which exactitude is a characteristic.
Local school officials properly are
'primarily concerned with maintaining internal discipline rather than obtaining convictions,' id., at 258, n. 10, and the admissibility oy-evidence in a juvenile court or
criminal proceedings is not a substantial
concern to them and hence is not likely appreciably to control their conduct."

. l

April 21, 1984
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83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O.
Dear Byron:
Thank you for the opportunity to take a look at
the proposed draft of your opinion in this case.
most part I think it is fine.
'·

For the

I am troubled by much of what

is said from the bottom of p. 10 to the end.
The opinion properly recognizes that a school
search may result - as this case did - in two types of Court
proceedings:

the review by the Superior Court of the sus-

pension of T.L.O. (disciplinary proceedings), and the delinquency prosecution in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court.

We are concerned here only with the latter.

You

commence the analysis (p. 7) by relying on decisions that
require a "weighing [of] the costs and benefits" of excluding illegally seized evidence obtained by a school official
' in enforcing school disciplinary rules.

As you note, the

only cost of not applying the exclusionary rule would be the
absence - to a limited extent - of deterrence.

Or as you

put it, applying the rule would be unlikely to result in
"appreciable deterrence".

I agree.

What troubles me is the portion of the draft that
commences with the last paragraph on page 10.

The argument

•'

.

2.

seems to be that the exclusionary rule applied in a delinquency

ca~e

would have little deterring effect because

school authorities have no
laws, and I aqree.
i~

for the criminal

respon~'bilitv

But you then imply that court deterrence

necessary to orotect Fourth

~endment

rights, ana i.denti-

fy with apparent approval several types of judicial action
that would constitute deterrence of a very different kind.
You refer to t e ruling of the Superior Court that

~.L.O.

could not properly be suspended on the basis of the search
of her purse, and also say:
"We as~urne that resort to the courts till
continue to be available to enforce anv
local, state or f~deral stand~rds applicable
to searches and seizures carrted out by
school authorities. Public school teachers
and admini!-'3trators • • • will also be subject
to liability under ~1983, and they rnay be
subject to action under state law as well."
(p. 12)

These remedies will be available, but as they are
not involved in this case I see no reason to address them.
The result of this portion of the opinion Cpp. 10-12), if I
read it correctly, could be to encourage recalcitrant and
rebellious students to resort to the courts.

Here, a 14-

year-old child - whose purse was searched - was found to be
a marijuana "pusher".

Yet, the Superior Court -on T.L.O.'s

petition - overruled the school authorities' imposition of
an extremely light disciplinary sentence.
I do not suggest that a 14-year-old in school has
no Fourth Amendment rights but I do think children in the

3.

school environment surrender a good deal of the expectation
of privacy we emphasize in our cases.

\'lith respect to re•

viewing disciplinary action, I think courts should be required - in applying Fourth Amendment rights - to take into
account the uniqueness of the school environment and partieularly the importance of leaving disciplinary measures primary to the school authorities.

On any cost/benefit analy-

sis, as I view it, deterring Fourth Amendment violations
weighs far less in the scales than leaving the school authorities with broad discretion to enforce disciplinary
rules that are
schools.

essential to the proper operation of the

The deterring influences I mentioned in Ingraham

v. Wright ar.e adequate.
Every recent study of the school discipline
problem emphasizes its seriousness.

It even affects the

recruiting of people into the teaching profession.

I saw an

article recently to the effect that the combination of low
salaries and the problem of maintaining discipline (including threats of violence and actual violence), have resulted
in public school teachers being drawn in large part from
persons who graduate in the bottom fourth of their college
classes.

They can't find jobs elsewhere.

Young people re-

sent being disciplined, and they will welcome any encouragement to overrule or sue their teachers.
We can avoid getting into a debate on this issue
by simply recognizing that the application of the Fourth

..

4.

Amendment in schonls is not before us.
of other remedies.

Nor is availab\lity
'}:I

-'<

'i-~

With thP one change in the paragraph tn the middle

..

of page 10 that ' I suggest in my memo attached to this letter,

I

~o~i.ll

be happy to 'join your ooini.on throuqh the second

paragraph on page 10.

Beyond that I would dissent .
Sincer.ely,

1•1.1:

Justice White

lfp/ss
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On p. 10, I suggest a revision of language in
the middle paragraph, commencing with "School officials" as
"

follows:
"Schoo] officials may search frequently
enough to develop some understanding of the
importance and purpose of the privacy intPrests protected by the Fourth Amendment. It
cannot reasonably be expected, however, for
them to be fami 1 i.ar w ;_th the appl icilt ion by
the courts of the exclusionary rule. As the
cases decided at almoRt every Term of thiR
Court illustrate, this is not an araa of thP
law in which exactitude is a ch~racteristic .
Local school officials properly are
'primarily concerned with maintaining internal discipline rather than obtaining convictions,' id., at 258, n. 10, and the admissibility oy-evidence in a juvenile court or
criminal procPe~inqR is not a substantial
concern to the~ and hence is not likely appreciably to control their conduct."
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Dear Byron:

I agree with the first nine pages of your
opinion, and with the holding that the exclusionary rule
does not apply in a juvenile delinquency or criminal
proceedings for the purpose of suppressing evidence
obtained in in-school searches.
The only issue before us is the one you decide,
namely, the applicability of the rule in a criminal
proceedings.

You rely properly on the unlikelihood that

enforcement of the rule would have any substantial
deterrent effect on school authorities.

They have no

responsiblity for enforcing the criminal law.

This is

made clear in the first nine pages of the opinion •

...r;

"...

2.

From about the middle of page 10) ~& tb9 eHd o ~
the opinion discusses the applicability of

~~~
the Fourth Amendment and the exclusion of evidence in a
.1\

school disciplinary} as distinguished from delinquency
proceedings.

You observe that to the

extent~

~

"school

officials may be deterred by the exclusion of evidence,
that result will be effected by forbidding use of the
.___./'

fruits of their searches in school disciplinary
proceedings." p. 11.
You refer to the ruling of the Superior Court
vacating T.L.O. 's seven-day suspension as an example of

~ ~~
the

deterrenc ~ that

your opinion seems to approve.

also say:
"We assume that resort to the courts will
continue to be available to enforce any local,

~£&--'
You

3.

state or federal standards applicable to
searches and seizures carried out by school
authorities.
Public school teachers and
administrators • • • will also be subject to
liability under §1983, and they may be subject
to action under state law as well." (p. 12)

These remedies may be available in appropriate
cases, but as they are not involved in this case I see no
reason to address them.

of the

opi~

I am concerned that this portion

will encourage rebellious students

to~

~

court review of disciplinary action

2r~ to

institute §1983

suit; !Here, a 14-year-old child - whose purse was searched
-was found to be a marijuana "pusher".

Yet, the Superior

&~::6;zzb >(Ab

Court - on her petition - overruled the school
authorities' imposition of an extremely light disciplinary
sentence.

I
I do not suggest that a 14-year-old has no

Fourth Amendment rights but I do think children in the

.·

4.

school environment surrender a good deal of the

~

u._J-~ ~ ~,~~M~-d

expectation of privac~ we em~Raoise i A ~~ ca~es.

With

-'

A

~

respect to reviewingl\disciplinary a~tion, il ~ ink~~o~~
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should be required - inj appl ~~ Fourth Amendment rights to take into account the uniqueness of the school
environment and particularly the importance of leaving
disciplinary measures primary to the school authorities.

~

On any cost/benefit analysis, as I view it, deterring
arguable Fourth Amendment violations weighs far less in
the scales than the importance of leaving the school
authorities with broad discretion to enforce disciplinary
rules that are

~oblem

"

essential - particularly in view of the

- to the proper operation of the schools.

The deterring influences of parents, P.T.A.s, and the
community (mentioned in Ingraham v. Wright) are adequate

l

•

~

5.

to prevent serious or frequent abuse of Fourth Amendment
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In the first full paragraph on page 10 you

~
A

suggest that school officials and school boards "may and

should have both the incentive and the means to foster •
~ an

."

understanding" of federal constitutional standards.

As a generality, this statement is unexceptional.

But the

implication is that school officials can and should become
familiar with the application by the courts of the
exclusionary rule.

~rI suppose such officials understand
-'\

generally that searches should not be conducted in the

~
absence of reasonable cause, but this is a standard that
even judges have difficulty applying.

And certainly

school officials cannot reasonably be expected to follow
and understand the numerous court decisions on the
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6.

exclusionary rule.

Consider, for example, the variety of

cases involving the rule before us at this Term.
In sum, Byron, the applicability of the
exclusionary rule in a criminal proceeding is the only
issue before the Court.

I would find it difficult to join

the portions of your opinion referred to above.
Sincerely,
Justice White
lfp/ss

....

-

,ju:pumt <!Jttnrl of tlrt ~tb ~tatt.s
~lfington. ~. <!J. 2Ll~~~
CHAMBERS OF

April 23, 1984

JusTicE sYRoN R . wH ITE

No. 83-712:

New Jersey v. T.L.O

Dear Lewis,
Thank

you

for

your

suggestions

that I am circulating today.

about

the

draft

I am reluctant to delete

the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 10 and
the two following paragraphs.
strongest arguments for
rule

in

T.L.O. 's

I think they contain the

not applying

juvenile

court

the exclusionary

proceedings.

They

neither decide nor imply that the Chancery Decision was
correct

in

applicable

holding
in

school

that

the

exclusionary

disciplinary

rule

proceedings.

is
That

question is not before us.
I could dispense with the penultimate paragraph if
that would help, but I hope to retain the prior three
~

paragraphs.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

'

~·

l

.iln:prmu <lf!tlttt "f tift ~ttittb ,iltatts
'JluJtinghtn. ~.<!f. 20,?~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

./

April 23, 1.984

Re:

83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron:
Although the Court has identified deterrence as
the primary rationale for the exclusionary rule, this
case suggests that more is at stake. we must also be
interested in providing an appropriate judicial
response to egregious due process violations, as well
as a concern for the example that is set by school
administrators. Perhaps my thoughts will not write
out, but I shall try my hand at a dissent that does not
confront you squarely on the deterrence rationale.
Respectfully,

Justice White
Copies to the Conference

.ilnpunu Clt411lrl ~f tlrt ~ttittb .ilhttt.tr
-.u.fringtou. ~. <If. 2ll,?'l'
CHAMBERS Of'

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 23, 1984

Re:

83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron:
Although the Court has identified deterrence as
the primary rationale for the exclusionary rule, this
case suggests that more is at stake. we must also be
interested in providing an appropriate judicial
response to egregious due process violations, as well
as a concern for the example that is set by school
administrators. Perhaps my thoughts will not write
out, but I shall try my hand at a dissent that does not
confront you squarely on the deterrence rationale.
Respectfully,

Justice White
Copies to the Conference

~tqtrtmt

Qf1tttrl af t4t ~~~ ~tait.tr

Jla.-ftingt.on, ~. Of.

2ll~'!~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 23, 1984

Re:

No. 83-712

New Jersey v. T.L. O.

Dear Byron,
For the present, I will await furt he r writing on
this case.
Sincerely,

Justice White
Copies to the Conference

..

lfp/ss 04/24/84

NJ3 SALLY-POW
83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron:

r~ioiuu, a~with
/

the holding that the exclusionary rule

does not apply in a juvenile delinquency or criminal
proceedings for the purpose of suppressing evidence
obtained in in-school searches.
The only issue before us is the one you decide,
namely, the applicability of the rule in a criminal

proceeding~

You rely properly on the unlikelihood that

enforcement of the rule

wou~ ~~tantial
WL.

deterrent effect on school authoritiesA Jhey have no
responsiblity for enforcing the criminal law.

This is

made clear in the first nine pages of the opinion.

2.

From about the middle of page 10, the opinion
discusses the applicability of the Fourth Amendment and

-1$1
the exclusion of evidence under the rule in afchool
disciplinary as distinguished from delinquency
proceedings.

You observe that to the extent "school

officials may be deterred by the exclusion of evidence,
that result will be effected by forbidding use of the
fruits of their searches in school disciplinary
proceedings." p. 11.
You refer to the ruling of the Superior Court
vacating T.L.O.'s seven-day suspension as an example of
the deterrence in disciplinary cases that your opinion
seems to approve.

You also say:

"We assume that resort to the courts will
continue to be available to enforce any local,

3.

state or federal standards applicable to
searches and seizures carried out by school
authorities. Public school teachers and
administrators • • • will also be subject to
liability under §1983, and they may be subject
to action under state law as well.n (p. 12)

These remedies may be available in appropriate
cases, but as they are not involved in this case I see no
reason to address them.

I am concerned that this portion

of the opinion will encourage rebellious students to seek
court review of disciplinary action and to institute §1983

--

------ -

------

Here, a 14-year-old child - whose purse was

searched -was found to be a marijuana npushern.

Yet, the

Superior Court - on her petition - found a Fourth
Amendment violation, and overruled the school authorities'
imposition of an extremely light disciplinary sentence.

-----

----·~--------------------·

---

I do not suggest that a 14-year-old has no

Fourth Amendment rights but I do think children in the

4.

~ ~= -.Jo ~ /'7~2> ~ ~ ~

tu~~

k>

~ ~

a..d~ .vu..~~

Wjo

~

-.1-u cJ.._ ~
1-w_ c._vD-J..c..L-..Jt; ~ ~ 19~3
school environment surrender a good deal of the ~..L>
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expectation of privacy that underlies Fourth Amendment
~

..reason ~.

U:~

With respect to

~ =5t'l~

reviewin~ school~~

into
account the uniqueness
particularly the
measures

environment and
leaving disciplinary

the school authorities.
On any cost/benefit analysis, as I view it,
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deterring arguable Fourth Amendment violations weighs far

~0

~~ less

in the scales than the importance of leaving the

school authorities with broad discretion to enforce
disciplinary rules that are

essential - particularly in

view of the pervasive drug problem - to the proper
operation of the schools.

The deterring influences of

5.

parents, P.T.A.s, and the community (mentioned in Ingraham
v. Wright) are adequate to prevent serious or frequent
abuse of Fourth Amendment rights.

The courts have enough

to do without overseeing every seven-day suspension of a
teenage drug pusher. 1
In the first full paragraph on page 10 you also
suggest that school officials and school boards "may and
should have both the incentive and the means to foster

..

• an understanding" of federal constitutional standards.
As a generality, this statement is unexceptional.

But the

implication is that school officials can and should become
familiar with the application by the courts of the

~

~

\

,..

1where evidence of pervasive drug use exists
in a school, I would not foreclose the right of school
authorities to screen every child entering the school. We
screen every person who enters the Courtroom.

6.

exclusionary rule.

I suppose most such officials

understand generally that searches should not be conducted
in the absence of reasonable cause, but this is a standard
that even judges have difficulty applying.

And certainly

school officials cannot reasonably be expected to follow
and understand the numerous court decisions on the
exclusionary rule.

Consider, for example, the variety of

cases involving the rule before us at this Term.
/

~.

In sum, Byron, the applicability of the
exclusionary rule in a criminal proceeding is the only
issue before the Court.

I would find it difficult to join

the portions of your opinion referred to above.
Sincerely,
Justice White
lfp/ss

lfp/ss 04/24/84

NJ4 SALLY-POW
83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron:
I

agree

with

the

first

nine

pages

of

your

opinion, and with the holding that the exclusionary rule
does

not

apply

in

for

proceeding

a

juvenile

the

purpose

delinquency
of

or

criminal

suppressing

evidence

obtained in in-school searches.
The only issue before us is the one you decide,
namely,

the

applicability

of

the

proceeding.

You

rely properly on

enforcement

of

the

rule

would

rule
the

in

a

criminal

unlikelihood

have

that

a.._,_, substantial
.Jle

deterrent effect on school authorities .. bQeattse f u y have
no responsiblity for enforcing the criminal law.

This is

made clear in the first nine pages of the opinion.
Much
unnecessary.
10,

the

of

subsequent

Beginning with

opinion

exclusionary

the

rule

the

discussion

seems

last paragraph on page
of

considers
to

roceedin s

the
as

distinguished from the
here.

The New Jerse

constitutional

g

unds

Superior Court excluded on federal
the

challenged

evidence

from

the

school disciplinary proceeding, thereby vacating T.L.O. 's

2.

seven-day suspension.
intimates no view as

Your note 6 states that the Court
to the propriety of

that decision.

It seems to me, however, that the subsequent discussion of
e:::... ~4#1.4-IU.,
the potential deterrent effect of such exelwo~on can be

1\

to

read

encourage

particularly

true

in

to

students

This

litigate.

view of your

statement on page

is
12

that "We assume that resort to the courts will continue to
be

available

to

enforce

any

federal

standards

applicable to searches and seizures carried out by school
authorities."
I also find
page

12

to

remedies.

c ~a~y

potential

unnecessary the reference on

§1983

and

unidentified

state

These remedies may be available in appropriate

cases, but as they are not involved in this case I see no
reason to
of

~ern.

the opinion

I am concerned that this portion

in particular will encourage students to

seek court review of disciplinary action and to institute
§1983 suits.
I

do

not

suggest

Fourth Amendment rights,
school

environment

expectation
reasoning.

of

but

that
I

surrender

privacy

that

a

14-year-old

has

no

do think children in the

a

good

underlies

deal
Fourth

of

the

Amendment

Courts should take into account the uniqueness

3.

of the school environment and particularly the importance
of

leaving

disciplinary

measures

primarily

to

the

applicability

school

authorities.

In
exclusionary

sum,
rule

Byron,
in

a

issue before the Court.

criminal

proceeding

is

of

the

the only

I therefore see little reason to

include the portion of your opinion I identify above, and
~
probably write separately.

j
1\

"\
Sincerely,
Justice White
lfp/ss

•
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CHAMI!IERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR .

April 24, 1984

83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron:
I agree with the first nine pages of your opinion,
and with the holding that the exclusionary rule does not
apply in a juvenile delinquency or criminal proceeding for
the purpose of suppressing evidence obtained in in-school
searches.
The only issue before us is the one you decide,
namely, the applicability of the rule in a criminal proceeding. You rely properly on the unlikelihood that enforcement
of the rule would have any · substantial deterrent effect on
school authorities. They have no responsiblity for enforcing the criminal law. This is made clear in the first nine
pages of the opinion.
Much of the subsequent discussion seems unnecessary. Beginning with the last paragraph on page 10, the
opinion considers the applicability of the exclusionary rule
to school disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from the
delinquency proceedings challenged here. The New Jersey
Superior Court excluded on federal constitutional grounds
the challenged evidence from the school disciplinary proceeding, thereby vacating T.L.O.'s seven-day suspension.
Your note 6 states that the Court intimates no view as to
the propriety of that decision. It seems to me, however,
that the subsequent discussion of the potential deterrent
effect of such a decision can be read to encourage students
to litigate. This is particularly true in view of your
statement on page 12 that "We assume that resort to the
courts will continue to be available to enforce any ••• federal standards applicable to searches and seizures carried
out by school authorities."
I also find unnecessary the reference on page 12 to
potential §1983 and unidentified state remedies. These remedies may be available in appropriate cases, but as they are
not involved in this case I see no reason to mention them.
I am concerned that this portion of the opinion in particular will encourage students to seek court review of disciplinary action and to institute §1983 suits.

,
f

!

2.

I do not suggest that a 14-year-old has no Fourth
Amendment rights, but I do think children in the school environment surrender a good deal of the expectation of privacy that underlies Fourth Amendment reasoning. Courts should
take into account the uniqueness of the school environment
and particularly the importance of leaving disciplinary
measures primarily to school authorities.
In sum, Byron, the applicability of the exclusionary rule in a criminal proceeding is the only issue before
the Court. I therefore see little reason to include the
portion of your op1n1on I identify above, and I probably
will write separately.
Sincerely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.:§u:p-rtmt C!fcu:rt cf tfrt ~tlt .:§hrltg

'JlagJrht.gt.ctt. :!9. (!f. 21l.;J'!.;t
CHAMBERS Or

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

April 24, 1984

Re:

No. 83-712-New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron:
I await further writing.
Sincerely,

~·
T.M.

Justice White
cc:

The Conference

---------------- ~

April 24, 1984

83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron:
I agree with the first nine pages of your opinion,
and with the holding that the exclusionary rule does not
apply in a juvenile delinquency or criminal proceeding for
the purpose of suppressing evidence obtained in in-school
searches.
~he only issue before us is the one you decide,
namely, the applicability of the rule in a criminal procP.eding. You rely propP.rly on the unlikeli.hood that enfor:c-=-ment
of the rule would have any subgtantial deterrent effect on
school authorities. They have no responsiblity for enforcing the criminal law. This is made clear in the first nine
pages of the opinion.

Much of the subsequent discussion seems unnecessary. Beginning with the last paragraph on page 10, the
opinion considers the applicability of the exclusionary rule
to school disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from the
delinquency proceedings challenged here. The New Jersey
Superior Court excluded on fedP.ral constitutional grounds
the challenged evidence from the school disciplinary proceeding, thereby vacating T.L.O.'s seven-day suspension.
Your note 6 states that the Court intimates no view as to
the propriety of that decision. It seems to me, however, ~\
that the subsequent discussion of the potential deterrent
effect of such a decision can be read to encourage students
to litigate. This is particularly true in view of your
statement on page 12 that "We assume that resort to the
courts will continue to be available to enforce any ••• federal standards applicable to searches and seizures carried
out by school authorities.•
I also find unnecessary the ref~rence on page 12 to
potential §1983 and unidentified state remedies. These remedies may be available in appropriate cases, but as they are
not involved in this case I see no reason to mention them.
I am concerned that this portion of the opinion in particular will encourage students to seek court review of disciplinary action and to institute Sl983 suits.

2.

I do not suggest that a 14-year-old has no Fourth
Amendment rights, but I do think children in the school environment surrender a good deal of the expectation of privacy that underlies Fourth Amendment reasoning. Courts should
take into account the uniqueness of the school environment
and particularly the importance of leaving disciplinary
measures primarily to school authorities.
In sum, Byron, the applicability of the exclusionary rule in a criminal proceeding is the only issue before
the Court. I therefore see little reason to include the
portion of your opinion I identify above, and I probably
will write s~~arately.
Sincerely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 30, 1984
Re:

No, 83-712

New Jersey v. T.L,G.

Dear Byron:
Please join me.

Sincerely'., /

Justice White
cc:

The Conference

.SttpTtntt aftturlttf

tlrt Jni±~ .Sta!tg

~~.~·Of· zn~~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

April 30, 1984

Re:

83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Lewis,
In response to your letter of April 24, it seems
to me that the paragraph beginning at the bottom of
page 10 and the following paragraph are relevant and
persuasive in negating a deterrence justification for
applying the exclusionary rule to juvenile court or
criminal proceedings.
The paragraph following those
two does not seem to me to be subject to the objections
you state in your letter.
These three paragraphs I
would hope to retain. The penultim&te paragraph of the 1
draft, however, I would be quite willing to delete.
_J
The draft was of course written against the
background of the present law, or lack thereof,
relating to the pertinence of the exclusionary rule to
civil
proceedings.
If
INS
v.
Lopez-Mendoza
is
announced before T.L.O. is finally acted upon by the
Court, and if Lopez-Mendoza rules that the exclusionary
rule never applies in civil cases, the two paragraphs
in the T.L.O. draft discussing school disciplinary
proceedings would be changed to reflect the newly
announced constitutional ruling.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
cpm
'
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School drug tests
Arkansas policy challenged
Two youths met their deaths in a
drug-related automobile accident on a
snowy night two years ago in
Arkadelphia, Ark. Another time, a shotgun blinded one of three men who were
illegally growing marijuana. Suddenly,
Arkadelphians knew their quiet town of
10,000 was not immune from the hazards
of drug and alcohol abuse.
That's when school officials decided
to get tough. The school board adopted
a policy that calls for students in grades
5 through 12 who are suspected of using
drugs and alcohol to take breath and
urine tests. Students who say they have
been falsely accused can take a lie
detector test to clear their names.
This hardline policy and a similar one
established last fall in nearby Hope have
been challenged by some parents and
the American Civil Liberties Union.
ACLU officials, who filed a lawsuit in
federal court in February on behalf of
parents who challenge the Arkadelphia
policy, maintain that the policy violates
the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. (Patsy Ezell v. James
Ford, 84-6033).
"Students do have Fourth Amendment rights," said Sandra Kurjiaka,
executive director of the ACLU in Little
Rock. "We see clear constitutional violations." The policy may also violate due
process rights, she added.
But school officials say they have no
intention of violating students' rights.
"We hope it will be a deterrent and serve
to caution students that drugs and alcohol are not accepted in school," said
Dale Franks, superintendent of the
3, 100-student Hope district. Since the
Hope school board approved the policy
in November, no students have been
asked to take the tests. Parents have
generally been supportive.
In the Arkadelphia district, urine and
breath tests have been given to 16 students since the policy began in the
1982-83 school year, said James Ford,
the superintendent. The results indicated
that nine students h~d taken illegal substances. Students found to possess or
use alcohol and drugs must withdraw
from school for a semester and lose all
credits, or else be expelled . Repeated
violations bring stronger penalties.
The police and sheriff's departments,
the prosecuting attorney, municipal
judge, civic organizations and parents
36

American Bar Association

"I know drugs in school are a problem ... but this is ridiculous."

were asked for input , Ford said, and law
enforcement officials had no problem
with the idea. Parents are asked to sign a
copy of the policy to show that they
have read it and are aware of it.
"The school attorney said ... [the
testing] was a risk, but it depended on
how the plan was implemented," Ford
said. Urine samples are sent to a laboratory and police officers administer the
breath tests , he added.
"We may have to go to court," Ford
said, "but if we're going too far, our kids
are worth protecting."

Clean out your lockers: Arkadelphia
Deputy Don Nix shows Ben, a drugsniffing dog, to parents and students.

is police report success in
ld program of videotaping
victims of child abuse:
st a case, and no child
the defense to testify.
Last year v
ing was used in 75
ants pleaded
cases, and about
saw the interguilty as soon as
doesn't plead
views . If a defend
in court.
guilty, the tapes are
interviewed in
The young victims
a setting like a living
m. They are
dolls with
given anatomically cor
ult. This
which to describe the a
spares the children the trau
traditional interrogation,
Dowson said.
Loren Goldman of the In
Association of Chiefs of Po ice
sure about another use of Vl• l'IPn,T<IT""
evidence in drunk driving cases,
that some people don't look drunk
when breath tests show high blood-a!
hoi levels.
Some California police departments
have stopped the taping, in part because
juries were confused when the tapes
seemed to contradict breath tests. On
the other hand, a new Texas law
requires most counties to buy videotape
equipment for use in drunk driving
cases.
-Sta./freport

err 05/09/84
May 9, 1984

RE: No. 83-712, New Jersey v. T.L.O.

TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Cammie

Here

is

a

rough

draft of

this what you had in mind?

a

concur renee

in T. L. 0.

Is

The New Jersey Superior Court's deci-

sion to apply the exclusionary rule to school disciplinary proceedings was based on federal law and thus could not be dismissed
I think that the Court

as merely a peculiar rule of state law.
makes clear in n.
sion.

6, page 10 that it is not endorsing this deci-

Thus, the Court may be criticized for discussing the issue

only on the grounds that the discussion is unnecessary and may
unnecessarily prejudge an issue that is not before the Court.
As Justice White mentioned

v.

Lopez-Mendoza,

No.

83-491

in his letter to you, if INS

(the exclusionary rule/deportation

hearing case), holds that the exclusionary rule is never applicable to civil proceedings, the Court's opinion should be revised.
This probably means that Justice White would eliminate the paragraph on pp. 10-11 to which you object.
currence unnecessary.

This would make a con-

This assumes of course that Lopez-Mendoza

will come down before T.L.O.

. ., .. 1·:.
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CHAMISE:RS 01'"

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

May 15, 1984

83-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron:
At last, I now have had an opportunity to get back
to this case.
In your letter of April 10, circulated to the Conference, you suggested your willingness to eliminate the
penultimate paragraph. This helps me. I continue to think,
however, that a good deal of what you have said on pages 10
and 11 is unnecessary, and carries implications with which I
would find it difficult to agree.
Accordingly, I am circulating a brief opinion that
concurs in your opinion with the exception of your discussion of the deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary
rule in a school disciplinary case.
Sincerely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

•·t

May 15, 1984
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Dear Byron:

·ft

At last,
to this case.

I

.jhn-

now have had an opportunity to get back

In your letter of April 10, circulated to the Conference, you suggested your willingness to eliminate the
penultimate paragraph. This helps me. I continue to think,
however, that a good deal of what you have said on pages 10
and 11 is unnecessary, and carries implications with which I
would find it difficult to agree.
Accordingly, I am circulating a brief opinion that
in your opinion with the excepti~ of your discussion of the deterrent effect orapplying the exclusionary
rule in a school dlscie!iE~ry case •

c~

..---

..

·"
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Sincerely,

,.

Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMI!!IERS OF"

May 22, 1984

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron:
I join. I may add a couple of words (well chosen
of course) about turning the management of the schools
over to the students. Then again, I may restrain myself
to cut the flow of needless "concurs."

Justice White
Copies to the Conference

.inprtmt Qfttnrl ttf tfrt ~lt .§hdtg
Jfa,g~ ~. (!}. 2!lc?~~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE

w...

J. BRENNAN, JR.

June 4,

No. 83-712
New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear John,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

1984 ~
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20~,.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 11, 1984

No. 83-712

New Jersey v. T. L.

o.

Dear Byron,
As you know, at Conference I had indicated I
thought the exclusionary rule was applicable to the evidence
in this case. I am still of that view. I will not be
joining John's dissent and will try to circulate something
separately as promptly as possible.
Sincerely,

Justice White

Copies to the Conference

Q}LTU:rl d tfrt ~ittb ;§fattg
'~lbtgitUtghtn. ~. <!}. 2.0~)1.~

.§upt".ttttt

I

CHAMBERS OF"

..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 12, 1984

Re:

83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Sandra:
Please join me in your separate dissent.
Respectfully,

9~
Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

;§upr.-nu <!Jourt ttf Ur.- ~~;§taUs
'masfringfttn:. ~. <!J. 2llgi'!~
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 12, 1984

Re:

No. 83-712-New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear John:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

,.

The Conference

;§u.prtmt <!fcutt cf tqt 1J!nittb j)taftg
~ttillfht.gion.

tJJ. <!f.

20,?'!$

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 13, · 1994

Memorandum to the Conference
Re:

No. 83-712, New Jersey v. T.L.O.

My vote is the last one out in this difficult case.
This is of no consequence, however, because the several
opinions cite Leon, Sheppard, and Lopez-Mandoza, which are
not yet out.
It looks as though none of the circulating opinions
will command a Court. Sandra correctly points out that the
difficulty with the case is that New Jersey has not challenged its Supreme Court's ruling that the search here was
unreasonable.
Thus, the case comes to us in a disjointed
posture.
After some soul-searching, I have concluded to vote to
DIG the case.
I realize that this is not the usual DIG
situation when, after oral argument, the case appears in a
different light.
It seems to me, however, that our disposition otherwise will tend only to confuse and not to assist.
Perhaps this could be discussed at the conference on
Thursday.
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CHAMIS!:RS 0,.

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 14, 1984

Re:

83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Harry,
My circulating draft in this case expresses the
conference vote, but without your join, it will not
fly.
You suggest a DIG and there are 4 votes to
affirm.
I suggest that in the light of Leon, neither
disposition is the preferable one and that the case
should be held for Leon and then GVR'D.
The trial court in this case admitted the evidence
after canvassing the disparate decisions around the
country with respect to the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment
to
school
officials.
There
was
no
authoritative New Jersey precedent until the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in this case, and I have
substantial doubt that the school official should have
known that his conduct was in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
The state did not challenge the holding of
a Fourth Amendment violation, but it does contend that
the evidence is nevertheless admissible.
Leon has a
direct bearing on that issue and I doubt that the case
should be affirmed or DIG'D rather than GVR'D.
Sincerely yours,

/1vV"J
Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 26, 1984

No. 83-712

New Jersey v. T. L.

o.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
After conferring with Byron, the proposed order
for reargument in this case is set forth below:
"This case is restored to the calendar
for reargument. In addition to the question
presented in the petition for writ of
certiora ri and previously briefed and argued,
the parties a re requested to address the
following qu est ion:
Did the assistant principal violate the
Fourth Amendment in opening
respondent's purse in the facts and
circumstances of this case?"
Your suggestions are welcome.
Sincerely,

~u:prtntt
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 83-712. - New Jersey

June 29, 1984

v~

T.L.O.

Dear John:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

cJJt1
. .
T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE

w ...

.J . BRENNAN, .JR.

July 2, 1984

No. 83-712
New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear John,
Please add me to your dissent.
Sincerely,
./

··c

j ,_--.:

1

i

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMI!I£RS 0,..

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

July 2, 1984

Re:

/

83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear John:
I am puzzled by your June 29 draft "dissent" supplanting your
dissent of June 14.
Are you really dissenting against the Court's vote to reargue
this case?
Will that forever foreclose you from voting to reargue a case?
. reargument?
Or only from cases that do not·' rner1t

,,

Regards,

~0
Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

-

September 25, 1984

Lee

No. 83-712, State of New Jersey v. T.L.O.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did

the

opening

assistant

principal

T.L.O. 's purse

case?

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

...

,,

in

the

violate
facts

the

Fourth

Amendment

and circumstances of

in
this

2.

On the morning of March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway
High

School

entered

fourteen-year-old,

the

girls'

restroom

and

found

T.L.O.,

a

and another g ir 1 holding lighted cigarettes.

Because school regulations prohibited smoking in the restrooms,
the

teacher

took

the

Theodore Choplick,

two

girls

she had been smoking,
T.L.O.,

the

principal's

office.

the assistant principal, asked the two girls

whether they had been smoking.

clinic.

to

T.L.O.'s companion admitted that

and Choplick assigned her to a three-day

however,

denied the teacher's allegations.

In

fact, T.L.O. claimed that she did not smoke at all.
Following

T.L.O. 's

Choplick into his office.

denial

of

guilt,

she

accompanied

Inside the office, Choplick asked to

see T.L.O.'s purse, and she gave it to him.

When the assistant

principal opened the purse, a package of Marlboro cigarettes was
Choplick

visible.
said,
the

took

"You lied to me."
purse,

Choplick

the

cigarettes

out

of

the

purse,

and

After the cigarettes were removed from

could

see

a

package

of

rolling

papers.

Because Choplick knew that the rolling papers probably were used
for

_____

smoking

........__
examine

all

marijuana,

of

its

he

decided

contents .

to

Inside

search
the

the

purse,

purse
the

and

to

assitant

principal found marijuana, a metal pipe, written documentation of
T.L.O.'s sale of marijuana to other students, and forty dollars
in cash.
Choplick

--

police.

T.L.O.

immediately
was

then

called

taken

to

T.L.O.

·~

police

mother

-and

the

headquarters

for

questioning.

The fourteen-year-old

admitted to the police that

she

selling mari 'uana at

school,

had

been

receiving

$1.00 per

...

3.

She

"joint."

stated

that

she

had

sold

about

twenty

joints

shortly before she was discovered smoking in the rest room.
T.L.O.
the

intent

to

wasv charged
distribute

§§24:21-19(a) (1)

with possession of

it,

in

violation

and 24:21-20(a) (4).

of

marijuana with
N.J.

Stat.

Ann.

At her trial, T.L.O. moved

to ,-....suppress the evidence taken from her purse, claiming that it
had been seized in violation of her fourth amendment rights.

The

fourteen year old student also contended that her confession was
inadmissible

because

----

it

was

"tainted"

by

-------------------------- -----search and seizure.

--------

II. The

Dec~
· ions

I

Th
County,

the

unconstitutional

~---------'

Below

Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for Middlesex

New

Jersey,

denied

T.L.O. 's

motion

to

suppress.

The

juvenile court stated that a search by a teacher, if it is based
upon "reasonable suspicion," does not violate a student's fourth
amendment

rights.

that T.L.O.
therefore

had

had been smoking

was

justified
The

cigarettes.
following

Choplick

the

rolling

removal

of

in

"reasonable

to

believe

in violation of school rules,

and

opening

for

papers,
the

cause"

her

which

purse
were

cigarettes,

to

in

gave

look

"plain
the

view"

assistant

principal reasonable cause to continue his search of the purse.
Following

-----

was

tried

and

probation

for

observe

a

the denial of the suppression motion,

found

She was sentenced to

to be a delinquent.

--------------------------one year, with the special

reasonale

curfew,

attend

.

conditions

school

successfully complete a drug therapy program.

'

T.L.O.

that

regularly,

she
and

~ ?rfS/~t- ltaLil J~ 4.

~''--:z_,~ 2.-V

~?<--~~~~~

The

Appellate

Division

of

/

the

Superior

Court

of

New

Jersey affirmed the denial of T.L.O. 's motion to suppress.

_M; • •

'~

~

The

~

case

was

remanded

proceedings.

The

to

the

trial

court,

juvenile

court

was

for

however,

instructed

to

further

determine

~,

:;

.

I

I~

whether T.L.O. had knowingly waived her Miranda rights.

~·'

T.L.O. appealed the denial of her suppression motion to
the

Supreme

reversed,

Court

holding

of

New

Jersey.

The

state

that

the

assistant

principal

supreme
had

court

seized

the

evidence in violation of T.L.O. 's fourth amendment rights.
"probable
....._

cause"

when the teacher

standard

is

inappropriate

for

school

The

searches ..__---

is not acting in concert with police officers.

A school official therefore may conduct a search whenever he has
"reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence
of illegal activity or activity that would interfere with school
discipline."

• .f

Choplick

~ purse.

~

1r

did

The

state

not ~ e

supreme
"reasonable

found,

grounds"

for

however,

that

searching

the

According to the majority, Choplick had, at best, a "good

hunch" that the purse contained cigarettes.

~
fourth
amendment
rights
1
~r· ipal opened her purse
..:

~-

court

were

violated

Therefore, T.L.O. 's

when

the

assistant

to search for cigarettes •

The state supreme court held that because the evidence

d been seized in violation of T.L.O. 's fourth amendment rights,
1t should have been excluded at trial pursuant to Mapp v. Ohio,

u.s.

643

(1961).

suppress

the

evidence

367

The court stated that it was necessary to
in

order

to

students' fourth amendment rights.
was

"of

little

comfort"

to

T.L.O.

deter

future

violations

of

According to the majority, it
that

the

evidence

had

been

5.

seized by a school administrator
officer.

Therefore,

illegally

seized

the

rather

court

evidence

than a

ordered

from

any

the

future

law enforcement

exclusion

of

proceedings

the

against

T.L.O. in juvenile court.
Judge Schreiber dissented from the court's holding that
T.L.O. 's

fourth

amendment

He stated

rights had been violated.

that he did not know whether the majority's "reasonable grounds
to

believe"

standard.

standard

differed

from

the

"reasonable

If there was a functional difference,

the dissenting

judge preferred the "reasonable suspicion" standard,
been

"applied

by

the

Supreme

Court."

In

suspicion"

any

for

it has

event,

Judge

Schreiber found that the search was proper under either test.
On October

7,

1983,

the

State of

petition for certiorari with this Court.
review of the finding
been

violated.

New

Jersey

filed

a

The state did not seek

that T.L.O. 's fourth amendment rights

Instead,

the

state

only

challenged

applicability of the exclusionary rule to searches conducted by

-----------------------officials.
The Court

school

granted

cert.,

and

the

case was

argued on March 28, 1984.

On July 5, 1984,

the Court restored

the

for

The

case

to

the

calender

reargument.

Court's

order

stated that the parties were to brief and argue the following the
question:

"Did

Amendment

in

the
opening

assistant

principal

respondent's

purse

violate
in

the

the

Fourth

facts

and

circumstances of this case?"
DISCUSSION

..,

6.

I.

The

Applicability

of

the

Fourth

Amendment

to

Searches

by

Teachers
The

state contends

that

the fourth

amendment does not

apply to searches by teachers and school officials.
clearly

intended

for

the

amendment

to

The Framers

apply

only

investigations conducted by law enforcement officers.
or

school

official

has

no

greater

to

A teacher

responsibility

for

the

detection of penal law violations than does an ordinary citizen.
A school

search

is ordinarily conducted

solely to protect

health of the students and to facilitate discipline.

the

Therefore,

according to the state, the fourth amendment should not apply to
searches by school officials such as Choplick, at least when they
are not acting in cooperation with the police.
The state's argument might have some force if the Court
In the past, however, the Court

were writing on a clean slate.

consistently has refused to limit the applicability of the fourth
~

A..

-

......,________

'-'
amendment to 'Llaw enforcement officers.

Court of San Francisco, 387
the

fourth

amendment

u.s.

provides

searches b~ous~~~ i ~~

In Camara v.

523 (1967), the Court held that
protection

u.s.

Barlow's,

Inc.,

v. Tyler, 436

u.s.

the

in

contrary

(1984),

did

u.s.

436

not

warrantless

~uilding

inspectors ]

541 (1967), lOSHA inspectors J Marshall v.
307

(1978),

and l firefi~_hters

499 (1978).

the

briefs,

hold

the

searches by prison guards.

'<

against

Subsequently the Court held that

the fourth amendment applies to searches by
See v. Seattle, 387

Municipal

Hudson
fourth
The

v.
inapplicable

to

7.

prisoner does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
ce11. 1

The state further argues that the fourth amendment has
no

applicability

to

argument must fail,
students

do

not

schoolhouse -:ate.

searches
however,

"shed

for

u.s.

in

the

503

Des Moines
(1969).

-

forbidden conduct would

the

Community

In Tinker, three students

were suspended because they wore black armbands to protest
involvement in Viet Nam.

that

at

rights

---------------Independent

v.

This

schools.

the Court has recognized

constitutional

their

'~nker

School District, 393

conducted

u.s.

Because there was no showing that the
"materially and substantially interfere

with the requirements of appropriate discipline," the
that

the

rights.

suspensions

school

disciplinary

fourteenth
the

v.

the

students'

Lopez,

419

first

u.s.

565

amendment
(1975),

the

that the Due Process Clause protected students from

Court noted

in

in ~oss

Similarly,

Court held

violated

that

action

the

without

"informal give

notice
and

and
take"

a

hearing.

The

required by the

amendment would not unduly interfere with discipline

schools.

It

would

not

"materially

and

substantially

interfere with the the requirements of appropriate discipline" to
hold

that

the

fourth

least to some extent.

amendment applies

to school

searches,

at

Therefore, as in Tinker and Goss, there is

no reason to deprive schoolchildren of their constitutional right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 2

1 The fourth amendment still applies to searches that implicate
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

T~

8.

There

are

at

least

two

other

reasons

why

this

Court

should hold that the fourth amendment applies to school searches,
at least to some extent.
decisions
privacy.

documenting

First, there are a number of reported

extreme

In Bellnier v.

Lund,

invasions
438 F.Supp.

of
47

schoolchildren's
(N.D.N.Y.

1977},

for example, an entire fifth grade class was strip-searched after
one student told the teacher that three dollars were missing from
his

coat

pocket.

interpreted

so as

The

fourth

amendment

probably

should

be

to prohibit school officials from conducting

such outrageous searches.

Furthermore, this Court has recognized

161---r

~~

1

that if students are denied all constitutional protections, they

~· may

"discount

platitudes."
319

u.s.

important

principles

of

our

government

as

mere

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,

624 (1943}.
In summary, the fourth amendment should apply to school

searches, at least to some extent.
~~--------------~

II. The Proper Standard: Probable Cause or Reasonable Suspicion

"legitimate" privacy interests, such as body cavity searches.
2 The eighth amendment's prohibition of cru~and unusal
punishment does not apply to the schools.
Ingraham v. Wright,
430 u.s. 651 (1977}. This does not suggest, however, that the
fourth amendment should have no applicability to school searches.
The eighth amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." The Ingraham Court noted that bail,
fines, and punishment traditionally have been associated with the
criminal process.
Therefore, the Court was unwilling to extend
the eighth amendment beyond the criminal context. The fourth
amendment contains no such limiting language, as it protects all
"people" from unreasonable searches and seizures.

9.

Ordinarily, a search or seizure is "unreasonable" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment, in the absence of "probable
In a

cause."

the public
sec5_!,ty,

number of cases,

interest against
and concluded

the

that a

u.s.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392

however,

the Court has balanced

individual's right
lesser standard

to personal

is appropriate.

1 (1969), for example, the Court held

that when a policeman has "reason to believe" that he is dealing
with an armed and dangerous individual, he may conduct a limited
"pat-down"

search

~gnoni-Ponce,

for

weapons.

u.s.

422

873

Similarly,

(1975),

in United States v.

the Court found

that if a

border patrolman has a "reasonable suspicion" that a car contains
illegal aliens, he may stop the car and ask a few questions of
its occupants.
In deciding whether a school search may be justified on
the basis of "reasonable suspicion," the Court must examine the
"public need" for a departure from the "probable cause" standard.
It appears that there is a substantial need for a lower standard
in the schools.
half

million

In each month of 1978, approximately two and a

students

had

their

personal

property

about 300,000 others were physically attacked.
of

Education,

1

Violent

Schools-Safe

Schools:

NIE,
The

Study Report to the Congress iii, 74-75 (1978).

stolen,
U.S.
Safe

and

Dept.
School

Moreover, there

is a well-documented drug problem in the public schools, and many
teachers

have

classroom.
easier

a

difficult

Teachers

and

to maintain order

students

from drugs

and

time

school
in

maintaining
officials

the classroom,

violence,

if

they

order

will
and
are

find

in
it

the
much

to protect the
able

to conduct

10.

searches

on

the

basis

of

"reasonable

suspicion."

Therefore,

there appears to be a substantial public need for a standard less
demanding than "probable cause."
The application of the
to

school

searches

public need.

cannot

be

"reasonable suspicion"
justified

soley on

the

standard
basis of

The Court must balance this public need against the

"individual's

right

Brignoni-Ponce,

to

personal

u.s.

422

at

where the Court has found

security."

878.

In

United

this case,

States

v.

unlike others

that a departure from probable cause

? ?

was warranted, there are substantial privacy interests at stake. 3
In Terry,
weapons.
873

the Court approved of a limited "pat-down" search for
Similarly, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422

(1975),

"modest."

the Court stressed that the

u.s.

intrusion involved was

The border patrolmen were not allowed

to search the

vehicle or its occupants, and the visual inspection was limited
to

those

standing

parts

of

the

alongside.

unprecedented

to

allow

vehicle

that

Therefore,
a

full

could
it

be

would

search 4

on

seen

by

anyone

be

virtually

the

basis

of

3 A five-year-old public kindergarten student might not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his person or effects. I
find it difficult to believe, however, that a fourteen-year-old,
such as T.L.O., does not have an expectation of privacy in her
person and effects, that society is willing to recognize as
reasonable.
See Katz v. United States, 389 u.s. 347 (1967).
4 There are at least two situations in which full searches of a
person are allowed, even in the absence of "reasonable
suspicion." Anyone may be searched as he crosses the border, and
a person may be searched immediately following his arrest. The
.Jborder search exception" has been justified as necessary to our
~"national self-protection."
Carrol v. United States, 267 u.s.
132 (1925). The "search incident to arrest" exception is needed
Footnote continued on next page.

?

11.

"reasonable suspicion." 5
Although the balancing mandated by Terry and BrignoniPonce

is

probable

inconclusive,
cause

standard

There

searches.

it

is

a

is

appears

that

justified

"commonality

a

in

of

departure
the

case

interest"

from
of

the

school

between

the

public school teacher and the student.

Goss v. Lopez,

419 u.s.

565, 593 (1975) (Powell,J., dissenting).

Because the relationship

is "rarely adversary in nature," schoolchildren do not need the
same protection
fourth
the

from arbitrary and

intrusive searches that the
Moreover,

amendment usually provides.

public

school

significant

and

safeguards

LA"""~~.

students. ·;\~ re,
teacher

may

its

search

supervision by

against"

this

Court

his

student

of

T.L.O. 's

the

the community afford
searches

unreasonable
probably
on

the

"openness of

should

basis

hold

of

that

a

of

"reasonable

Upon

"Reasonable

suspicion." 6

III.

Was

the

Search

Purse

Based

Suspicion"?
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the assistant

to protect the arresting officer and to avoid the destruction of
contraband. See United States v. Robinson, 414 u.s. 218 (1973).
5 Noone has suggested that strip searches should be allowed on
the basis of "reasonable suspicion."
6 The majority of federal and state courts to consider the issue ~~
have held that a teacher may search a student in the absence of
probable cause. These courts have required that the teacher h~ve
"reasonable cause" or "reasonable suspicion." See, e.g., Horton
v. Goose Creek Ind. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 s.ct. 3536 (1983).

12.

principal had no more than a "good hunch" that cigarettes were in
T.L.O. 's purse.
to

open

the

It is clear, however,
purse

was

justified

that Choplick's decision

by

~

suspicion." a.,.c.J~

"reasonable

1..-<....

Choplick was "aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant[ed]
suspicion" that cigarettes were in the purse.
v.

Brignoni-Ponce,

suggestion

that

u.s.

422

the

cigarettes

infraction" is ridiculous.
all,

and

The

the

fourth

873,

assistant

amendment

884

See United States

(1975).

"had

no

The state court's

direct

bearing

on

the

T.L.O. had denied that she smoked at

principal was

clearly

does

testing

not

her

credibility.

prohibit

a

search

for

probative evidence, simply because it is not dispostive.
Given

that

the

assistant principal's decision

to open

the purse was reasonable, his "seizure" of the cigarettes did not
T.L.O. 's

violate

amendment

fourth

Although

rights.

the

possession of cigarettes was not prohibited by school rules,
teacher

had

Therefore,
the

seen

T.L.O.

confiscation of

cigarettes were

view.

smoking

in

a

non-designated

the cigarettes was

removed,

the

area.

justified.

rolling papers were

a

Once

in plain

The rolling papers gave Choplick "reason to believe" that

there

might

Hence,

the

be

marijuana and drug paraphernalia

remainder

of

the

assistant

in the purse.

principal's

search

was

justified under the "reasonable suspicion" standard.
SUMMARY
Although

the

fourth

amendment

should

apply

to

school

searches, there are reasons for departing from the probable cause
requirement

•

!,;'.

in

this

setting.

The

public

schools

are

open

7

•

13.

institutions,

and

students

and

teachers.

allowed

to

search

suspicion."
purse

there

is

a

"commonality of

Therefore,

students

school

on

the

interest"

officials

basis

between

should

be

"reasonable

of

Choplick had a "reasonable suspicion" that T.L.O. 's

contained

Therefore,

the

evidence
search

that she had violated a

did

not

violate

her

school rule.
"k-J-L~

fourth

amendment /r,~u~-~

~".

~~

rights.
Like

the dissenting

justice,

I

/.2~--<--

determin ~

am unable to

whether the state supreme court intended to apply the "reasonable c;t
suspicion"

standard.

The parties and

the amicii all appear

to

assume that there is no difference between "reasonable grounds to
believe,"

the

standard

"reasonable suspicion."
court

intended

"reasonable
Court

could

to

hold

I

adopt

suspicion"
that

applied

by

the

state

court,

think it possible, however,
a

and
the

standard
"probable
state

that

is

cause."

court:

(1)

that the

somewhere

between

Therefore,
used

and

the

this

proper

standard, but misapplied it to the facts of the case; or (2) used

-------

an improper standard.

~~/"
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This

memo

records

reactions

after

reading

Lee

Bentley's helpful bench memo of September 25.
None of the cases cited in support of a Fourth
Amendment
high

right

school

in

the

students

school

is

house

more

than

for

elementary and

marginally

relevant.

Three categories of cases are cited.
Administrative
Municipal

Court

See

Seattle

v.

Marshall v.

involved

searches

(searches

Barlow

Searches.

by

by

housing

building

(OSHA inspectors).

v.

Camara

officials.

inspectors).

Michigan v.

Tyler

(fire inspectors interested in ascertaining whether there
was arson) •
In each of
buildings
whether

these cases there were searches of

by government

laws

were

inspectors

being

seeking

violated.

The

to ascertain

duty

of

these

officials was to "inspect" (i.e. search).
2.
First

First Amendment.

Amendment

absence

of

any

substantially
discipline" •

.

, '

right

to

showing
interfere

Tinker v. DeMoines upheld

wear

that

black

this

with

arm

would

bands

in

the

"materially

and

appropriate

2.

3.

Other School Cases.

Goss v. Lopez involved

tl'-

only procedural due process claim to notice and some sort
of

/\

hearing prior

to suspension.

Ingraham v.

Wright,

on

the other hand, declined to apply the Eighth Amendment to
the use of physical punishment to maintain discipline in a
school.

Of all the cases, Ingraham is the most relevant.

* * *
School Environment
This

is

unique

in many

respects.

Unlike

the

"administrative search" cases, only immature children are
involved.

The problem of maintaining order and discipline

in our schools is abundantly documented in the SG's brief.
It simply cannot be compared with the situation in any of
the

cases

cited

in

Lee's

The

memorandum.

educational

purpose of schools in our country often is frustrated by
the

absence

legitimate

of

discipline

school

rules.

and
The

of

means

physical

to

well

enforce
being

of

pupils and teachers, as well as their personal belongings,
are

constantly

in

jeopardy

where

maintain discipline do not exist.
to

compare

judgments

the

capability

required

~

of

trained

adequate

means

to

It is unrealistic also
teachers

officers

to
to

make

the

comply

with

3.

Fourth

Amendment

Amendment,
law,

by

Although

requirements.

----

its terms,

is not limited

the

Fourth

to the criminal

its origin and history make clear that this was its

--

basic purpose.
have

thought

Fourth

History surely teaches that no one would
at

the

time

of

Amendment

was

being

the

Constitution

adopted

to

that

protect

the

immature

children in the classroom.
The difficulty of drawing

lines -

particularly

to meet exigent circumstances - between "probable cause",
"reasonable
illustrated
probable

grounds",
by

this

cause,

as

and

case.

"reasonable

suspicion"

is

~-~-~ . --tc...,.-~_

In my view,

respondent

theA t....Q.acher Ahad

was caught

in

the

act of

smoking by a teacher in violation of school rules and lied
about

it.

justified
Juvenile

What else would a teacher have to know to be
in
Court

searching
held

that

a

14-year-old 's
the

assistant

reasonable cause" to search the purse.
Supreme Court of

New Jersey agreed

purse?
principal

The
"had

Inexplicably, the

that

"probable cause

school searches",

agreed with the

Juvenile Court that "reasonable grounds"

for a search is

the

no such grounds

need not be shown for

appropriate

standard,

but concluded

existed in this case!

* * *

4.

I
children
Rather

can agree that the Fourth Amendment protects

in

school

than

create

suspicion"

should

from
a

wholly

new

be

unreasonable

standard,

adopted

but

perhaps

"reasonable

making

clear

teachers and school officials are not trained
cannot
that

be

adequately

prove

Therefore,

so

difficult

application

stringent where
whether

the

reasonable.
reasonable

trained)
even

of

the

reasonable

that

Moreover,

we

rules

make

the

41::- lawyers
standard

that

(and really
distinctions
and

should

judges.
be

less

lay minds could differ as to

suspicion

school

to

searches.

and

prompted
should

a

make

regulation

search
clear
may

was
that

specific

circumstances in which searches lawfully may be made.

For

example, I would have no doubt that metal detectors - such
as those used at our Court - could be installed in school
houses.

L.F.P., Jr.
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TO: Justice Powell
FRO : Lee
RE: New Jerse v. T.L.O., the applicability of the exclusionary
~-~ to j~~nil_~-- ~:~~-~~uency proceedings { ~ ~

~~~~~)
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the state supreme court held

~that

T.L.O. 's purse had been searched in violation of her fourth

amendment rights,

an~hat

the evidence that had been seized

should have been excluded from her trial in juvenile court.

The

state did not challenge the court's holding that T.L.O.'s fourth
amendment rights had been violated.

Instead, the state asked

this Court to consider only whether the exclusionary rule barred
the use in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence that has
been illegally obtained by a school teacher.
cert. on this issue, and it was

argu~d

The Court granted

on March 28, 1984.

At the conference, the Court split 5-4 on the
applicability of the exclusionary rule.

You, CJ, BRW, HAB, and

WHR voted to reverse, holding that the exclusionary rule did not
apply in this context.

WJB, TM, JPS, and SO'C voted to reverse.

Justice White was assigned to write the majority opinion, and
Justice Stevens was to write the dissent.
Justice White's majority opinion was circulated, and ~
he was joined by CJ and WHR.

Justice White assumed that T.L.O. 's
·---=

. -:-~----

fourth amendment rights had been violated by the assistant
principal's search.

Nevertheless, he stated that the

------------

exclusionary rule should not bar the illegally seized evidence
~-----~------~--~--~------------~

from juvenile delinquency proceedings.

Deterrence is the

"primary, if not the only" justification for suppressing the
fruits of illegal searches and seizures.

Justice White argued

that the application of the exclusionary rule in this context
would not deter teachers from conducting illegal searches.
Teachers have a strong interest in enforcing school rules, and in
keeping drugs and weapons out of the classroom.

In contrast, few

teachers have an interest in the criminal justice system.
Therefore, applying the exclusionary rule to juvenile delinquency
proceedings would not have "behavioral effects" upon teachers.
Justice White went on to add that the New Jersey courts
had held that illegally seized evidence should be excluded from
h

________

~~

school disciplinary___,proceedings.

He thought that this ruling

would deter teachers from violating the fourth amendment rights
of schoolchildren, for teachers do have a strong interest in such
internal proceedings.

He also pointed out that students whose

J ~.

rights were violated could bring §1983 actions against their
teachers.
You asked Justice White to remove the discussion about
school disciplinary proceedings from his opinion.

Although he

did not state that the exclusionary rule necessarily should be
applied in this context, he certainly implied that it should.
There was no reason to reach the issue in this case.

Justice

-------------------------------------------------~

White, however, refused to delete this discussion from his
opinion.

You also asked Justice White to remove the reference to

the availability of §1983 actions.

Although he agreed to remove

this language from the ·opinion, he subsequently circulated drafts
containing this objectionable language.

You joined most of BRW's opinion, but in a short
concurrence you pointed out that it was unnecessary to discuss
the applicability of the exclusionary rule to school disciplinary
proceedings.

You also pointed out that "it was unrealistic to

extend the subtleties of the Fourth Amendment to

t~i school

classroom."
Justice Stevens dissent was short and unpersuasive.

He

argued that there was no reason to believe that teachers would
not be deterred by the application of the exclusionary rule to
proceedings in juvenile court.

Moreover, the exlcusionary rule

I

should be applied in this context, so as to let students know
that "our society attaches serious consequences to violations of
constitutional rights."

WJB and TM joined this dissent.

Justice

O'Connor filed a separate dissent in which she stated that there
was no reason to depart from

~

v. Ohio in this context.

Rhe

pointed out that in no other case had the Court held that
illegally seized evidence could be introduced in the state's
case-in-chief.

JPS joined her separate dissent.
'--- -- -- ---·----...
HAB refused to join Justice White's opinion.

He was

troubled ~~ the state's failure to challenge the finding of a
fourth amendment violation.

He thought the case should be

DIG'ed.
The Court subsequently ord ~ reargument.
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CHAMaE.-a 01'"

JUSTICE

w... ..1.

BRENNAN, .JR.

October 29, 1984

No. 83-712
New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron,
You will recall that at Conference
I expressed the view that the probable
cause

standard

shortly

should

circulate

a

apply.
brief

Sincer~.~, '

~~~
Justice White
Copies to the Conference

shall

dissent

that effect.

·;J..

I

to

/
October 29, 1984
Re:

No. 83-712

New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

' e1~•v}-··J

Justice White
cc:

The Conference

.Bu.prnnt <!fonri of tl{t ~b .Btatts
JJasftinghtn. ~. (ij. 2Llp'!~
CH.O.MeERS 01"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

October 30, 1984

Re:

No. 83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron:
I join.

Justice White
Copies to the Conference

'•

.h.prtmt Ofmtd (tf tqt 'Jnittlt .italt.e'
Jtulfington.~.

OJ.

211'.?'!~

CHAMBE:RS OF"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

October 30, 1984

No. 83-712

New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice White

Copies to the Conference

i'.uprtmt Q}!tnrl gf tlrt ~ttlt ~bdt.if
..-u-.lfinghtn. ~. Q}. 211~~~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 1, 1984

Re:

83-712 - New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron:
Although I agree with a good deal of what you have
written, I will be writing separately.
Respectfully,

J~
Justice White
Copies to the Conference

.t\u,rtnu <lfourt of tlft~b .§tatte
111aeJringhm, ~.Of.

211p'l-~

CHAMBERS 01'"

.JUSTICE THURGOOD .MARSHALL

November 2, 1984

Re:

No. 83-712-New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Byron:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

cf1U

T.M.

Justice White
cc:

The Conference

November 8 , 1984

83-712 New Jersey v . TLO

DP.ar Byron:
I

~.,ill

v1rite a bt'ief concurrinCJ opinion and hope

to get to thiR soon.
I agree with most of your opinion and the holdinq .
My view about the school environment , as you know, differs a
shade or two from yours.

Riner--rely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

Of!tttrl !tf t4t ~nitta ,jtah.s'
Jla,gltittgt!ttt, ~. Of. 211ft~~

,jnvrtntt

I

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

November 21, 1984

No. 83-712

New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Lewis,
Please join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

I

I

~UVftutt ~.ttud

of tfrt :Juibb .Jhttt-

Jlasfriugtlllt, ~. ~· 2 n~,.~
CHAMBERS 0 ,

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

f<.-?t1-

(f-.-s,_

TL.o.

~~~

~~ctl~p

T~~~~ .l
~ ~ ~ O"h"'"'..& L;k_~
~

~· ~

<!f&ntri of tl{t 1brittb jltatts
'Baslfin:ghnt. ~. <!f. 21lc?~~

~uprtutt

CHAMI!IERS Of'

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 8, 1985

Re:

No. 83-712-New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear John:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

~T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

,juprtmt <!fourt of tift ~b ,jtatts

'Jlhtsltinghtn. ~.

<If.

20~)1.~

CHAMIIERS 01"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 8, 1985

Re:

No. 83-712-New Jersey v. T.L.O.

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

(fttA. .
T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

13.
&83-712 New Jersey v. TLO (Cammie)%
BRW for the Court 3/31/84
1st draft 4/23/84
2nd draft 6/12/84
Joined by WHR 4/30/84
CJ 5/22/84
LFP dissent
1st draft 5/15/84
JPS dissent
1st draft 6/1/84
2nd draft 6/14/84
Joined by WJB 6/4/84
Joined by TM 6/12/84
SOC dissent
1st draft 6/12/84
Joined by JPS 6/12/84
SOC await other writing 4/23/84
TM awaiting further writing 4/24/84

83-712 New Jersey v. TLO (Lee)
BRW for the Court 10/5/84
1st draft 10/26/84
2nd draft 10/31/84
3rd draft 12/20/84
4th draft 1/4/85
5th draft 1/7/85
Joined by WHR 10/29/84
soc 10/30/84
CJ 10/30/84
LFP concurring opinion
1st draft 11/21/84
2nd draft 11/30/84
Joined by SOC 11/21/84
HAB concurring in the judgment
1st draft 12/4/84
2nd draft 12/21/84
JPS dissent
1st draft 12/7/84
2nd draft 12/17/84
3rd draft l/4/85
4th draft 1/8/85
Joined by TM 1/8/85
WJB dissenting
1st draft 1/2/85
2nd draft 1/7/85
3rd draft 1/9/85
Joined by TM 1/8/85
WJB will dissent 10/29/84
JPB will write separately 11/1/84
TM awaiting dissent 11/2/84
LFP will write concurring opinion 11/8/84
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
--:::>Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice White

APR
2 3_1984
Circulated: _ _
__
_ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT
-

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-712

NEW JERSEY, PETITIONER v. T. L. 0.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI , TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW JERSEY
[April - , 1984]

JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a question concerning the admissibility
in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence illegally obtained in an in-school search by a public-school official. Because that official was engaged in enforcing a school disciplinary rule and was not acting with the participation of law
enforcement authorities, we hold that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the
evidence he obtained.
I
On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in
Middlesex County, N.J., observed 14-year-old T. L. 0. and
another student smoking cigarettes in the girls' lavatory in
violation of school regulations. The teacher escorted the
girls to the vice-principal's office and accused them of violating the regulation prohibiting smoking in lavatories. In response to the vice-principal's questions, T. L. O.'s companion
admitted the infraction and was assigned to a three-day
smoking clinic. T. L. 0., however, denied smoking in the
lavatory and declared that she "didn't smoke at all."
1 The vice-principal took T. L. 0. to a private office, closed
the door, and requested her purse. He opened the purse
and observed a package of cigarettes plainly visible. Saying
that T. L. 0. had lied to him, he reached into the purse to
remove the cigarettes and saw rolling papers, which in his

83-712-0PINION
2

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

experience indicated that marihuana was probably involved.
He then looked further into the purse and discovered marihuana, marihuana paraphernalia, a number of one-dollar
bills. ;:~ nd index cards and papers containing language clearly
indicating drug dealing by T. L. 0.
The vice-principal _notified T. L. O.'s parents. He also ·
summoned the police and gave them the marihuana and paraphernalia. In her mother's presence at police headquarters,
T. L. 0. was advised of her rights and admitted to selling
marihuana in school. T. L. 0. was suspended from school
for three days for smoking cigarettes in a nonsmoking area
and seven days for possessing marihuana. On T. L. O.'s moti0n in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, the latter suspension was set aside on the ground that the suspension resulted from evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. [T. L. 0.] v. Piscataway Board of Education,
No. C.2865-79 (Super. Ct. N.J., Ch. Div., Mar. 31, 1980).
The validity of that judgment is not before us.
T. L. 0. was also charged in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, Middlesex County, with delinquency based
on possession of marihuana with the intent to distribute.
N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:4-44; 24:21-19(a)(1); 24:21-20(a)(4)
(West Supp. 1983). T. L. 0. moved to suppress the physical
evidence obtained in the search of her purse; she also sought
suppression of her confession on the ground that it was
tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. The juvenile court
denied T. L. O.'s motion to suppress. State in Interest of
T. L. 0., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 428 A. 2d 1327 (1980). The
court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to school
searches, but declared that
"a school official may properly conduct a search of a student's person if the official has a reasonable suspicion
that a crime has been or is in the process of being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is
necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school

83-712-0PINION
NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

policies."
original).

3

Id., at 341, 428 A. 2d, at 1333 (emphasis in.

Applying this standard, the court c .. ~:.Idl...: the:.., ~h-- ...... c ·
principal had reasonable cause to believe that T. L. 0. had
violated the school's smoking regulations. Once he had
opened the purse, the-court held, its contents were subject to
the plain-view doctrine; having found marihuana and paraphernalia, the vice-principal justifiably continued his search
to determine the extent ofT. L. O.'s criminal activity. I d.,
at 343, 428 A. 2d, at 1334.
A divided Appellate Division affirmed the denial of
T. L. O.'s suppression motion with respect to the contents of
the purse on the basis of the Juvenile Court's opinion, but vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether T. L. 0. had knowingly waived her constitutional rights before confessing. .
State in Interest ofT. L. 0., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A. 2d
493 (1982) (per curiam). The Supreme Court of New Jersey
reversed the Appellate Division's judgment and directed that
the physical evidence be suppressed. State in Interest of
T. L. 0., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934 (1983). In response to
the contention that the exclusionary rule, which was applied
to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), should
not govern searches by school officials since its primary purpose is to deter violations of constitutional rights by law enforcement officials, the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared that "the issue is settled by the decisions of the
[United States] Supreme Court" and "accept[ed] the proposition that if an official search violates constitutional rights, the
evidence is not admissible in criminal proceedings." 94
N.J., at 341, 463 A. 2d, at 939 (footnote omitted). 1
Although the court indicated that "[o]ur code of Juvenile Justice buttresses this conclusion," 94 N.J., at 342, n. 5, 463 A. 2d, at 939, n. 5, we
agree with the State that the decision below concerning the admissibility of
illegally obtained evidence in juvenile delinquency proceedings does not
rest on adequate and independent state grounds. It bears mentioning
1
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey then held that school
officials could conduct warrantless searches without violating
the Fourth .A rnendment~ 3.nd t.h3.t., iP the absence of police
participation, such searches should be assessed under a
standard less stringent than probable cause. Like the Juvenile Court, the Supre!Jle Court was
"satisfied that when a school official has reasonable
grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of
illegal activity or activity that would interfere with
school discipline and order, the school official has the
right to conduct a reasonable search for such evidence."
Id., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 941-942.
The court concluded, with two justices dissenting, that the
vice-principal's search could not pass muster under this
standard. The contents of the purse had no direct bearing
on T. L. O.'s infraction since mere possession of cigarettes
did not violate the school's rules, and a desire to gather evidence to impeach T. L. O.'s credibility could not justify the
search. In any event, the vice-principal had no reasonable
grounds to believe that T. L. O.'s purse contained cigarettes,
but rather was acting on, "at best, a good hunch." I d. at
347, 463 A. 2d, at 942.
We granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certiorari. 464 U. S. - - (1983). State and federal courts have
disagreed on whether the Fourth Amendment applies to inschool searches and seizures by public-school officials and
teachers. 2 For present purposes, however, the State does
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied T. L. O.'s motion-filed
after this Court had granted a writ of certiorari-for clarification of its decision to make clear that it was based on state law. State in Interest of
T. L. 0., M~22 Q"an 17, 1984).
2
State and federal courts have struggled to accommodate the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment and the interest of the States in providing a safe environment conducive to education in the public schools.
Some courts have resolved the tension between these interests by giving
full force to one or the other side of the balance. Thus, in a number of
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not contest the holding that the Fourth Amendment protects
students like T. L. 0. from being unreasonably searched by
school principals or teachers, the standard of reason;:~bleneR!'l.
cases it has been held that school officials conducting in-school searches of
students are private parties acting in loco parentis who are not subject to ·
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., D. R. C. v. State,
646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In reG., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220
(1969); People v. Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (1970);
R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450
S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See also State v. Kappes, 26 Ariz.
App. 567, 550 P. 2d 121 (1976) (student advisers in dormitory search); State
v. Wingerd, 40 Ohio App. 2d 236, 318 N. E. 2d 866 (1974) (same); State v.
Keadle, 277 S. E . 2d 456 (N.C. App. 1981) (same). At least one court has
held, on the other hand, that the Fourth Amendment applies in full to inschool searches by school officials and that a search conducted without
probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.),
vacated, 423 U. S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976), and
others have made clear that the probable-cause standard applies where
there is police involvement, seeM. v. Board of Education Ball-Chatham
Community Unit School District No. 5, 429 F . Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill.
1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State
v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S. E. 2d 586, 594 (1975), or where the
search is highly intrusive. SeeM. M. v. Anker, 607 F. 2d 588, 589 (CA2
1979). Other courts have struck the balance by holding that the Fourth
Amendment applies, but that the exclusionary rule developed to remedy
violations of the Amendment does not. See, e. g., State v. Lamb, 137 Ga.
App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976); State v. Young, supra. See also United
States v. Coles, 302 F . Supp. 99 (Me. 1969) (exclusionary rule would not
deter search by administrative officer at Job Corps Center).
The applicability of the exclusionary rule, however, has been discussed
in very few of the cases, for most courts that have considered challenges by
students to in-school searches or seizures by school officials have held that
the officials' activity did not violate the Fourth Amendment. But see In re
J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); People v. D ., 34 N.Y.
2d 483, 358 N. Y.S. 2d 403, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974). These courts have
rejected the view that school officials conducting in-school searches act as
private individuals to which the Fourth Amendment does not apply.
E. g., Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F. 2d 470,
480 (CA51982); Jones v. Latexo Independent School District, 499 F. Supp.
223, 229 (ED Tex. 1980); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F . Supp. 47, 51 (NDNY
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against which the state court held that school officials' conduct is to be judged, or the state court's conclusion that
T. L. O.'s purse had been Rearcherl contranr t0 thP. Fourth
Amendment. The sole q·..t~!:"cion prese:nte<! Ly che petition is
whether the exclusionary rule should be applied so as to bar
the use in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence that ·
has been illegally seized by a school teacher without the participation of law enforcement officers. The State submits
that the rule should not apply in such circumstances. We
agree with this submission and reverse the judgment of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 3
1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-1218 (ND Ill. 1976); State
v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976); People v. Ward, 62
Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M. 827, 540 P.
2d 827 (App. 1975); State v. Walker, 19 Or. App. 420, 528 P. 2d 113 (1974).
But they typically have held that school officials may act without a warrant, e. g., Bilbrey v. Brown, 481 F. Supp. 26, 27-28 (Or. 1979); In reG.,
11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970), and have relaxed the standard of suspicion necessary to justify in-school searches by school officials
acting without the participation of law enforcement officials. E. g., Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, supra; Stern v. New Haven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31 (ED Mich. 1981); Jones v. Latexo
Independent School District, supra; Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012
(ND Ind. 1979); Bellnier v. Lund, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105
Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971);

State v. Young, supra; In re J. A., supra; People v. Ward, supra; People
v. D., supra; State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P. 2d 781 (1977); In
re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979). In assessing the
reasonableness of searches and seizures by school officials, the courts have
looked to such factors as: (1) whether the officials acted alone or in concert
with the police; (2) whether the search was undertaken to promote school
discipline or to facilitate criminal prosecution; (3) the nature and extent of
the search; (4) the child's age and disciplinary record; (5) the seriousness of
the problem to which the search was addressed; (6) whether the official
acted under exigent circumstances; and (7) the probative value and reliability of the evidence on the basis of which the search was undertaken. See
e. g., Bellnier v. Lund, supra; Doe v. State, supra; People v. D., supra; In
re L. L., supra; Schiff, The Emergence of Student Rights to Privacy
Under the Fourth Amendment, 34 Baylor L. Rev. 209, 213 (1982).
3
In United States v. Leon, - - U. S. - - (1984), and Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, - - U. S. - - (1984), we held that the exclusionary rule
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II

Since the Fourth Amendment "has never been interpreted
to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all
prvcetJings or agai:.Jst all persons," Stone v. Powell, 428
U. S. 465, 486 (1976), the State's concession that the viceprincipal's search of _T. L. O.'s purse violated the Fourth Amendment only begins the inquiry in this case. We have
repeatedly stressed that the Constitution itself does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, United States v. Leon,-- U.S.--,
- - (1984), and have emphasized that whether the judicially
created exclusionary rule is appropriately applied in a particular case or class of cases is "an issue separate and apart
from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of
the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police
conduct." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. - -, - - (1983).
The remedial question before us in this case, our decisions
make clear, must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of excluding from juvenile delinquency proceedings evidence illegally obtained by a school official who sought to enforce school disciplinary rules and who acted without the
participation of law enforcement authorities. See United
States v. Leon, supra, at - - ; United States v. Calandra,
414 U. S. 338, 347-352 (1974). The primary, if not the only,
justification for suppressing the fruits of illegal searches and
seizures is the belief that the imposition of that severe remedy will reduce the incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment and deter future illegality. United States v. Leon,
supra, at--; Stone v. Powell, supra, at 486; United States
should not be applied where, judged objectively, it cannot be said that officers should have known that they were violating the Fourth Amendment.
Here, as stated in the text, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the
vice-principal had "no reasonable grounds" to believe that T. L. O. 's purse
contained cigarettes. Hence, there is no occasion to vacate the judgment
of the New Jersey court and remand the case for reconsideration in light of
Leon and Sheppard.
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v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 446 (1976). Accordingly, in light of
the "substantial cost [imposed] on the societal interest in law
enforcement by . . . [excluding] . . . what <'""'"~de~ly i""
relevant evidence," id., at 448-449, we have restricted "the
application of the [exclusionary] rule ... to those areas
where its remedial obiectives are thought most efficaciously
served." United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. Furthermore, in determining the applicability of the exclusionary
rule, we must be convinced that an appreciable deterrent effect has been shown.
Speculative benefits do not warrant
the "strong medicine" of the exclusionary rule. United
States v. Janis, supra, at 453; United States v. Calandra,
supra, at 351-352.
On the strength of this balancing test, we have held that
the exclusionary rule does not apply in certain types of judicial proceedings, see United States v. Janis, supra; United
States v. Calandra, supra, 4 and does not prevent all possible
uses of illegally obtained evidence in proceedings to which it
is generally applicable. See, e. g., United States v. Havens,
446 U. S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62
(1964). We also have concluded that the rule constitutes an
inappropriate remedy for certain types of objectively reasonable errors by law enforcement officers. United States v.
Leon, supra; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, - - U. S. - (1984).
We have not had occasion to consider the applicability of
this approach to evidence obtained in unlawful searches or
seizures conducted by state or federal governmental employees who do not work for law enforcement agencies and whose
• Although this Court has never addressed the question whether the exclusionary rule applies in juvenile delinquency proceedings and we need
not do so to resolve this case, state courts that have considered the issue
have consistently held that the rule is applicable. E. g., In re K., 24 Cal.
3d 395, 595 P. 2d 105, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 973 (1979); In re J . A., 85 Ill.
App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); State v. Doe, 93 N. M. 143, 597 P. 2d
1183 (App. 1979); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App.
1979).
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functions do not fall within the realm of law enforcement.
We are now confronted with such a case: assuming that there
has been a Fourth Am,,r1ment vi"l~ti(l"'--hP"a'Ise the case
comes to us in that posture-the question is whether the evidence seized from T. L. 0. by the vice-principal may be used
against T. L. 0. in her juvenile delinquency proceedings. In
making this determination, there is no reason to depart from
the general principles that have emerged in cases decided
over more than a decade. Guided by these principles, we
conclude that applying the exclusionary rule, in the context
of juvenile delinquency or criminal proceedings, to exclude
the fruits of in-school searches and seizures, made without
the participation of law enforcement officers, 5 is unlikely to
"result in appreciable deterrence ... [and that] ... its use in
the instant situation is unwarranted." United States v.
Janis, supra, at 454.
It goes without saying that a duty to exercise care in promoting the health and physical development of students and
to maintain order and discipline is inextricably tied to a
school's mission to educate. Although, as they were in this
case, school authorities may be required to report to the police what they perceive to be violations of the state or local
criminal law, these officials cannot generally be classified as
law-enforcement authorities. The unique relationship between schools and students gives rise to concerns that are
largely unrelated to desires to obtain criminal convictions or
adjudications of delinquency. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400
U. S. 309, 322-323 (1971). In-school searches ordinarily further purposes or interests entirely separate and distinct from
those served by the criminal-justice system; prohibiting the
There is no evidence in this record that the vice-principal searched
T. L. O.'s purse at the behest of or in cooperation with law enforcement
authorities. The latter's participation in this case began only after the seizure had been made. The State agrees that suppression would be appropriate if a school official had acted as an agent of the police. Brief for
Petitioner 16-17.
5
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use in the criminal-justice system of evidence obtained in
such searches may well have none of the behavioral effects on
~ithP-~ schnnl l)ff\f'i:> ls or school boards that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions generally is
thought to have on the typical law enforcement official.
Whether viewed from the perspective of individual school
officials or of school boards, "[t]he enforcement of school
regulations, the safeguarding of students during school hours
through confiscation of weapons and other contraband, and
the maintenance of a drug-free learning environment provide
substantial incentives to search that would no
ess
by
suppression of evidence at a subseque delin uency oceeding." D. R. C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 2 2 25
a App.
1982). School officials may search frequently enough to develop an understandin of state and federal constitutional
standards, and school boar s may and should have both the
incentive and the means to foster such an understanding.
But a persuasive case can be made for the proposition that
local school officials are "primarily concerned with maintaining internal discipline rather than obtaining convictions," id.,
at 258, n. 10, and that the admissibility of the evidence in a
juvenile delinquency or criminal proceeding is not a substantial concern o em an ence W1 no appreciably control
their conduct. See, e. g., United States v. Coles, 302 F.
Supp. 99, 102-103 (1969); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488,
489-494, 216 S. E. 2d 586, 588--591 (1975).
It sho d-als
recalled that, in reviewing the propriety
of the disciplinar sanction imposed on T. L. 0. by her
school,
w Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division,
held that she could not suspended from school on the basis of
the evidence seized from her purse, a holding consistent with
the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision on the scope of
the Fourth Amendment in the case now under review. 6 To
We emphasize that the propriety of that decision is not before us in this
case and that our opinion is not intended to intimate any view concerning
whether the exclusionary rule applies in school disciplinary proceedings.
6
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the extent that school officials may be deterred by the exclusion of evidence, that result will be effected by forbidding the
use of the fruits of their searches in E"hfln1 di~dplh,~:p~r Il'""ceedings. It is in those proceedings that the acceptdl.>ility of
school officials' conduct will, in effect, be judged, and it is in
the outcome of those proceedings that they presumably are
most interested. As long as the Chancery Division's ruling
on T. L. O.'s suspension continues to govern the high
school-and particularly if it is or becomes the general rule in
New Jersey-illegal searches and seizures by school oficials
will be adequately deterred. We are quite convinced that
also excluding the evidence from juvenile delinquency proceedings, which fall "outside the offending [officials'] zone of
primary interest," United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 458,
would produce only marginal deterrence, insufficient to justify the cost to law enforcement efforts. Cf. id., at 453-454;
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 493-495; United States v.
Calandra, 414 U. S., at 350-352.
On the other hand, if in the long run, the Chancery Division's holding that forbids the use of illegally seized evidence
in school disciplinary proceedings does not retain its author~. we have substantial doubt that teacliers and other officials will be appreciably restrained in the future by a decision
that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of probative
but illegally obtained evidence in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In such circumstances, school authorities would
have little reason or incentive to f0rgo searches insofar as the
utility of the evidence in school disciplinary proceedings is
concerned. It may be that a teacher would be deterred from
searching by school rules and policies governing such
searches, violation of which may affect the assessment of his
performance by his superiors, or even result in charges being
filed against him. But if the evidence is admissible in internal proceedings against the student, it seems unlikely that
suppressing the evidence in juvenile delinquency or criminal
proceedings would produce the appreciable deterrent conse-
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quences necessary to outweigh society's interest in sanctioning crimes by students that unquestionably have been exposed by s~ho0l offici3J<;, , albeit b~' 0~cials acting contrary to
the applicalJ:e constitutional, statutory, or administrative
rules governing the performance of the tasks for which they
have been hired.
Assuming, as we do, that the vice-principal violated
T. L. O.'s Fourth Amendment rights, we do not hold that
she should not have a remedy for this violation, but only that
she is not entitled to have the evidence suppressed in her juvenile delinquency proceeding. The exclusionary rule is designed to deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment,
particularly infringements on the rights of the innocent who,
without the rule, might be subjected to an unacceptable regime of unjustified searches. Under the rationale of the exclusionary rule as it has developed, T. L. 0. herself, about
whom reliable evidence has come to light showing that she
was illegally selling drugs to her classmates, has little entitlement to claim that the evidence should not be used against
her. The violation, if it occurred, has already been completed. The admission of the evidence against T. L. 0. is
not itself a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and excluding it would be a remedy designed not to benefit her, but to
forestall similar lawless invasions of the rights of others.
We do not leave T. L. 0., others like her, or wholly innocent persons without remedies to vindicate their Fourth
Amendment rights. T. L. 0. sought judicial review of her
suspension and successfully urged that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. We assume that resort to
the courts will continue to be available to enforce any local,
state, or federal standards applicable to searches and seizures carried out by school authorities. Public-school teachers and administrators who know or should have known that
their conduct is contrary to the Fourth Amendment will ~
be subject to liability under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and they may
be subject to action under state law as well. We do not,

l
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however, discern any satisfactory predicate for excluding
from state juvenile delin uency or criminal proceedings the
product of in-schoo searches carne ou y sc oo authorities
w\ho1 ~ r-......iicipation by law enforcement personnel.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is accordingly reversed.
So ordered.
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[June-, 1984]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a question concerning the admissibility
in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence illegally obtained in an in-school search by a public-school official. Because that official was engaged in enforcing a school disciplinary rule and was not acting with the participation of law
enforcement authorities, we hold that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the
evidence he obtained.
I
On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in
Middlesex County, N. J., observed 14-year-old T. L. 0. and
another student smoking cigarettes in the girls' lavatory in
violation of school regulations. The teacher escorted the
girls to the vice-principal's office and accused them of violating the regulation prohibiting smoking in lavatories. In response to the vice-principal's questions, T. L. O.'s companion
admitted the infraction and was assigned to a three-day
smoking clinic. T. L. 0., however, denied smoking in the
lavatory and declared that she "didn't smoke at all."
The vice-principal took T. L. 0. to a private office, closed
the door, and requested her purse. He opened the purse
and observed a package of cigarettes plainly visible. Saying
that T. L. 0. had lied to him, he reached into the purse to
remove the cigarettes and saw rolling papers, which in his
experience indicated that marihuana was probably involved.
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He then looked further into the purse and discovered marihuana, marihuana paraphernalia, a number of one-dollar
bills, and index cards and papers containing language clearly
indicating drug dealing by T. L. 0.
The vice-principal notified T. L. O.'s parents. He also
summoned the police and gave them the marihuana and paraphernalia. In her mother's presence at police headquarters,
T. L. 0. was advised of her rights and admitted to selling
marihuana in school. T. L. 0. was suspended from school
for three days for smoking cigarettes in a nonsmoking area
and seven days for possessing marihuana. On T. L. O.'s motion in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, the latter suspension was set aside on the ground that the suspension resulted from evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. [T. L. 0.] v. Piscataway Board of Education,
No. C.2865-79 (Super. Ct. N. J., Ch. Div., Mar. 31, 1980).
The validity of that judgment is not before us.
T. L. 0. was also charged in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Middlesex County, with delinquency based on
possession of marihuana with the intent to distribute. N. J.
Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:4-44; 24:21-19(a)(1); 24:21-20(a)(4) (West
Supp. 1983). T. L. 0 . moved to suppress the physical evidence obtained in the search of her purse; she also sought
suppression of her confession on the ground that it was
tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. The juvenile court
denied T. L. O.'s motion to suppress. State in Interest of
T. L. 0., 178 N. J. Super. 329, 428 A. 2d 1327 (1980). The
court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to school
searches, but declared that
"a school official may properly conduct a search of a student's person if the official has a reasonable suspicion
that a crime has been or is in the process of being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is
necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school
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policies." !d., at 341, 428 A. 2d, at 1333 (emphasis in
original).
Applying this standard, the court concluded that the viceprincipal had reasonable cause to believe that T. L. 0. had
violated the school's smoking regulations. Once he had
opened the purse, the court held, its contents were subject to
the plain-view doctrine; having found marihuana and paraphernalia, the vice-principal justifiably continued his search
to determine the extent ofT. L. O.'s criminal activity. !d.,
at 343, 428 A. 2d, at 1334.
A divided Appellate Division affirmed the denial of
T. L. O.'s suppression motion with respect to the contents of
the purse on the basis of the Juvenile Court's opinion, but vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether T. L. 0. had knowingly waived her constitutional rights before confessing.
State in Interest ofT. L. 0., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A. 2d
493 (1982) (per curiam). The Supreme Court of New Jersey
reversed the Appellate Division's judgment and directed that
the physical evidence be suppressed. State in Interest of
T. L. 0., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934 (1983). In response to
the contention that the exclusionary rule, which was applied
to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), should
not govern searches by school officials since its primary purpose is to deter violations of constitutional rights by law enforcement officials, the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared that "the issue is settled by the decisions of the
[United States] Supreme Court" and "accept[ed] the proposition that if an official search violates constitutional rights, the
evidence is not admissible in criminal proceedings." 94
N. J., at 341, 463 A. 2d, at 939 (footnote omitted). 1
Although the court indicated that "[o]ur code of Juvenile Justice buttresses this conclusion," 94 N. J., at 342, n. 5, 463 A. 2d, at 939, n. 5, we
agree with the State that the decision below concerning the admissibility of
illegally obtained evidence in juvenile delinquency proceedings does not
rest on adequate and independent state grounds. It bears mentioning
1
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey then held that school
officials could conduct warrantless searches without violating
the Fourth Amendment, and that, in the absence of police
participation, such searches should be assessed under a
standard less stringent than probable cause. Like the Juvenile Court, the Supreme Court was
"satisfied that when a school official has reasonable
grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of
illegal activity or activity that would interfere with
school discipline and order, the school official has the
right to conduct a reasonable search for such evidence."
Id., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 941-942.
The court concluded, with two justices dissenting, that the
vice-principal's search could not pass muster under this
standard. The contents of the purse had no direct bearing
on T. L. O.'s infraction since mere possession of cigarettes
did not violate the school's rules, and a desire to gather evidence to impeach T. L. O.'s credibility could not justify the
search. In any event, the vice-principal had no reasonable
grounds to believe that T. L. O.'s purse contained cigarettes,
but rather was acting on, "at best, a good hunch." I d., at
347, 463 A. 2d, at 942.
We granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certiorari. 464 U. S. - - (1983). State and federal courts have
disagreed on whether the Fourth Amendment applies to inschool searches and seizures by public-school officials and
teachers. 2 For present purposes, however, the State does
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied T. L. O.'s motion-filed
after this Court had granted a writ of certiorari-for clarification of its decision to make clear that it was based on state law. State in Interest of
T. L. 0., M-422 (Jan. 17, 1984).
2
State and federal courts have struggled to accommodate the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment and the interest of the States in providing a safe environment conducive to education in the public schools.
Some courts have resolved the tension between these interests by giving
full force to one or the other side of the balance. Thus, in a number of
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not contest the holding that the Fourth Amendment protects
students like T. L. 0. from being unreasonably searched by
school principals or teachers, the standard of reasonableness
cases it has been held that school officials conducting in-school searches of
students are private parties acting in loco parentis who are not subject to
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., D. R. C. v. State,
646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In reG., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220
(1969); People v. Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (1970);
R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450
S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See also State v. Kappes, 26 Ariz.
App. 567, 550 P. 2d 121 (1976) (student advisers in dormitory search); State
v. Wingerd, 40 Ohio App. 2d 236, 318 N. E. 2d 866 (1974) (same); State v.
Keadle, 277 S. E. 2d 456 (N. C. App. 1981) (same). At least one court has
held, on the other hand, that the Fourth Amendment applies in full to inschool searches by school officials and that a search conducted without
probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.),
vacated, 423 U. S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976), and
others have made clear that the probable-cause standard applies where
there is police involvement, seeM. v. Board of Education Ball-Chatham
Community Unit School District No . 5, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill.
1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State
v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S. E. 2d 586, 594 (1975), or where the
search is highly intrusive. SeeM. M. v. Anker, 607 F. 2d 588, 589 (CA2
1979). Other courts have struck the balance by holding that the Fourth
Amendment applies, but that the exclusionary rule developed to remedy
violations of the Amendment does not. See, e. g., State v. Lamb, 137 Ga.
App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976); State v. Young, supra. See also United
States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (Me. 1969) (exclusionary rule would not
deter search by administrative officer at Job Corps Center).
The applicability of the exclusionary rule, however, has been discussed
in very few of the cases, for most courts that have considered challenges by
students to in-school searches or seizures by school officials have held that
the officials' activity did not violate the Fourth Amendment. But see In re
J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); People v. D., 34 N. Y.
2d 483, 358 N. Y. S. 2d 403, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974). These courts have
rejected the view that school officials conducting in-school searches act as
private individuals to which the Fourth Amendment does not apply.
E . g., Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F. 2d 470,
480 (CA5 1982); Jones v. Latexo Independent School District, 499 F. Supp.
223, 229 (ED Tex. 1980); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F . Supp. 47, 51 (NDNY
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against which the state court held that school officials' conduct is to be judged, or the state court's conclusion that
T. L. O.'s purse had been searched contrary to the Fourth
Amendment. The sole question presented by the petition is
whether the exclusionary rule should be applied so as to bar
the use in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence that
has been illegally seized by a school official without the participation of law enforcement officers. The State submits
that the rule should not apply in such circumstances. We
1977); Picha v. Wilgos, supra, at 1217-1218; State v. Lamb, supra; People
v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M.
827, 540 P. 2d 827 (App. 1975); State v. Walker, 19 Or. App. 420, 528 P. 2d
113 (1974). But they typically have held that school officials may act without a warrant, e. g., Bilbrey v. Brown, 481 F. Supp. 26, 27-28 (Or. 1979);
In reG., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970), and have relaxed
the standard of suspicion necessary to justify in-school searches by school
officials acting without the participation of law enforcement officials.
E. g., Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, supra; Stern v.
New Haven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31 (ED Mich. 1981); Jones
v. Latexo Independent School District, supra; Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F.
Supp. 1012 (ND Ind. 1979, aff'd in part and remanded in part, 631 F. 2d 91
(CA5 1980), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 1022 (1981)); Bellnier v. Lund, supra;
In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino,
282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); State v. Young, supra; In re J. A., supra;
People v. Ward, supra; People v. D., supra; State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash.
2d 75, 558 P. 2d 781 (1977); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343
(App. 1979). In assessing the reasonableness of searches and seizures by
school officials, the courts have looked to such factors as: (1) whether the
officials acted alone or in concert with the police; (2) whether the search
was undertaken to promote school discipline or to facilitate criminal prosecution; (3) the nature and extent of the search; (4) the child's age and disciplinary record; (5) the seriousness of the problem to which the search was
addressed; (6) whether the official acted under exigent circumstances; and
(7) the probative value and reliability of the evidence on the basis of which
the search was undertaken. See e. g., Bellnier v. Lund, supra; Doe v.
State, supra; People v. D., supra; In re L. L., supra; Schiff, The Emergence of Student Rights to Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 34
Baylor L. Rev. 209, 213 (1982).
00
In United States v. Leon,-- U. S. - - (1984), and Massachusetts v.
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agree with this submission and reverse the judgment of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 3
II

Since the Fourth Amendment "has never been interpreted
to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all
proceedings or against all persons," Stone v. Powell, 428
U. S. 465, 486 (1976), the State's concession that the viceprincipal's search of T. L. O.'s purse violated the Fourth
Amendment only begins the inquiry in this case. We have
repeatedly stressed that the Constitution itself does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, United States v. Leon, - - U. S. - - ,
- - (1984), and have emphasized that whether the judicially
created exclusionary rule is appropriately applied in a particular case or class of cases is "an issue separate and apart
from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of
the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police
conduct." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. - - , - - (1983).
The remedial question before us in this case, our decisions
make clear, must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of excluding from juvenile delinquency proceedings evidence illegally obtained by a school official who sought to enforce school disciplinary rules and who acted without the
participation of law enforcement authorities. See United
States v. Leon, supra, at --; United States v. Calandra,
414 U. S. 338, 347-352 (1974). The primary, if not the only,
justification for suppressing the fruits of illegal searches and
Sheppard, U. S. (1984), we held that the exclusionary rule
should not be applied where, judged objectively, it cannot be said that officers should have known that they were violating the Fourth Amendment.
Here, as stated in the text, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the
vice-principal had "no reasonable grounds" to believe that T. L. O.'s purse
contained cigarettes. Hence, there is no occasion to vacate the judgment
of the New Jersey court and remand the case for reconsideration in light of
Leon and Sheppard.
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seizures is the belief that the imposition of that severe remedy will reduce the incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment and deter future illegality. United States v. Leon,
supra, at - - ; Stone v. Powell, supra, at 486; United States
v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 446 (1976). Accordingly, in light of
the "substantial cost [imposed] on the societal interest in law
enforcement by ... [excluding] ... what concededly is
relevant evidence," id., at 448-449, we have restricted "the
application of the [exclusionary] rule ... to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served." United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. Furthermore, in determining the applicability of the exclusionary
rule, we must be convinced that an appreciable deterrent effect has been shown.
Speculative benefits do not warrant
the "strong medicine" of the exclusionary rule. United
States v. Janis, supra, at 453; United States v. Calandra,
supra, at 351-352.
On the strength of this balancing test, we have held that
the exclusionary rule does not apply in certain types of judicial proceedings, see United States v. Janis, supra; United
States v. Calandra, supra, 4 does not render per se admissible all evidence that came to light through a chain of causation beginning with an illegal search or arrest, see, e. g.,
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 (1978); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975), and does not prevent all possible
uses of illegally obtained evidence in proceedings to which it
is generally applicable. See, e. g., United States v. Havens,
446 U. S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62
(1964). We also have concluded that the rule constitutes an
• Although this Court has never addressed the question whether the exclusionary rule applies in juvenile delinquency proceedings and we need
not do so to resolve this case, state courts that have considered the issue
have consistently held that the rule is applicable. E. g., In re K., 24 Cal.
3d 395, 595 P. 2d 105, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 973 (1979); In re J. A., 85 Ill.
App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); State v. Doe, 93 N. M. 143, 597 P. 2d
1183 (App. 1979); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App.
1979).
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inappropriate remedy for certain types of objectively reasonable errors by law enforcement officers. United States v.
Leon, supra; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, - - U.S. - (1984).

We have not had occasion to consider the applicability of
this approach to evidence obtained in unlawful searches or
seizures conducted by state or federal governmental employees who do not work for law enforcement agencies and whose
funct"ons do noC a within the ream o aw enforcement.
we are now confronted withsuch a case:assu!ning that there
has been a Fourth Amendment violation-because the case
comes to us in that posture-the question is whether the evidence seized from T. L. 0. by the vice-principal may be used
against T. L. 0. in her juvenile <(lelinq_uenc;y- proceedings. In
making this determination, there is no reason to depart from
the general principles that have emerged in cases decided
over more than a decade. Guided by these principles, we
conclude that ap lying the exclusiona rule, in the context
of juveru e e nquency or criminal proceedings, to exclude
the fruits of in-school searches and seizures, made wit out
the pa 1c1pa 1on of aw e orcemen officers, 5 is unlikely to
"result in appreciable deterrence ... [and that] ... its use in
the instant-si ua ion Is unwarranted." United States v.
Janis, supra, at 454.
It goes without saying that a duty to exercise care in promoting the health and physical development of students and
to maintain order and discipline is inextricably tied to a
school's mission to educate. Although, as they were in this
case, school authorities may be required to report to the police what they perceive to be violations of the state or local
5
There is no evidence in this record that the vice-principal searched
T. L. O.'s purse at the behest of or in cooperation with law enforcement
authorities. The latter's participation in this case began only after the seizure had been made. The State agrees that suppression would be appropriate if a school official had acted as an agent of the police. Brief for
Petitioner 16-17.

7l-<.
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criminal law, these officials cannot generally be classified as
law enforcement authorities. The unique relationship between schools and students gives rise to concerns that are
largely unrelated to desires to obtain criminal convictions or
adjudications of delinquency. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400
U. S. 309, 322-323 (1971). In-school searches ordinarily further purposes or interests entirely separate and 1stinct om
those serve y the ~Ice s stem; prohibiting the
use m Ehe crimmal-justice system of evidence obtained in
such searches may well have none of the behavioral effects on
either school officials or school boards that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions generally is
thought to have on the typical law enforcement official.
Whether viewed from the perspective of individual school
officials or of school boards, "[t]he enforcement of school
regulations, the safeguarding of students during school hours
through confiscation of weapons and other contraband, and
the maintenance of a drug-free learning environment provide
substantial incentives to search that would not be lessened by
suppression of evidence at a subsequent delinquency proceeding." D. R. C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 252, 258 (Alaska App.
1982). School officials may search frequently enough to develop an understanding of state and federal constitutional
standards, and school boards may and should have both the
incentive and the means to foster such an understanding.
But a persuasive case can be made for the proposition that
local school officials are "primarily concerned with maintaining internal discipline rather than obtaining convictions," id.,
at 258, n. 10, and that the admissibility of the evidence in a
juvenile delinquency or criminal proceeding is not a substantial concern to them and hence will not appreciably control
their conduct. See, e. g., United States v. Coles, 302 F.
Supp. 99, 102-103 (1969); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488,
489-494, 216 S. E. 2d 586, 588-591 (1975). 6
• The dissenters would prefer that the effectiveness of the exclusionary
rule as a deterrent be determined by empirical evidence. At bottom, how-

t

n
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It should also be recalled that, in reviewing the propriety
of the disciplinary sanction imposed on T. L. 0. by her school,
the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, held that
she could not suspended from school on the basis of the evidence seized from her purse, a holding consistent with the
Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision on the scope of the
Fourth Amendment in the case now under review. 7 To the
extent that school officials may be deterred by the exclusion
of evidence, that result will be effected by forbidding the use
of the fruits of their searc es in school disc1p nary proceed----~=-----------~-----ever, the Court's faith in the exclusionary rule has been grounded not so
much on empirical evidence, which is flawed and inconclusive, see United
States v. Janis, supra, at 452, n. 22, as on an informed judgment concerning the rule's behavioral effects. "[T]his Court has opted for exclusion in
the anticipation that that law enforcement officials would be deterred from
violating Fourth Amendment rights. Then, as now, the Court acted in the
absence of convincing empirical evidence and relied, instead, on its own assumptions of human nature and the interrelationship of the various components of the law enforcement system." !d., at 459 (emphasis added). Unlike the dissenters, we are aware of no ersuasive reason for concluding
that the relevant jud ent should not vary epending on the identit duties, an res ons1 1 1es of the overnmen a o c1a w o conducted the
search in question. Just as "common sense dictates that the deterrent effect of the exclusion of relevant evidence is highly attenuated when the
'punishment' imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement officer is
the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or against a different sovereign," id., at 457-458, common se se and reasoned analysis suggest that
the benefits of the exclusionary rule do no ou we g 1 cos s 1 cases like
thisone. Tlie subs antfai pi'tor jUatc~al expefience With searches and seizures undertaken by public-school officials provides, in our view, an adequate basis for concluding that, whether or not evidence that public-school
officials obtain illegally from students in in-school searches is admissible in
a school's internal disciplinary proceedings, the roles and duties of these
officials are such that excluding the fruits of their illegal actions in juvenile
delinquency proceedings will have no appreciable deterrent effect in the
absence of police instigation or involvement.
7
We emphasize that the propriety of that decision is not before us in
this case and that our opinion is not intended to intimate any view concerning whether the exclusionary rule applies in school disciplinary
proceedings.
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ings. It is in those proceedings that the acceptability of
school officials' conduct will, in effect, be judged, and it is in
the outcome of those proceedings that they presumably are
most interested. As long as the Chancery Division's ruling
on T. L. O.'s suspension continues to govern the high
school-and particularly if it is or becomes the general rule in
New Jersey-illegal searches and seizures by school officials
will be adequately deterred. We are quite convinced that
also excluding the evidence from juvenile delinquency proceedings, which fall "outside the offending [officials'] zone of
primary interest," United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 458,
would produce only marginal deterrence, insufficient to justify the cost to law enforcement efforts. Cf. id., at 453-454;
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 493-495; United States v.
Calandra, 414 U. S., at 350-352.
On the other hand, if in the long run, the Chancery Division's holding that forbids the use of illegally seized evidence
in school disciplinary proceedings does not retain its authority, we have substantial doubt that teachers and other officials will be appreciably restrained in the future by a decision
that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of probative
but illegally obtained evidence in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In such circumstances, school authorities w~mld
have little reason or incentive to forgo searches insofar as the
utility of the evidence in school disciplinary proceedings is
concerned. It may be that a teacher would be deterred from
searching by school rules and policies governing such
searches, violation of which may affect the assessment of his
performance by his superiors, or even result in charges being
filed against him. But if the evidence is admissible in internal proceedings against the student, it seems unlikely that
suppressing the evidence in juvenile delinquency or criminal
proceedings would produce the appreciable deterrent consequences necessary to outweigh society's interest in sanctioning crimes by students that unquestionably have been exposed by school officials, albeit by officials acting contrary to
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the applicable constitutional, statutory, or administrative
rules governing the performance of the tasks for which they
have been hired.
Assuming, as we do, that the vice-principal violated
T. L. O.'s Fourth Amendment rights, we do not hold that
she should not have a remedy for this violation, but only that
she is not entitled to have the evidence suppressed in her juvenile delinquency proceeding. The exclusionary rule is designed to deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment,
particularly infringements on the rights of the innocent who,
without the rule, might be subjected to an unacceptable regime of unjustified searches. Under the rationale of the exclusionary rule as it has developed, T. L. 0. hers lf, about
whom reliable evidence has come to light showing that she
was illegally selling drugs to her classmates, has little entitlement to claim that the evidence should not be used a ainst
her. - The vi6Iafwn, 1 1t occurre , as already been completed. The admission of the evidence agams T. L. o:Tsnot
itselfa violation of the Fourth Amendment; and excluding it
would be a remedy designed not to benefit her, but to forestall similar lawless invasionsOf the rights of others.
We do not leave T. L. 0., others like her, or wholly innocent persons without remedies to vindicate their Fourth
Amendment rights. T. L. 0. sought judicial review of her
suspension and successfully urged that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. We assume that resort to
the courts will continue to be available to enforce any local,
state, or federal standards applicable to searches and seizures carried out by school authorities. Public-school teachers and administrators who know or should have known that
their conduct is contrary to the Fourth Amendment will also
be subject to liability under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and they may
be 'SuQ.ject to acboil ~eTI. We do not,
however, discern any satisfactory predicate for excluding
from state juvenile delinquency or criminal proceedings the
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product of in-school searches carried out by school authorities
without participation by law enforcement personnel.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is accordingly reversed.
So ordered.
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW JERSEY
[October - , 1984]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to examine the appropriateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for searches carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment by public
school authorities. Our consideration of the proper application of the Fourth Amendment to the public schools, however, has led us to conclude that the search that gave rise to
the case now before us did not violate the Fourth Amendment. AcC'Oraingly, we here address o.!!!y the questions of
the proper standard for assessmg the legality of searc es
coiiOucted ~ puoiiC sChool officials and the application of that
standard tothe facts of thfs case.
I

On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in
Middlesex County, New Jersey, discovered two girls smoking in a lavatory. One of the two girls was the respondent
T. L. 0., who at that time was a 14-year-old high school
freshman. Because smoking in the lavatory was a violation
of a school rule, the teacher took the two girls to the principal's office, where they met with Assistant Vice Principal
Theodore Choplick. In response to questioning by Mr.
Choplick, T. L. O.'s companion admitted that she had violated the rule. T. L. 0., however, denied that she had been
smoking in the lavatory and claimed that she did not smoke at
all.
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Mr. Choplick asked T. L. 0. to come into his private office
and demanded to see her purse. Opening the purse, he
found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed from the purse
and held before T. L. 0. as he accused her of having lied to
him. As he reached into the purse for the cigarettes, Mr.
Choplick also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers.
In his experience, possession of rolling papers by high school
students was closely associated with the use of marihuana.
Suspecting that a closer examination of the purse might yield
further evidence of drug use, Mr. Choplick proceeded to
search the purse thoroughly. The search revealed a small
amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags,
a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index
card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T. L. 0.
money, and two letters that implicated T. L. 0. in marihuana
dealing.
Mr. Choplick notified T. L. O.'s mother and the police, and
turned the evidence of drug dealing over to the police. At
the request of the police, T. L. O.'s mother took her daughter to police headquarters, where T. L. 0. confessed that she
had been selling marihuana at the high school. On the basis
of her confession and the evidence seized by Mr. Choplick,
the state brought delinquency charges against T. L. 0. in the
Juvem e an
omes ·
e a Ions Court of Middlesex
County. 1 Contending that Mr. Choplick's search of her
purse violated the Fourth Amendment, T. L. 0. moved to
suppress the evidence found in her purse as well her confession, which, she argued, was tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. The juvenile court denied the motion to sup'T. L. 0. also received a three-day suspension from school for smoking
cigarettes in a nonsmoking area and a seven-day suspension for possession of marihuana. On T. L. O.'s motion, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, set aside the seven-day suspension on the ground
that it was based on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
[T. L. 0 .] v. Piscataway Bd. of Educ., No. C.2865-79 (Super. Ct. N. J .,
Ch. Div. , Mar. 31 , 1980). The Board of Education apparently did not appeal the decision of the Chancery Division.
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pr~ss.
State in the Interest ofT. L. 0., 178 N.J. Super.
· 329, 428 A. 2d 1327 (1980). Although the court concluded
that the Fourth Amendment did apply to searches carried
out by school officials, it held that

Applying this standard, the court concluded that the
search conducted by Mr. Choplick was a reasonable one.
The initial decision to open the purse was justified by Mr.
Choplick's well-founded suspicion that T. L. 0. had violated
the rule forbidding smoking in the lavatory. Once the purse
was open, evidence of marihuana violations was in plain view,
and Mr. Choplick was entitled to conduct a thorough search
to determine the nature and extent ofT. L. O.'s drug-related
activities. I d., at 343, 428 A. 2d, at 1334. Having denied
the motion to suppress, the court on March 23, 1981 found
T. L. 0. to be a delinquent and on January 8, 1982 sentenced
her to a year's probation.
On appeal from the final judgment of the juvenile court, a
dividedAppellate Division affirmed the trial court's finding
that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation, but vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for a
determination whether T. L. 0. had knowingly and voluntarily waived her Fifth Amendment rights before confessing.
State in the Interest ofT. L. 0., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A.
2d 493 (1982). T. L. 0. again appealed the Fourth Amendment ruling, and the Supreme Court of New J~sey reversed
the judgment of the Appellate Division and ordered the suppression of the evidence found in T. L. O.'s purse. State in
the Interest ofT. L. 0., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934 (1983).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the lower
courts that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school officials. The court also rejected the State
of New Jersey's argument that the exclusionary rule should
not be employed to prevent the use in juvenile proceedings of
evidence unlawfully seized by school officials. Declining to
consider whether applying the rule to the fruits of searches
by school officials would have any deterrent value, the c_Qurt
held simply that the precedents of this Court estaOlish that
"ifan oTfiClaTSearcn violates constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible m cnmina procee mgs. ' 94N":3.,
at 341, 463
, a 939 ootnote om1 e .
With respect to the question of the legality of the search
before it, the court agreed with the Juvenile Court that a
warrantless search y a school offic1al does not vio ate the
Fou~ me ment so ong as the official "has reasonable
groun s o e 1eve t at a s udent possesses evidence of illegal
activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline
and order." ld., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 941-942. However,
the court, with two justices dissenting, sharply disagreed
with the Juvenile Court's conclusion that the search of the
purse was reasonable. According to the majority, the contents of T. L. O.'s purse had no bearing on the accusation
against T. L. 0., for possession of cigarettes (as opposed to
smoking them in the lavatory) did not violate school rules,
and a mere desire for evidence that would impeach T. L. O.'s
claim that she did not smoke cigarettes could not justify the
search. Moreover, even if a reasonable suspicion that
T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse would justify a search,
Mr. Choplick had no such suspicion, as no one had furnished
him with any specific information that there were cigarettes
in the purse. Finally, leaving aside the question whether
Mr. Choplick was justified in opening the purse, the court
found that the evidence of drug use that he found inside did
not justify the extensive "rummaging" through T. L. O.'s papers and effects that followed. !d., at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942.
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We granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certiorari. 464 U. S. - - (1983). Although the State had argued
in the Supreme Court of New Jersey that the search of
T. L. O.'s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the
petition for certiorari raised only the question whether the
exclusionary rule should operate to bar consideration in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by
a school official without the involvement of law enforcement
officers. When this case was first argued last Term, the
State conceded for the purpose of argument that the standard devised by the New Jersey Supreme Court for determining the legality of school searches was appropriate and that
the court had correctly applied that standard; the State contended only that the remedial purposes of the exclusionary
rule were not well served by applying it to searches conducted by public authorities not primarily engaed in law
enforcement.
Although we originally granted certiorari to decide the
issue of the appropriate remedy in juvenile court proceedings
for unlawful school searches, our doubts regarding the wisdom of deciding that question in isolation from the broader
question of what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places
on the activities of school authorities prompted us to order
reargument on that question. 2 Having heard argument on
2

State and federal courts considering these questions have struggled to
accommodate the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and the
interest of the States in providing a safe environment conducive to education in the public schools. Some courts have resolved the tension between
these interests by giving full force to one or the other side of the balance.
Thus, in a number of cases courts have held that school officials conducting
in-school searches of students are private parties acting in loco parentis
and are therefore not subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.
See, e. g., D. R. C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In reG., 11
Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App.
2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); R . C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex.
App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). At
least one court has held, on the other hand, that the Fourth Amendment
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the legality of the search ofT. L. O.'s purse, we are satisfied
that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
II
In determining whether the search at issue in this case violated the Fourth Amendment, we are faced initially with the
applies in full to in-school searches by school officials and that a search conducted without probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So.
2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 U. S. 809 (1975), on remand , 330 So. 2d 900 (La.
1976); others have held or suggested that the probable-cause standard is
applicable at least where the police are involved in a search, see M. v.
Board of Educ. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No.5, 429 F.
Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill. 1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214,
1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S. E. 2d
586, 594 (1975), or where the search is highly intrusive, see M. M. v.
Anker, 607 F. 2d 588, 589 (CA2 1979).
The majority of courts that have addressed the issue o..f_ tl}_e Fourth
Amendment in the schoo s ave, I e t e Supreme Court of New Jersey in
this case, reached a middle position: the Fourth Amendment applies to
searches coiiducte(fliySchOoTalrthorities, but the special needs oL the
school environmen!_ req_uire as~essment of the leg ality of such se~rches
agantst a st anaar"ir ss
cfmg1lian €Fiat probable cause. These courts
ool authorities pro5
have,
and arge, uphe warran
vided that they are supported by a asonable sus icion that the search will
oo disciplinary rule~ violation
uncover evidence of an infraction o
of the law. See, e. g., Tarter v. Raybuck No. 83-3174 ~_;Aug. 31,
1984); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F. 2d 1462 (~984); Horton v. Goose Creek
Independent School Dist., 690 F. 2d 470 Mi 982); Bellnier v. Lund, 438
F. Supp. 47 (NDNY 1977); M. v. Board o due. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No.5, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); State v.
D. T. W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Young,
supra; In re J . A. 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); People v.
Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M.
827, 540 P. 2d 827 (App. 1975); People v. D., 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 358 N. Y. S.
2d 403, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.
2d 781 (1977); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979).
Alth~w have considered the matter, courts have also split over
whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for Fourth
Amendment violauOnS committed by school authorities. The Georgia
courts have held that although the Fourth Amendment applies to the

or
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question whether that Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted
/ _,~
/ / P'_'-- /7 ~ .L / . ~
by public school officials. We hold that it does.
--r-....---,.--r~
It is now beyond dispute that "the. Federhl Constitution,
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers." Elkins v.
United States, 364 U. S. 206, 213 (1960); accord Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25
(1949). Equally indisputable is the proposition that the
FourteenthAmendment protects the rights of stude'irts
againstencroa&mellt bypublics chool of cials: ~

'---

-

------ --·

---..__

·-

"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and
all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted.
These have, of course, delicate, and highly discretionary
functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943).

These two propositions-that the Fourth Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and
that the actions of public school officials are subject to the
limits placed on State action by the Fourteenth Amendment--;-might appear sufficient to answer the suggestion that
the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe unreasonable
schools, the exclusionary rule does not. See, e. g., State v. Young, supra;
State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S. E . 2d 51 (1976). Other jurisdictions have applied the rule to exclude the fruits of unlawful school searches
from criminal trials and delinquency proceedings. See State v. Mora,
supra; People v. D., supra.
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searches by school officials. On reargument, however, the
e Jersey ha ar ed that the history of the
Fou
Amendment indicates t at the Amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out by
law enforcement officers; accordingly, although public school
officials are concededly State agents for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment creates no
rights enforceable against them. 3
It may well be true that the evil toward which the Fourth
Amendment was primarily directed was the resurrection of
the pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants or
"writs of assistance" to authorize searches for contraband by
officers of the Crown. See United States v. Chadwick, 433
U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
624-629 (1886). But this Court has never limited the
Amendment's prohibition on unr so
le ea es and seizures to opera 1ons con ucted by the police. Rather, the
Court ~1-h Amendment's strictures
as restraints imposed upon "governmental action"-that is,
"upon the activities of sovereign authority." Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 475 (1921). Accordingly, we have
held the Fourth Amendment applicable to the activities of
yivil as well as criminal authorities: building inspectors, see
)/Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967),
OSHA inspectors, see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S.
307, 312-313 (1978), and even firemen entering privately
owned premises to battle a fire, see Michigan v. Tyler, 436
uj s. 499, 506 (1978), are all subject to the restraints im~~~ed by the Fourth Amendment.
As we observed in
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, "[t]he basic purpose of
this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this
Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals

\

3
Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (holding that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applies only to
punishments imposed ~r criminal convictions and hence does not apply
to the punishment of schoolchildren by public school officials).
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against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." 387
U. S., at 528. Because the individual's interest in privacy
and personal security "suffers whether the government's
motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or
breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards," Marshall v. Barlow's, 436 U. S., at 312-313, it would be "anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528.
Notwithstanding the general applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to the activities of civil authorities, a few courts
have concluded that school officials are exempt from the dictates of the Fourth Amendment by virtue of the special
nature of their authority over schoolchildren. See, e. g.,
R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983).
Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act in loco
parentis in their dealings with students: their authority is
that of the parent, not the state, and is therefore not subject
to the limits of the Fourth Amendment. Ibid.
Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality and
the teachings of this Court. We have held school officials
subject to the commands of the First Amendment, see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent GOmmuntiy ScRool District,
393 U. S. 503 (1969), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see ~z, supra. If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the consitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority when conducting searches of their students. More generally, the Court
has recognized that "the concept of parental delegation" as a
source of school authority is not entirely "consonant with
compulsory education laws." Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U. S., at 662. Today's public school officials do not merely
exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individ-
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ual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies. See, e. g., the
opinion in State in the Interest ofT. L. 0., 94 N.J. 331, 343,
463 A. 2d 934, 940 (1983), describing the New Jersey statutes
regulating school disciplinary policies and establishing the
authority of school officials over their students. In carrying
out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to
such policies, school officials act as representagyes of the
state, not merely ~or the parent, and they cannot claim the parent's immunity from the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment.
III
To hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches
conducted by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry
into the standards governing such searches. Although the
underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always
that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable
depends on the context within which a search takes place.
Theaetermination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires "balancing the need
to search against the invasion which thesearch entails."
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 536-537. On one
side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate
expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other,
the government's need for effective methods to deal with
breaches of public order.
We have recognized that even a limited search of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S., at 24-25. We have also recognized that searches of
closed items of personal luggage are intrusions on protected
privacy interests, for "the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view." United States v. Ross, 456 U. S.
798, 822-823 (1982). A search of a child's person or of a

u~

Y
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closed purse or other bag carried on her person, 4 no less than
a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly q se- \
vere violation of sub· ective ex ectation Ofriv~ - c::::._)
Of course, the Fourth Amendment oes not protect subjective ex ectations of privacy that are unreasonable or otherwise "illegitimate.
ee, e. g., udsonv. Palmer~
U. & (1984); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980). To receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment,
an expectation of privacy must be one that society is "prepared to recognize as legitimate." Hudson v. Palmer, - U. S., at--. The State of New Jersey has argued that because of the pervasive supervision to which children in the
schools are necessarily1 subject, a child has virtually no legitimate expectation of privacy in articles of personal property
"unnecessarily" carried into a school. This argument has
two factual premises: (1) the fundamental incompatibility of
expectations of privacy with the maintenance of a sound educational environment; and (2) the minimal interest of the child
in bringing any items of personal property into the school.
Both premises are severely flawed. """(
Although this Court may take notice of the difficulty of
maintaining discipline in the public schools today, the situa'We do not address the question, not presented by this case, whether a
schoolchild has a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers, desks, or
other school property provided for the storage of school supplies. Nor do
we express any opinion on the standards (if any) governing searches of
such areas by school officials or by other public authorities acting at the
request of school officials. Compare Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F. 2d 662,
670 (CAlO 1981) ("Inasmuch as the school had assumed joint control of the
locker it cannot be successfully maintained that the school did not have a
right to inspect it."), and People v. Overton, 24 N. Y. 2d 522, 301 N. Y. S.
2d 479, 249 N. E. 2d 366 (1969) (school administrators have power to consent to search of a student's locker), with State v. Engerud, 94 N. J. 331,
463 A. 2d 934 (1983) ("We are satisfied that in the context of this case the
student had an expectation of privacy in the contents of his locker.... For
the four years of high school, the school locker is a home away from home.
In it the student stores the kind of personal 'effects' protected by the
Fourth Amendment.").

7

? 'J)I..AJ
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tion is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no
legitimate expectations of privacy. We have recently recognized that the need to maintain order in a prison is such that
prisoners retain no legitimate expectations of privacy in their
cells, but it goes almost without saying that "[t]he prisoner
and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances,
separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 669. We are}
not yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be
equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Nor does the State's suggestion that children have no legitimate need to bring personal property into the schools
seem well-anchored inreality. Students at a minimum must
bring to school not only the supplies needed for their studies,
but also keys, money, and the necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming. In addition, students may carry on
their persons or in purses or wallets such nondisruptive yet
highly personal items as photographs, letters, and diaries.
Finally, students -may have perfectly legitimate reasons to
carry with them articles of property needed in connection
with extracurricular or recreational activities. In short,
schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, non-contraband items, and there is no
reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all
rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto
school grounds.
A ainst the child's interest in rivac must be set the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaine ~c:;:::;
la:"'s.=c
sr:;...;o::...:o:..:;:m=a':nd
.::.....=o..=.:
n:...;;s:...:c.:.:
h.::..
oo:.;l:.Jg2:...::
ro-=u=.:
nds. Maining ~-=t~h::taining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in
recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly
ugly form ·
nd viol t crime in the schools have become major social roblems. See generally NIE, U. S.
Dep't
ucation, 10 en chools-§'afe Schools: The Safe
School Study Report to the Congress (1978). Even in
schools that have been spared the most severe disciplinary

l

/'!.A'/d...J
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problems, the preservation of order and a proper educational
environment re uires close supervision of schoolchildren, as
well as the enforcement o ru es agamst conduct that would
be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult. "Events
calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes
require immediate, effective action." Goss v. Lopez, 419
U. S. 565, 580 (1975). Accordingly, we have recognized that
maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures,
and we have respected the value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship. See id., at 582-583;
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 680-682 (1977).
H~, should we strike the balance between the
schoolchild's legitimate expectations of privacy and the
school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment
in which learning can take place? It is evident that the
school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to
which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.
The warrant re uirement, in particular, is unsuited to the
school environment: requirmg a eacher to obtain a warrant
before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school
rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures
needed in the schools. Just as we have in other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when "the burden of
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search," Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U. S., at 533, we hold today that school officials need not
obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under
their authority.
The school setting also requires some modification of the
level of suSDlciOnOf11llcit activity needed to justify a search.
Or inarily, a search-even one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant-must be based upon "probable
cause" to believe that a violation of the law has occurred.
See, e. g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266,
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273; Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 62-66 (1968). However, "probable cause" is not an irreducible requirement of a
valid search. The fundamental command of the Fourth
Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and
although "both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search,
. . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required."
Almeida-Sanchez v. Um'ted States, supra, at 277 (POWELL,
J., concurring). Thus, we have in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on sus pi- ~
cions that, although "reaso~aple," do n~t rise to the level of
probable cause. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohw, 392 U. S. 1 (1968);
United States v.'1irignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881 (1975);
Delaware v Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979); United
States v. ~artinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976); cf. Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 534-539. Where a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests
that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable
cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.
We join the majority of courts that have examined this
i~ G n concluding tbat tfie accommodation of the rivacy
interests o sc oo chi ren Wit t e su stantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the
schools (!Qes not require strict adherence to the requirement
that searches fie based on prooaole cause to believe that the
sub}ect of tile searc1i has vkirated or is violating the law.
Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend
slri!Ply on the 'reasonableness:' under alfthe circumstances, of
the search. ~the reasonableness of any search
involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether
the . . . action was justified at its inception," Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S., at 20; second, one must determine whether the
search as actually conducted "was reasonably related in scope

\1
5

See cases cited, supra n. 2.
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to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place," ibid. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of
a student by a teacher or other school official 6 will be "justified at its inception" when there ar~ 'reasonable grounds for
suspecti,ni that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of
the school. 7 Such a search is permissible in its scope when
its intrusiveness is reasonably related to its objectives.
This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the
efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools
nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of
schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the uestion of
reasonableness, the stan ar WI spare teachers and school
admunstra ors the necessity of schooling themselves in the
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their
6
We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting
alone and on their own authority. This case does not present the question
of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of se~ches conducted
by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement
agencies, and we express no opinion on that question. Compare Picha v.
Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976) (holding probable
cause standard applicable to searches involving the police).
7
We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasoniilileness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities. In offiet contexts, however, we have field that although "some
quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure[,] ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." United States v. a tnez-Fuerte,
428 U. ~See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U. S. 523 (1967). Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated
by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards" are available "to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject
to the discretion of the official in the field.' " Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979) (citation omitted). Because the search of
T. L. O.'s purse was based upon an individualized suspicion that she had
violated school rules, see infra, we need not consider the circumstances
that might justify school authorities in conducting searches unsupported by
indi~.
_;.,

j
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conduct according to the dictates of reason and common
sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard
should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded
no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of
preserving order in the schools.
IV
There remains the question of the legality of the search in
this case. We recognize that the "reasonable grounds"
standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its
consideration of this question is not substantially different
from the standard that we have adopted today. Nonetheless, we believe that the New Jersey court's application of
that standard to strike down the search ofT. L. O.'s purse
reflects a somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness. Our
review of the facts surrounding the search leads us to conclude that the search was in no sense unreasonable for
Fourth Amendment purposes. 8
The incident that gave rise to this case actually involved
two separate searches, with the first-the search for cigarettes-providing the suspicion that gave rise to the second-the search for marihuana. Although it is the fruits of
the second search that are at issue here, the validity of the
search for marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of
the initial search for cigarettes, as there would have been no
reason to suspect that T. L. 0. possessed marihuana had the
first search not taken place. Accordingly, it is to the search
for cigarettes that we first turn our attention.
The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed to two grounds
for its holding that the search for cigarettes was unreasonable. First, the Court observed that possession of cigarettes
was not in itself illegal or a violation of school rules. Because
8

constitution

Of course, New Jersey may insist on a more demanding standard
under its own construction or statutes. In that case, its courts would not
purport to b~ applying the Fourth Amendment when they invalidate a
search.
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the contents ofT. L. O.'s purse would therefore have "nodirect bearing on the infraction" of which she was accused
(smoking in a lavatory where smoking was prohibited), there
was no reason to search her purse. Second, even assuming
that a search ofT. L. O.'s purse might under some circumstances be reasonable in light of the accusation made against
T. L. 0., the New Jersey Court concluded that Mr. Choplick
in this particular case had no reasonable grounds to suspect
that T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse. At best, according to the court, Mr. Choplick had "a good hunch." 94 N.J.,
at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942.
Both these conclusions are implausible. T. L. 0. had been
accused of smoking, and had denied the accusation in the
strongest possible terms when she stated that she did not
smoke at all. Surely it cannot be said that under these circumstances, T. L. O.'s possession of cigarettes would be irrelevant to the charges against her or to her response to
those charges. T. L. O.'s possession of cigarettes, once it
was discovered, would both corroborate the report that she
had been smoking and undermine the credibility of her defense to the charge of smoking. To be sure, the discovery of
the cigarettes would not prove that T. L. 0. had been smoking in the lavatory; nor would it, strictly speaking, necessarily be inconsistent with her claim that she did not smoke at
all. But it is universally recognized that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate
fact in issue, but only have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." Fed. Rule Evid. 401. The relevance ofT. L. O.'s possession of cigarettes to the question
whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her
denial that she smoked supplied the necessary "nexus" between the item searched for and the infraction under investigation. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 306-307
(1967). Thus, if Mr. Choplick in fact had a reasonable suspi-
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cion that T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse, the search was
justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if found, would
constitute "mere evidence" of a violation. Ibid.
Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that
Mr. Choplick had no reasonable suspicion that the purse
would contain cigarettes. This conclusion is puzzling. A
teacher had reported that T. L. 0. was smoking in the lavatory. Certainly this report gave Mr. Choplick reason to suspect that T. L. 0. was carrying cigarettes with her; and if
she did have cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in
which to find them. Mr. Choplick's suspicion that there
were cigarettes in the purse was not an "inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,"' Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S., at 27; rather, it was the sort of "common-sense conclusion[] about human nature" upon which "practical people"including government officials-are entitled to rely. United
States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). Of course, even
if the teacher's report were true, T. L. 0. might not have
had a pack of cigarettes with her; she might have borrowed a
cigarette from someone else or have been sharing a cigarette
with another student. But the requirement of reasonable
suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty: "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourteenth Amendment .... " Hill v.
California, 401 U. S. 797, 804 (1971). Because the hypothesis that T. L. 0. was carrying cigarettes in her purse was itself not unreasonable, it is irrelevant that other hypotheses
were also consistent with the teacher's accusation. 9 Accord9
T. L. 0. also contends that even if it was reasonable for Mr. Choplick
to open her purse to look for cigarettes, it was not reasonable for him to
reach in and take the cigarettes out of her purse once he found them. Had
he not removed the cigarettes from the purse, she asserts, he would not
have observed the rolling papers that suggested the presence of marihuana, and the search for marihuana could not have taken place.
T. L. O.'s argument is based on the fact that the cigarettes were not "contraband," as no school rule forbade her to have them. Thus, according to
T. L. 0., the cigarettes were not subject to seizure or confiscation by
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ingly, it cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted unreasonably
when he examined T. L. O.'s purse to see if it contained
cigarettes.
Our conclusion that Mr. Choplick's decision to open
T. L. O.'s purse was reasonable brings us to the question of
the further search for marihuana once the pack of cigarettes
was located. The suspicion upon which the search for marihuana was founded was provided when Mr. Choplick observed a package of rolling papers in the purse as he removed
the pack of cigarettes. Although T. L. 0. does not dispute
the reasonableness of Mr. Choplick's belief that the rolling
papers indicated the presence of marihuana, she does contend
that the scope of the search Mr. Choplick conducted exceeded permissible bounds when he seized and read certain
letters that implicated T. L. 0. in drug dealing activity.
This argument, too, is unpersuasive. The discovery of the
rolling papers concededly gave rise to a reasonable suspicion
that T. L. 0. was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in
her purse. This suspicion justified further exploration of
T. L. O.'s purse, which turned up more evidence of drug-related activities: a pipe, a number of plastic bags of the type
commonly used to store marihuana, a small quantity of marihuana, and a fairly substantial amount of money. Under
these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the
search to a separate zippered compartment of the purse; and
when a search of that compartment revealed an index card
containing a list of "people who owe me money" as well as
two letters, the inference that T. L. 0. was involved in marischool authorities, and Mr. Choplick was not entitled to take them out of
T. L. O.'s purse regardless of whether he was entitled to peer into the
purse to see if they were there. Such hairsplitting argumentation has no
place in an inquiry addressed to the issue of reasonableness. If Mr.
Choplick could permissibly search T. L. O.'s purse for cigarettes, it hardly
seems reasonable to suggest that his natural reaction to finding thempicking them up-could be a Constitutional violation. Accordingly, we
find that neither in opening the purse nor in reaching into it to remove the
cigarettes did Mr. Choplick violate the Fourth Amendment.

-
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huana trafficking was substantial enough to justify Mr.
Choplick in examining the letters to determine whether they
contained any further evidence. In short, we cannot conclude that the search for marihuana was unreasonable in any
respect.
Because the search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of marihuana dealing by T. L. 0. was reasonable, the
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision to exclude that evidence from T. L. O.'s juvenile delinquency proceedings on
Fourth Amendment grounds was erroneous. Accordingly,
the judgment of the Supreme Court of New J ers~

~

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

...

..

From:

Justice White

Circulated: _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __

pp. 7, 16-18 and stylistic
changes throughout

Recirculated :

I 2-

3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-712

NEW JERSEY, PETITIONER v. T. L. 0.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW JERSEY
[December -
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JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to examine the appropriateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for searches carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment by public
school authorities. Our consideration of the proper application of the Fourth Amendment to the public schools, however, has led us to conclude that the search that gave rise to
the case now before us did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we here address only the questions of
the proper standard for assessing the legality of searches
conducted by public school officials and the application of that
standard to the facts of this case.
I

On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in
Middlesex County, N.J., discovered two girls smoking in a
lavatory. One of the two girls was the respondent T. L. 0.,
who at that time was a 14-year-old high school freshman.
Because smoking in the lavatory was a violation of a school
rule, the teacher took the two girls to the Principal's office,
where they met with Assistant Vice Principal Theodore
Choplick. In response to questioning by Mr. Choplick,
T. L. O.'s companion admitted that she had violated the rule.
T. L. 0., however, denied that she had been smoking in the
lavatory and claimed that she did not smoke at all.
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Mr. Choplick asked T. L. 0. to come into his private office
and demanded to see her purse. Opening the purse, he
found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed from the purse
and held before T. L. 0. as he accused her of having lied to
him. As he reached into the purse for the cigarettes, Mr.
Choplick also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers.
In his experience, possession of rolling papers by high school
students was closely associated with the use of marihuana.
Suspecting that a closer examination of the purse might yield
further evidence of drug use, Mr. Choplick proceeded to
search the purse thoroughly. The search revealed a small
amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags,
a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index
card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T. L. 0.
money, and two letters that implicated T. L. 0. in marihuana
dealing.
Mr. Choplick notified T. L. O.'s mother and the police, and
turned the evidence of drug dealing over· to the police. At
the request of the police, T. L. O.'s mother took her daughter to police headquarters, where T. L. 0. confessed that she
had been selling marihuana at the high school. On the basis
of the confession and the evidence seized by Mr. Choplick,
the State brought delinquency charges against T. L. 0. in
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex
County.' Contending that Mr. Choplick's search of her
purse violated the Fourth Amendment, T. L. 0. moved to
suppress the evidence found in her purse as well her confession, which, she argued, was tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. The Juvenile Court denied the motion to sup'T. L. 0. also received a 3-day suspension from school for smoking ·cigarettes in a nonsmoking area and a 7-day suspension for possession of marihuana. On T. L. O.'s motion, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, set aside the 7-day suspension on the ground that it was
based on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
(T. L. 0.) v. Piscataway Bd. ofEd., No. C.2865-79 (Super. Ct. N.J., Ch.
Div., Mar. 31, 1980). The Board of Education apparently did not appeal
the decision of the Chancery Division.
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press. State ex rel. T. L. 0., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 428 A. 2d
1327 (1980). Although the court concluded that the Fourth
Amendment did apply to searches carried out by school officials, it held that
"a school official may properly conduct a search of a student's person if the official has a reasonable suspicion
that a crime has been or is in the process of being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is
necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school
policies." I d., at 341, 428 A. 2d, at 1333 (emphasis in
original).
Applying this standard, the court concluded that the
search conducted by Mr. Choplick was a reasonable one.
The initial decision to open the purse was justified by Mr.
Choplick's well-founded suspicion that T. L. 0. had violated
the rule forbidding smoking in the lavatory. Once the purse
was open, evidence of marihuana violations was in plain view,
and Mr. Choplick was entitled to conduct a thorough search
to determine the nature and extent ofT. L. O.'s drug-related
activities. !d., at 343, 428 A. 2d, at 1334. Having denied
the motion to suppress, the court on March 23, 1981 found
T. L. 0. to be a delinquent and on January 8, 1982, sentenced
her to a year's probation.
On appeal from the final judgment of the Juvenile Court, a
divided Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's finding
that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation, but vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for a
determination whether T. L. 0. had knowingly and voluntarily waived her Fifth Amendment rights before confessing.
State ex rel. T. L. 0., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A. 2d 493
(1982). T. L. 0. appealed the Fourth Amendment ruling,
and the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and ordered the suppression
of the evidence found in T. L. O.'s purse. State ex rel.
T. L. 0., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934 (1983).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the lower
courts that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school officials. The court also rejected the State
of New Jersey's argument that the exclusionary rule should
not be employed to prevent the use in juvenile proceedings of
evidence unlawfully seized by school officials. Declining to
consider whether applying the rule to the fruits of searches
by school officials would have any deterrent value, the court
held simply that the precedents of this Court establish that
"if an official search violates constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in criminal proceedings." !d., at 341,
463 A. 2d, at 939 (footnote omitted).
With respect to the question of the legality of the search
before it, the court agreed with the Juvenile Court that a
warrantless search by a school official does not violate the
Fourth Amendment so long as the official "has reasonable
grounds to beli~ve that a student possesses evidence of illegal
activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline
and order." !d., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 941-942. However,
the court, with two justices dissenting, sharply disagreed
with the Juvenile Court's conclusion that the search of the
purse was reasonable. According to the majority, the contents ofT. L. O.'s purse had no bearing on the accusation
against T. L. 0., for possession of cigarettes (as opposed to
smoking them in the lavatory) did not violate school rules,
and a mere desire for evidence that would impeach T. L. O.'s
claim that she did not smoke cigarettes could not justify the
search. Moreover, even if a reasonable suspicion that
T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse would justify a search,
Mr. Choplick had no such suspicion, as no one had furnished
him with any specific information that there were cigarettes
in the purse. Finally, leaving aside the question whether
Mr. Choplick was justified in opening the purse, the court
. held that the evidence of drug use that he saw inside did not
justify the extensive "rummaging" through T. L. O.'s papers
and effects that followed. !d., at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942-943.
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We granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certiorari. 464 U. S. - - (1983). Although the State had argued
in the Supreme Court of New Jersey that the search of
T. L. O.'s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the
petition for certiorari raised only the question whether the
exclusionary rule should operate to bar consideration in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by
a school official without the involvement of law enforcement
officers. When this case was first argued last Term, the
State conceded for the purpose of argument that the standard devised by the New Jersey Supreme Court for determining the legality of school searches was appropriate and that
the court had correctly applied that standard; the State contended only that the remedial purposes of the exclusionary
rule were not well served by applying it to searches conducted by public authorities not primarily engaged in law
enforcement.
Although we originally granted certiorari to decide the
issue of the appropriate remedy in juvenile court proceedings
for unlawful school searches, our doubts regarding the wisdom of deciding that question in isolation from the broader
question of what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places
on the activities of school authorities prompted us to order
reargument on that question. 2 Having heard argument on
State and federal courts considering these questions have struggled to
accommodate the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and the
interest of the States in providing a safe environment conducive to education in the public schools. Some courts have resolved the tension between
these interests by giving full force to one or the other side of the balance.
Thus, in a number of cases courts have held that school officials conducting
in-school searches of students are private parties acting in loco parentis
and are therefore not subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.
See, e. g., D. R. C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In reG., 11
Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App.
2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); R . C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex.
App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). At
least one court has held, on the other hand , that the Fourth Amendment
2
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the legality of the search ofT. L. O.'s purse, we are satisfied
that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 3
II
In determining whether the search at issue in this case violated the Fourth Amendment, we are faced initially with the
applies in full to in-school searches by school officials and that a search conducted without probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So.
2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 U. S. 809 (1975), on remand , 330 So. 2d 900 (La.
1976); others have held or suggested that the probable-cause standard is
applicable at least where the police are involved in a search, see M. v.
Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No . 5, 429 F .
Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill. 1977); Picha v. Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214,
1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S. E. 2d
586, 594 (1975); or where the search is highly intrusive, see M. M . v.
Anker, 607 F. 2d 588, 589 (CA2 1979).
The majority of courts that have addressed the issue of the Fourth
Amendment in the schools have, like the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
this case, reac.hed a middle position: the Fourth Amendment applies to
searches conducted by school authorities, but the special needs of the
school environment require assessment of the legality of such searches
against a standard less exacting than that of probable cause. These courts
have, by and large, upheld warrantless searches by school authorities provided that they are supported by a reasonable suspicion that the search will
uncover evidence of an infraction of school disciplinary rules or a violation
of the law. See, e. g., Tarter v. Raybuck, No. 83-3174 (CA6, Aug. 31,
1984); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F. 2d 1462 (CA9 1984); Horton v. Goose Creek
Independent School Dist., 690 F. 2d 470 (CA5 1982); Bellnier v. Lund, 438
F. Supp. 47 (NDNY 1977); M . v. Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham Community
Unit School Dist. No. 5, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); State v.
D. T. W ., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Young,
supra; In re J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); People v.
Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M.
827, 540 P. 2d 827 (App. 1975); People v. D., 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 358 N. Y. S.
2d 403, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.
2d 781 (1977); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979).
Although few have considered the matter, courts have also split over
whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations committed by school authorities. The Georgia
courts have held that although the Fourth Amendment applies to the
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question whether that Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted
by public school officials. We hold that it does.
It is now beyond dispute that "the Federal Constitution,
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers." Elkins v.
United States, 364 U. S. 206, 213 (1960); accord, Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25
(1949). Equally indisputable is the proposition that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of students
against encroachment by public school officials:
"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and
all of its creatures-Boards of .Education not excepted.
Tnese have, of course, delicate, and highly discretionary
functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
schools, the exclusionary rule does not. See, e. g., State v. Young , supra;
State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976). Other jurisdictions have applied the rule to exclude the fruits of unlawful school searches
from criminal trials and delinquency proceedings. See State v. Mora ,
supra; People v. D., supra.
3
In holding that the search ofT. L. O.'s purse did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, we do not, as JusTICE STEVENS suggests, see post, at - - ,
implicitly determine that the exclusionary rule applies to the fruits of unlawful searches conducted by school authorities. The question whether
evidence should be excluded from a criminal proceeding involves two discrete inquiries: whether the evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and whether the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy
for the violation. Neither question is logically antecedent to the other, for
a negative answer to either question is sufficient to dispose of the case.
Thus, our determination that the search at issue in this case did not violate
the Fourth Amendment implies no particular resolution of the question of
the applicability of the exclusionary rule.
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discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes." West Virginia State Ed. of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943).
These two propositions-that the Fourth Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and
that the actions of public school officials are subject to the
limits placed on state action by the Fourteenth Amendment-might appear sufficient to answer the suggestion that
the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe unreasonable
searches by school officials. On reargument, however, the
State of New Jersey has argued that the history of the
Fourth Amendment indicates that the Amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out by
law enforcement officers; accordingly, although public school
officials are concededly state agents for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment creates no
rights enforceable against them. 4
It may well be true that the evil toward which the Fourth
Amendment was primarily directed was the resurrection of
the pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants or
"writs of assistance" to authorize searches for contraband by
officers of the Crown. See United States v. Chadwick, 433
U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
624-629 (1886). But this Court has never limited the
Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to operations conducted by the police. Rather, the
Court has long spoken of the Fourth Amendment's strictures
as restraints imposed upon "governmental action"-that is,
"upon the activities of sovereign authority." Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 475 (1921). Accordingly, we have
held the Fourth Amendment applicable to the activities of
civil as well as criminal authorities: building inspectors, see
'Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applies only to
punishments imposed after criminal convictions and hence does not apply
to the punishment of schoolchildren by public school officials) .

..
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Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967),
OSHA inspectors, see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S.
307, 312-313 (1978), and even firemen entering privately
owned premises to battle a fire, see Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U. S. 499, 506 (1978), are all subject to the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment. As we observed in
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, "[t]he basic purpose of
this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this
Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." 387
U. S., at 528. Because the individual's intere.s t in privacy
and personal security "suffers whether the government's
motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or
breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards," Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, at 312-313, it would be "anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 530.
Notwithstanding the general applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to the activities of civil authorities, a few courts
have concluded that school officials are exempt from the dictates of the Fourth Amendment by virtue of the special
nature of their authority over schoolchildren. See, e. g.,
R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983).
Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act in loco
parentis in their dealings with students: their authority is
that of the parent, not the State, and is therefore not subject
to the limits of the Fourth Amendment. Ibid.
Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality.and
the teachings of this Court. We have held school officials
subject to the commands of the First Amendment, see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
393 U. S. 503 (1969), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975).
If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the
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consitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due
process, it is difficult to understand why they should be
deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority
when conducting searches of their students. More generally, the Court has recognized that "the concept of parental
delegation" as a source of school authority is not entirely
"consonant with compulsory education laws." Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 662 (1977). Today's public school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred
on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance
of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies.
See, e. g., the opinion in State ex rel. T. L . 0 ., 94 N.J., at
343, 463 A. 2d, at 934, 940, describing the New Jersey statutes regulating school disciplinary policies and establishing
the authority of school officials over their students. In carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant
to such policies, school officials act as representatives of the
State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they
cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment.
III
To hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches
conducted by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry
into the standards governing such searches. Although the
underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always
that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable
depends on the context within which a search takes place.
The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires "balancing the need
to search against the invasion which the search entails."
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 536-537. On one
side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate
expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other,
the government's need for effective methods to deal with
breaches of public order.
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We have recognized that even a limited search of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1, 24-25 (1967). We have also recognized that
searches of closed items of personal luggage are intrusions on
protected privacy interests, for "the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals
its contents from plain view." United States v. Ross , 456
U. S. 798, 822-823 (1982). A search of a child's person or of
a closed purse or other bag carried on her person,5 no less
than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a
severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.
Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not protect subjective expectations of privacy that are unreasonable or otherwise "illegitimate." See, e. g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S.
(1984); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98 (1980). To
receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment, an expectation of privacy must be one that society is "prepared to recognize as legitimate." Hudson v. Palmer, supra, at - - .
The State of New Jersey has argued that because of the pervasive supervision to which children in the schools are necessarily subject, a child has virtually no legitimate expectation
of privacy in articles of personal property "unnecessarily"
'We do not address the question, not presented by this case, whether a
schoolchild has a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers, desks, or
other school property provided for the storage of school supplies. Nor do
we express any opinion on the standards (if any) governing searches of
such areas by school officials or by other public authorities acting at the
request of school officials. Compare Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F. 2d 662,
670 (CAlO 1981) ("Inasmuch as the school had assumed joint control of the
locker it cannot be successfully maintained that the school did not have a
right to inspect it."), and People v. Overton, 24 N. Y. 2d 522, 249 N. E . 2d
366 (1969) (school administrators have power to consent to search of a student's locker), with State v. Engerud, 94 N. J. 331, 348, 463 A. 2d 934, 943
(1983) ("We are satisfied that in the context of this case the student had an
expectation of privacy in the contents of his locker.. . . For the four years
of high school, the school locker is a home away from home. In it the student stores the kind of personal 'effects' protected by the Fourth
Amendment").
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carried into a school. This argument has two factual
premises: (1) the fundamental incompatibility of expectations
of privacy with the maintenance of a sound educational environment; and (2) the minimal interest of the child in bringing
any items of personal property into the school. Both
premises are severely flawed.
Although this Court may take notice of the difficulty of
maintaining discipline in the public schools today, the situation is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no
legitimate expectations of privacy. We have recently recognized that the need to maintain order in a prison is such that
prisoners retain no legitimate expectations of privacy in their
cells, but it goes almost without saying that "[t]he prisoner
and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances,
separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 669. We are
not yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be
equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Nor does the State's suggestion that children have no legitimate need to bring personal property into the schools
seem well anchored in reality. Students at a minimum must
bring to school not only the supplies needed for their studies,
but also keys, money, and the necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming. In addition, students may carry on
their persons or in purses or wallets such nondisruptive yet
highly personal items as photographs, letters, and diaries.
Finally, students may have perfectly legitimate reasons to
carry with them articles of property needed in connection
with extracurricular or recreational activities. In short,
schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights
to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school
grounds.
Against the child's interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintain-
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ing discipline in the classroom and on school grounds. Maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in
recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly
ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems. See generally 1 NIE, U. S.
Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Violent SchoolsSafe Schools: The Safe School Study Report to the Congress
(1978). Even in schools that have been spared the most severe disciplinary problems, the preservation of order and a
proper educational environment requires close supervision of
schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against
conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by
an adult. "Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action."
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S., at 580. Accordingly, we have recognized that maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary
procedures, and we have respected the value of preserving
the informality of the student-teacher relationship. See id.,
at 582-583; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 680-682.
How, then, should we strike the balance between the
schoolchild's legitimate expectations of privacy and the
school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment
in which learning can take place? It is evident that the
school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to
which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.
The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the
school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant
before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school
rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures
needed in the schools. Just as we have in other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when "the burden of
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search," Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U. S., at 532-533, we hold today that school officials need
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not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under
their authority.
The school setting also requires some modification of the
level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search.
Ordinarily, a search-even one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant-must be based upon "probable
cause" to believe that a violation of the law has occurred.
See, e. g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266,
273 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 62-66 (1968).
However, "probable cause" is not an irreducible requirement
of a valid search. The fundamental command of the Fourth
Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and
although "both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search,
. . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required."
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, at 277 (POWELL,
J., concurring). Thus, we have in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that, although "reasonable," do not rise to the level of
probable cause. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881 (1975);
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976); cf. Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 534-539. Where a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests
that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable
cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.
We join the majority of courts that have examined this
issue 6 in concluding that the accommodation of the privacy
interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the
schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement
that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the
'See cases cited in

~·

2, supra.
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subject of the search has violated or is violating the law.
Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of
the search. Determining the reasonableness of any search
involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether
the ... action was justified at its inception," Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S., at 20; second, one must determine whether the
search as actually conducted "was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place," ibid. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of
a student by a teacher or other school official' will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of
the school. 8 Such a search ~ll be permissible in its scope
'We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting
alone and on their own authority. This case does not present the question
of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted
by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement
agencies, and we express no opinion on that question. Cf. Picha v.
Wilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976) (holding probable
cause standard applicable to searches involving the police).
8
We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities. In other contexts, however, we have held that although "some
quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure[,] ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U. S. 543, 560-561 (1976). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U. S. 523 (1967). Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated
by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards" are available "to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject
to the discretion of the official in the field.'" Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979) (citation omitted). Because the search of
T. L. O.'s purse was based upon an individualized suspicion that she had
violated school rules, see infra, at 16-20, we need not consider the circumstances that might justify school authorities in conducting searches unsupported by individualized suspicion.
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when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of
the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction. 9
Our reference to the nature of the infraction is not intended as an endorsement of JUSTICE STEVENS' suggestion that some rules regarding student conduct are by nature too "trivial" to justify a search based upon reasonable suspicion. See post, at - -. We are unwilling to adopt a
standard under which the legality of a search is dependent upon a judge's
evaluation of the relative importance of various school rules. The maintenance of discipline in the schools requires not only that students be restrained from assaulting one another, abusing drugs and alcohol, and committing other crimes, but also that students conform themselves to the
standards of conduct prescribed by school authorities. We have "repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional
safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 507
(1969). The promulgation of a rule forbidding specified conduct presumably reflects a judgment on the part of school officials that such conduct is
destructive of school order or of a proper educational environment. Absent any suggestion that the rule violates some substantive constitutional
guarantee, the courts should, as a general matter, defer to that judgment
and refrain from attempting to distinguish between rules that are important to the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not.
Thus, in most cases, the nature of the infraction will enter into the calculus only to the extent that it affects the likelihood that a search of any given
level of intrusiveness will reveal evidence bearing directly on the infraction. Suspicions relating to certain kinds of infractions (for example, violations of rules against the possession or use of particular items) will frequently provide grounds for a search, while suspicions of other infractions
(for example, rules regulating conduct unrelated to possession or use of
physical objects) will rarely provide any justification for a search. In the
ordinary case, a search limited in scope to measures reasonably likely to
turn up evidence of an infraction will not be deemed to violate the Constitution. Nonetheless, certain extraordinarily intrusive searches (as, for example, "strip searches" or body cavity searches) may be justifiable, if at all,
only when there is reason to believe that they will reveal evidence that a
student has violated some criminal law or poses a significant and immediate
threat to the safety of fellow students. It is only in the exceptional case in
which the authorities have resorted to such extreme measures, however,
9
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This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the
efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools
nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of
schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the question of
reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school
administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their
conduct according to the dictates of reason and common
sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard
should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded
no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of
preserving order in the schools.
IV
There remains the question of the legality of the search in
this case. We recognize that the "reasonable grounds"
standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its
consideration of this question is not substantially different
from the standard that we have adopted today. Nonetheless, we believe that the New Jersey court's application of
that standard to strike down the search ofT. L. O.'s purse
reflects a somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness. Our
review of the facts surrounding the search leads us to conclude that the search was in no sense unreasonable for
Fourth Amendment purposes. 10
The incident that gave rise to this case actually involved
two separate searches, with the first-the search for cigathat the court's perception of the importance of the rule that the school officials have sought to enforce in carrying out a search should be a factor in
determining the legality of the search. In most cases, the need to consider
the importance of the underlying rule will not arise, because excessively
intrusive searches will be prevented by the requirement that any intrusion
be justified by a reasonable likelihood that it will reveal evidence of an
infraction.
10
0f course, New Jersey may insist on a more demanding standard
under its own Constitution or statutes. In that case, its courts would not
purport to be applying the Fourth Amendment when they invalidate a
search.
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rettes-providing the suspicion that gave rise to the second-the search for marihuana. Although it is the fruits of
the second search that are at issue here, the validity of the
search for marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of
the initial search for cigarettes, as there would have been no
reason to suspect that T. L. 0. possessed marihuana had the
first search not taken place. Accordingly, it is to the search
for cigarettes that we first turn our attention.
The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed to two grounds
for its holding that the search for cigarettes was unreasonable. First, the court observed that possession of cigarettes
was not in itself illegal or a violation of school rules. Because
the contents ofT. L. O.'s purse would therefore have "nodirect bearing on the infraction" of which she was accused
(smoking in a lavatory where smoking was prohibited), there
was no reason to search her purse. 11 Second, even assuming
that a search ofT. L. O.'s purse might under some circumstances be reasonable in light of the accusation made against
T. L. 0., the New Jersey court concluded that Mr. Choplick
in this particular case had no reasonable grounds to suspect
that T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse. At best, accordJUSTICE STEVENS interprets these statements as a holding that enforcement of the school's smoking regulations was not sufficiently related
to the goal of maintaining discipline or order in the school to justify a
search under the standard adopted by the New Jersey court. See post, at
- -. We do not agree that this is an accurate characterization of the New
Jersey Supreme Court's opinion. The New Jersey court did not hold that
the school's smoking rules were unrelated to the goal of maintaining discipline or order, nor did it suggest that a search that would produce evidence
bearing directly on an accusation that a student had violated the smoking
rules would be impermissible under the court's reasonable suspicion standard; rather, the court concluded that any evidence a search ofT. L. O.'s
purse was likely to produce would not have a sufficiently direct bearing on
the infraction to justify a search-a conclusion with which we cannot agree
for the reasons set forth infra, at - - . JUSTICE STEVENS' suggestion
that the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision rested on the perceived
triviality of the smoking infraction appears to be a reflection of his own
views rather than those of the New Jersey court.
11

83-712-0PINION
NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

19

ing to the court, Mr. Choplick had "a good hunch." 94 N. J.,
at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942.
Both these conclusions are implausible. T. L. 0. had been
accused of smoking, and had denied the accusation in the
strongest possible terms when she stated that she did not
smoke at all. Surely it cannot be said that under these circumstances, T. L. O.'s possession of cigarettes would be irrelevant to the charges against her or to her response to
those charges. T. L. O.'s possession of cigarettes, once it
was discovered , would both corroborate the report that she
had been smoking and undermine the credibility of her defense to the charge of smoking. To be sure, the discovery of
the cigarettes would not prove that T. L. 0. had been smoking in the lavatory; nor would it, strictly speaking, necessarily be inconsistent with her claim that she did not smoke at
all. But it is universally recognized that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate
fact in issue, but only have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.'' Fed. Rule Evid. 401. The relevance ofT. L. O.'s possession of cigarettes to the question
whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her
denial that she smoked supplied the necessary "nexus" between the item searched for and the infraction under investigation. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 306-307
(1967). Thus, if Mr. Choplick in fact had a reasonable suspicion that T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse, the search was
justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if found, would
constitute "mere evidence" of a violation. Ibid.
Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that
Mr. Choplick had no reasonable suspicion that the purse
would contain cigarettes. This conclusion is puzzling. A
teacher had reported that T. L. 0. was smoking in the lavatory. Certainly this report gave Mr. Choplick reason to suspect that T. L. 0. was carrying cigarettes with her; and if
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she did have cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in
which to find them. Mr. Choplick's suspicion that there
were cigarettes in the purse was not an "inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,"' Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S., at 27; rather, it was the sort of"common-sense conclusio[n] about human behavior" upon which "practical people"-including government officials-are entitled to rely.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). Of
course, even if the teacher's report were true, T. L. 0. might
not have had a pack of cigarettes with her; she might have
borrowed a cigarette from someone else or have been sharing
a cigarette with another student. But the requirement of
reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty: "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone
of reasonableness under the Fs*Hth Amendment . . . ."
Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 79 , 04 (1971). Because the
hypothesis that T. L. 0. was carrying cigarettes in her purse
was itself not unreasonable, it is irrelevant that other hypotheses were also consistent with the teacher's accusation.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted unreasonably when he examined T. L. O.'s purse to see if it contained cigarettes. 12
l2 T. L. 0. contends that even if it was reasonable for Mr. Choplick to
open her purse to look for cigarettes, it was not reasonable for him to reach
in and take the cigarettes out of her purse once he found them. Had he
not removed the cigarettes from the purse, she asserts, he would not have
observed the rolling papers that suggested the presence of marihuana, and
the search for marihuana could not have taken place. T. L. 0. 's argument
is based on the fact that the cigarettes were not "contraband," as no school
rule forbade her to have them. Thus, according toT. L. 0., the cigarettes
were not subject to seizure or confiscation by school authorities, and Mr.
Choplick was not entitled to take them out ofT. L. O.'s purse regardless of
whether he was entitled to peer into the purse to see if they were there.
Such hairsplitting argumentation has no place in an inquiry addressed to
the issue of reasonableness. If Mr. Choplick could pemrissibly search
T. L. O.'s purse for cigarettes, it hardly seems reasonable to suggest that
his natural reaction to finding them-picking them up---eould be a constitutional violation. We find that neither in opening the purse nor in reaching
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Our conclusion that Mr. Choplick's decision to open
T. L. O.'s purse was reasonable brings us to the question of
the further search for marihuana once the pack of cigarettes
was located. The suspicion upon which the search for marihuana was founded was provided when Mr. Choplick observed a package of rolling papers in the purse as he removed
the pack of cigarettes. Although T. L. 0. does not dispute
the reasonableness of Mr. Choplick's belief that the rolling
papers indicated the presence of marihuana, she does contend
that the scope of the search Mr. Choplick conducted exceeded
permissible bounds when he seized and read certain letters
that implicated T. L. 0. in drug dealing. This argument,
too, is unpersuasive. The discovery of the rolling papers
concededly gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T. L. 0.
was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse.
This suspicion justified further exploration of T. L. O.'s
purse, which turned up more evidence of drug-related activities: a pipe, a number of plastic bags of the t)rpe commonly
used to store marihuana, a small quantity of marihuana, and
a fairly substantial. amount of money. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the search to a
separate zippered compartment of the purse; and when a
search of that compartment revealed an index card containing a list of "people who owe me money" as well as two letters, the inference that T. L. 0. was involved in marihuana
trafficking was substantial enough to justify Mr. Choplick in
examining the letters to determine whether they contained
any further evidence. In short, we cannot conclude that the
search for marihuana was unreasonable in any respect.
Because the search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of marihuana dealing by T. L. 0. was reasonable,· the
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision to exclude that evidence from T. L. O.'s juvenile delinquency proceedings on
into it to remove the cigarettes did Mr. Choplick violate the Fourth
Amendment.

83-712-0PINION

22

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0 .

Fourth Amendment grounds was erroneous. Accordingly,
the judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is
Reversed.
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
"... One nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all."
"But, my child, you must remember that there are certain
exceptions . . . . "
I
Justice Brandeis was both a great student and a great
teacher. It was he who wrote:
"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people
by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
Those of us who revere the flag and the ideals for which it
stands believe in the power of symbols. Rules of law have a
symbolic power that may vastly exceed their utility. Questions about the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule
are often answered with utilitarian judgments about its deterrent impact on the behavior of unknown officials in unknown circumstances. That approach results from mistaken
priorities. Practical considerations require us to place limits
on the ideal application of some of our constitutional values~
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such considerations are not, however, the basic motivating
rationale for the rules themselves.
Serious practical problems attend the maintenance of discipline in a school setting. Official behavior that would constitute an intolerable intrusion into privacy in a domestic setting may be entirely reasonable in the classroom. Moreover,
it is arguable that the manner in which a teacher acquires
knowledge of facts that justify the discipline of a student
should be irrelevant to the administration of an appropriate
punishment. This case, however, does not involve any question concerning a school disciplinary proceeding; a school's
authority to ta~ whatever steps are necessary, up to and including the expJBsion of a student, in order to protect other
students and preserve an appropriate educational environment, is simply not at issue here. The case deals only witliJ
an evidentiary question that can arise only in a criminal proceeding after an unconstitutional search and seizure has
occurred.
Because it has agreed to hear this case even though the
merits of the Fourth Amendment issue are not presented in
the State's petition for certiorari, the majority does not tell
us what conduct by school officials violates the Fourth
Amendment; its decision is made in a kind of vacuum that
makes it less than apparent what methods may be used under
today's holding to obtain evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. However, a few things are clear about the consequences of today's holding. The majority itself tells us that
its holding applies when a school official has "no reasonable
grounds" for undertaking a search or seizure. Ante, at 6-7,
n. 3. Moreover, in determining what a reasonable search or
seizure is within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 1
judgments as to reasonableness are appropriately informed
The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "
1

1
~
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by the State's broad power to protect minors in its care, 2 and
the necessarily ample discretion afforded school officials to
maintain an appropriate educational environment. 3 Given
these premises, it will likely be the case that only the most
abusive search and seizure will cross the line into constitutional unreasonableness. Thus, the random body cavity j
search, the arbitrary strip search-in short, the tactics of the
police state-may well be the kinds of methods for obtaining
evidence that are ultimately at issue here.
II

The Court's decision not to apply the exclusionary rule to
evidence obtained by school officials in the course of their duties rests on an empirical judgment: "prohibiting the use in
the criminal-justice system of evidence obtained in such
searches may well have none of the behavioral effects on
either school officials or school boards that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions is generally
thought to have on the typical law enforcement official."
Ante, at 9--10. The Court cites no empirical evidence in support of its conclusion; there is none in the record. The
Court's assumptions about the sociology of schools may be
correct, 4 but they are based not on any principle of law, nor
See, e. g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U . S . - , - (1984); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion); id., at 351--352
(WHITE, J., concurring).
3
See, e. g., Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863-864, 868
(1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 880-881 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment); id., at 889 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 681--Q82 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U. S. 565, 589-590 (POWELL, J., dissenting).
• However, their correctness surely is not clear beyond doubt. The
record tells us nothing about the duties or responsibilities of the vice-principal who searched TLO. For all we know, an important part of his job
was to refer students who have committed crimes to the authorities and to
ensure that they are successfully prosecuted. A number of States have
statutes requiring school officials to report certain kinds of criminal conduct by students to the authorities so that they may be prosecuted. See
2
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on anything in the record. Instead, they are premised on
five Justices' personal experiences and beliefs.
The problem with this approach has been candidly identified by JUSTICE BLACKMUN: "Like all courts, we face institutional limitations on our ability to gather information about
'legislative facts,' and the exclusionary rule itself has exacerbated the shortage of hard data concerning the behavior of
police officers in the absence of such a rule." United States
v. Leon, ante, at-- (concurring opinion). This case illustrates the problem. I am unaware of how we have gathered
or could gather information about the relevant "legislative
facts." 5 That being the case, I think it unwise to make law
based on little more than our best guesses.
The rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), is perfectly
adequate to decide the case before us: "We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court." I d., at 655. It is true that this holding rested,
in part, o its deterrent effect, see id., at 656, and as a general matter it is tolerably clear to me, as it has been to the
Court, that the existence of an exclusionary remedy does deter the authorities from violating the Fourth Amendment by
sharply reducing their incentive to do so. 6 But beyond that
Ala. Code § 1~1-24 (Supp. 1983); Cal. Educ. Code § 48902 (West Supp.
1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-233g (West Supp. 1983); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 29~71 (Supp. 1983); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, § 10-21.7 (1983); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 49-6-4301 (repl. 1983). Thus, in these States school officials have
been in effect assigned law enforcment duties. Informal policies to similar
effect may be widespread.
5
Until today, the Court had proceeded with more caution in this area,
recognizing the difficulty of gathering data and making empirical judgments as to the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. See Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433,
449-453 (1976).
6
See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v.
Janis , 428 U. S. 433, 453 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. · S. 338,
347-348 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 174-175 (1969).

n
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generalized judgment I have little confidence in our ability to
gather "legislative facts" sufficient to engage in the kind of
exacting sociological analysis necessary to holdings like that
of today's majority. 7 For whatever the limitations on the
use of the exclusionary rule in collateral contexts, ante, at
7-S, until today, "[t]he Court has not questioned, in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application
of the rule to suppress evidence from the State's case where
the Fourth Amendment violation has been deliberate and
substantial." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171
(1978). 8 I would not start down the road of creating ad hoc
exceptions to the rule of M app v. Ohio.

III
It was no accident that in M app the Court harkened back
to Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent in explaining its holding. 9 The exclusionary rule does have an "overall educative
effect." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493 (1976). Nowhere would it be more anomalous to deprecate the importance of that effect than in our schools:
Moreover, one "legislative fact" overlooked by the majority is that its
holding may invite abuse and generate litigation, by tempting some law enforcement officials to solicit covertly the aid of school authorities in obtaining evidence that can be used in criminal prosecutions. It was its experience with this same type of abuse-the danger that federal law
enforcement officials would seek the aid of state officials not subject to the
exclusionary rule in order to obtain evidence-that induced this Court to
hold that state officials should be subject to the same exclusionary rule as
are federal authorities. See Mapp , 367 U. S., at 658. Cf. Elkins v.
United States , 364 U. S. 206 (1960) (rejecting for similar reasons the "silver platter doctrine" which allowed federal courts to admit evidence obtained by state authorities in violation of the Constitution if done without
involvement of federal officers).
8
The Court has consistently held that there is no alternative remedy of
demonstrated efficacy to the suppression of evidence. See Franks, 438
U. S. , at 652-653; Mapp, 367 U. s~; at 652-653.
9
See 367 U.S., at 659.
7
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"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and
all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted.
These have, of course, delicate, and highly discretionary
functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating th~
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes." West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943).
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential
to a self-governing citizenry that can responsibly exercise the
rights and responsibilities it has under our Constitution. 10 If
the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot
help but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly. 11 If
See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864-865 (1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 876, 880 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 221 (1982); Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 507, 511-513 (1969).
11
Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 26--27 (1967) (conviction of juveniles
through processes lacking in procedural regularity alienate them by creating an appearance of arbitrariness).
Justice Frankfurter, who did not advocate applying the exclusionary rule
to the States, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), nevertheless respected the warning in Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent. See Irvine v.
California, 347 U. S. 128, 149 (1954) (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted) ("Of course it is a loss to the community when a conviction is overturned because the indefensible means by which it was obtained cannot be
squared with the commands of due process. A new trial is necessitated,
and by reason of the exclusion of evidence derived from the unfair aspects
of the prior prosecution a guilty defendant may escape. But the people
can avoid such miscarriages of justice. A sturdy, self-respecting democratic community should not put up with lawless police and prosecutors.
'Oui people may tolerate many mistakes of both intent and performance,
but, with unerring instinct, they know that when any person is intention10
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they or their companions are deprived of their liberty
through such methods, being left to a speculative and probably unrewarding civil remedy, they cannot but conclude that
the ideals of our Constitution are but "a form of words"; 12 the
belief that ours is a Government of laws and not men and that
the Constitution is a fundamental charter of human liberty
cannot but be sullied. 13
ally deprived of his constitutional rights those responsible have committed
no ordinary offense. A crime of this nature, if subtly encouraged by failure to condemn and punish, certainly leads down the road to totalitarianism."'); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173--174 (1952) ("It has long
since ceased to be true that due process of law is heedless of the means by
which otherwise relevant and credible evidence is obtained. . . . [T]he
general requirement [is] that States in their prosecutions respect certain
decencies of civilized conduct. . . . [T]o sanction the brutal conduct which
naturally enough was condemned by the court whose judgment is before
us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more
calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a
society.").
12
The Mapp Court wrote:
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as
is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as
. . . the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures
would be 'a form of words,' valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a
freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 367 U. S., at 655.
18
JUSTICE BRENNAN has written of an analogous case:
"We do not know what class petitioner was in when the police and dogs
burst in, but the lesson the school authorities taught her that day will undoubtedly make a greater impression than the one her teacher had hoped
to convey. I would grant certiorari to teach petitioner another lesson:
that the Fourth Amendment protects '[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures,' and that before police and local officers are permitted to conduct dog-assisted dragnet inspections of public school students,
they must obtain a warrant based on sufficient particularized evidence to
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If the validity of the Court's holding is to be judged en-

tirely by its deterrent value, the result is a matter of small
importance. But if we look to the symbolic value of the holding-if we examine it as a statement about the Constitution's
importance to our Nation-then the Court is surely wrong.
This is a case in which the Court has an opportunity-at a relatively low cost-to teach our students "that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional
rights." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493 (1976). Because I consider that message more important than the preservation of this evidence for use in a criminal proceeding
against an errant child, I respectfully dissent.

•

establish probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed.
Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship
when the school authorities themselves disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional freedoms." Doe v. Renfrow, 451
U. S. 1022, 1027-1028 (1981) (BRENNAN, J ., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
"... One nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all."
"But, my child, you must remember that there are certain
exceptions . . . . "
I

f' /

-~ -~

Justice Brandeis was both a great student and a great
teacher. It was he who wrote:
"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people
by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
~

Those of us who revere the flag and the ideals for which it
stands believe in the power of symbols. Rules of law have a
symbolic power that may vastly exceed their utility. Questions about the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule
are often answered with utilitarian judgments about its deterrent impact on the behavior of unknown officials in unknown circumstances. That approach results from mistaken
priorities. Practical considerations require us to place limits
on the ideal application of some of our constitutional values;

.
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such considerations are not, however, the basic motivating
rationale for the rules themselves.
Serious practical problems attend the maintenance of discipline in a school setting. Official behavior that would constitute an intolerable intrusion into privacy in a domestic setting may be entirely reasonable in the classroom. Moreover,
it is arguable that the manner in which a teacher acquires
knowledge of facts that justify the discipline of a student
should be irrelevant to the administration of an appropriate
punishment. This case, however, does not involve any question concerning a school disciplinary proceeding; a school's
authority to take whatever steps are necessary, up to and including the ex~sion of a student, in order to protect other
students and preserve an appropriate educational environment, is simply not at issue here. The case deals only with
an evidentiary question that can arise only in a criminal proceeding after an unconstitutional search and seizure has
occurred.
Because it has agreed to hear this case even though the
merits of the Fourth Amendment issue are not presented in
the State's petition for certiorari, the majority does not tell
us what conduct by school officials violates the Fourth
Amendment; its decision is made in a kind of vacuum that
makes it less than apparent what methods may be used under
today's holding to obtain evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. However, a few things are clear about the consequences of today's holding. The majority itself tells us that
its holding applies when a school official has "no reasonable
grounds" for undertaking a search or seizure. Ante, at 6-7,
n. 3. Moreover, in determining what a reasonable search or
seizure is within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 1
judgments as to reasonableness are appropriately informed
1
The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "
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by the State's broad power to protect minors in its care, 2 and
the necessarily ample discretion afforded school officials to
maintain an appropriate educational environment. 3 Given
these premises, it will likely be the case that only the most
abusive search and seizure will cross the line into constitutional unreasonableness. Thus, the random body cavity
search, the arbitrary strip search-in short, the tactics of the
police state-may well be the kinds of methods for obtaining
evidence that are ultimately at issue here.
II

The Court's decision not to apply the exclusionary rule to
evidence obtained by school officials in the course of their duties rests on an empirical judgment: "prohibiting the use in
the criminal-justice system of evidence obtained in such
searches may well have none of the behavioral effects on
either school officials or school boards that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions is generally
thought to have on the typical law enforcement official."
Ante, at 9-10. The Court cites no empirical evidence in support · of its conclusion; there is none in the record. The
Court's assumptions about the sociology of schools may be
correct,' but they are based not on any principle of law, nor
See, e. g.,. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.-, (1984); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion); id. , at 351-352
(WHITE, J., concurring).
3
See, e. g., Board of Education v. Pico , 457 U. S. 853, 863-864,868
(1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 880-881 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment); id., at 889 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting);
Ingraham v. Wright , 430 U. S. 651, 681-682 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U. S. 565, 589-590 (POWELL, J., dissenting).
'However, their correctness surely is not clear beyond doubt. The
record tells us nothing about the duties or responsibilities of the vice-prin·
cipal who searched TLO. For all we know, an important part of his job
was to refer students who have committed crimes to the authorities and to
ensure that they are successfully prosecuted. A number of States have
statutes requiring school officials to report certain kinds of criminal conduct by students to the authorities so that they may be prosecuted. See
2
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on anything in the record. Instead, they are premised on
five Justices' personal experiences and beliefs.
The problem with this approach has been candidly identified by JUSTICE BLACKMUN: "Like all courts, we face institutional limitations on our ability to gather information about
'legislative facts,' and the exclusionary rule itself has exacerbated the shortage of hard data concerning the behavior of
police officers in the absence of such a rule." United States
v. Leon, ante, at-- (concurring opinion). This case illustrates the problem. I am unaware of how we have gathered
or could gather information about the relevant "legislative
facts." 5 That being the case, I think it unwise to make law
based on little more than our best guesses.
The rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), is perfectly
adequate to decide the case before us: "We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court." !d., at 655. It is true that this holding rested,
in part, o its deterrent effect, see id., at 656, and as a general matter it is tolerably clear to me, as it has been to the
Court, that the existence of an exclusionary remedy does deter the authorities from violating the Fourth Amendment by
sharply reducing their incentive to do so. 6 But beyond that
Ala. Code § 1&-1-24 (Supp. 1983); Cal. Educ. Code § 48902 (West Supp.
1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-233g (West Supp. 1983); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 29&-71 (Supp. 1983); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, § 10-21.7 (1983); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 49--6-4301 (repl. 1983). Thus, in these States school officials have
been in effect assigned law enforcment duties. Informal policies to similar
effect may be widespread.
• Until today, the Court had proceeded with more caution in this area,
recognizing the difficulty of gathering data and making empirical judgments as to the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. See Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v. Janis , 428 U. S. 433,
449-453 (1976).
6
See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v.
Janis , 428 U. S. 433, 453 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338,
347-348 (1974); Alderman v. United States , 394 U. S. 165, 174-175 (1969).

..
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generalized judgment I have little confidence in our ability to
gather "legislative facts" sufficient to 1mgage in the kind of
exacting sociological analysis necessary to holdings like that
of today's majority. 7 For whatever the limitations on the
use of the exclusionary rule in collateral contexts, ante, at
7--8, until today, "[t]he Court has not questioned, in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application
of the rule to suppress evidence from the State's case where
the Fourth Amendment violation has been deliberate and
substantial." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171
(1978). 8 I would not start down the road of creating ad hoc
exceptions to the rule of M app v. Ohio.

III
It was no accident that in M app the Court harkened back
to Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent in explaining its holding. 9 The exclusionary·rule does have an "overall educative
effect." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493 (1976). Nowhere would it be more anomalous to deprecate the importance of that effect than in our schools:
7
Moreover, one "legislative fact" overlooked by the majority is that its
holding may invite abuse and generate litigation, by tempting some law enforcement officials to solicit covertly the aid of school authorities in obtaining evidence that can be used in criminal prosecutions. It was its experience with this same type of abuse-the danger that federal law
enforcement officials would seek the aid of state officials not subject to the
exclusionary rule in order to obtain evidence-that induced this Court to
hold that state officials should be subject to the same exclusionary rule as
are federal authorities. See Mapp, 367 U. S., at 658. Cf. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960) (rejecting for similar reasons the "silver platter doctrine" which allowed federal courts to admit evidence obtained by state authorities in violation of the Constitution if done without
involvement of federal officers).
8
The Court has consistently held that there is no alternative remedy of
demonstrated efficacy to the suppression of evidence. See Franks, 438
U. S., at 652-653; Mapp, 367 U. S., at 652-653.
9
See 367 U. S., at 659.
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"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
States, p.rutects the citizen against the State itself and
all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted.
These have, of course, delicate, and highly discretionary
functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes." West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943).
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential
to a self-governing citizenry that can responsibly exercise the
rights and responsibilities it has under our Constitution. 10 If
the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot
help but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly." If
See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864-865 (1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 876, 880 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 221 (1982); Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 511-513 (1969).
11
Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 2&-27 (1967) (conviction of juveniles
through processes lacking in procedural regularity alienate them by creating an appearance of arbitrariness).
Justice Frankfurter, who did not advocate applying the exclusionary rule
to the States, see Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), nevertheless respected the warning in Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent. See Irvine v.
California, 347 U. S. 128, 149 (1954) (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted) ("Of course it is a loss to the community when a conviction is overturned because the indefensible means by which it was obtained cannot be
squared with the commands of due process. A new trial is necessitated,
and by reason of the exclusion of evidence derived from the unfair aspects
of the prior prosecution a guilty defendant may escape. But the people
can avoid such miscarriages of justice. A sturdy, self-respecting democratic community should not put up with lawless police and prosecutors.
'Our people may tolerate many mistakes of both intent and performance,
but, with unerring instinct, they know that when any person is intention10
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they or their companions are deprived of their liberty
through such methods, being left to a speculative and probably unrewarding civil remedy, they cannot but conclude that
the ideals of our Constitution are but "a form of words"; 12 the
belief that ours is a Government of laws and not men and that
the Constitution is a fundamental charter of human liberty
cannot but be sullied. 13
ally deprived of his constitutional rights those responsible have committed
no ordinary offense. A crime of this nature, if subtly encouraged by failure to condemn and punish, certainly leads down the road to totalitarianism."'); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 173-174 (1952) ("It has long
since ceased to be true that due process of law is heedless of the means by
which otherwise relevant and credible evidence is obtained. . . . [T]he
general requirement [is] that States in their prosecutions respect certain
decencies of civilized conduct. . . . [T]o sanction the brutal conduct which
naturally enough was condemned by the court whose judgment is before
us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more
calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a
society.").
12
The Mapp Court wrote:
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as
is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as
. . . the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures
would be 'a form of words,' valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a
freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" 367 U. S., at 655.
13
JUSTICE BRENNAN has written of an analogous case:
"We do not know what class petitioner was in when the police and dogs
burst in, but the lesson the school authorities taught her that day will undoubtedly make a greater impression than the one her teacher had hoped
to convey. I would grant certiorari to teach petitioner another lesson:
that the Fourth Amendment protects '[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures,' and that before police and local officers are permitted to conduct dog-assisted dragnet inspections of public school students,
they must obtain a warrant based on sufficient particularized evidence to
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If the validity of the Court's holding is to be judged entirely by its deterrent value, the result is a matter of small
importance. But if we look to the symbolic value of the holding-if we examine it as a statement about the Constitution's
importance to our Nation-then the Court is surely wrong.
This is a case in which the Court has an opportunity-at a relatively low cost-to teach our students "that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional
rights." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493 (1976). Because I consider that message more important than the preservation of this evidence for use in a criminal proceeding
against an errant child, I respectfully dissent.

establish probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed.
Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship
when the school authorities themselves disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional freedoms." Doe v. Renfrow, 451
U. S. 1022, 1027-1028 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and
JUSTICE MARSHALL, join, dissenting.
"... One nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all."
But, my child, you must remember that there are certain
exceptions . . . .
I
Justice Brandeis was both a great student and a great
teacher. It was he who wrote:
"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people
by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
Those of us who revere the flag and the ideals for which it
stands believe in the power of symbols. Rules of law have a
symbolic power that may vastly exceed their utility. Questions about the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule
are often answered with utilitarian judgments about its deterrent impact on the behavior of unknown officials in unknown circumstances. That approach results from mistaken
priorities. Practical considerations require us to place limits
on the ideal application of some of our constitutional values;

I
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such considerations are not, however, the basic motivating
rationale for the rules themselves.
Serious practical problems attend the maintenance of discipline in a school setting. Official behavior that would constitute an intolerable intrusion into privacy in a domestic setting may be entirely reasonable in the classroom. Moreover,
it is arguable that the manner in which a teacher acquires
knowledge of facts that justify the discipline of a student
should be irrelevant to the administration of an appropriate
punishment. This case, however, does not involve any question concerning a school disciplinary proceeding; a school's
authority to take whatever steps are necessary, up to and including the expulsion of a student, in order to protect other
students and preserve an appropriate educational environment, is simply not at issue here. The case deals only with
an evidentiary question that can arise only in a criminal proceeding after an unconstitutional search and seizure has
occurred.
Because it has agreed to hear this case even though the
merits of the Fourth Amendment issue are not presented in
the State's petition for certiorari, the majority does not tell
us what conduct by school officials violates the Fourth
Amendment; its decision is made in a kind of vacuum that
makes it less than apparent what methods may be used under
today's holding to obtain evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. However, a few things are clear about the consequences of today's holding. The majority itself tells us that
its holding applies when a school official has "no reasonable
grounds" for undertaking a search or seizure. Ante, at 6-7,
n. 3. Moreover, in determining what a reasonable search or
seizure is within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 1
judgments as to reasonableness are appropriately informed
'The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .. . ."

,,
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by the State's broad power to protect minors in its care, 2 and
the necessarily ample discretion afforded school officials to
maintain an appropriate educational environment. 3 Given
these premises, it will likely be the case that only the most
abusive search and seizure will cross the line into constitutional unreasonableness. Thus, the random body cavity
search, the arbitrary strip search-in short, the tactics of the
police state-may well be the kinds of methods for obtaining
evidence that are ultimately at issue here.
II
The Court's decision not to apply the exclusionary rule to
evidence obtained by school officials in the course of their duties rests on an empirical judgment: "prohibiting the use in
the criminal-justice system of evidence obtained in such
searches may well have none of the behavioral effects on
either school officials or school boards that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions is generally
thought to have on the typical law enforcement official."
Ante, at 9-10. The Court cites no empirical evidence in support of its conclusion; there is none in the record. The
Court's assumptions about the sociology of schools may be
correct, 4 but they are based not on any principle of law, nor
2
See, e. g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.--,-- (1984); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion); id., at 351-352
(WHITE, J., concurring).
8
See, e. g., Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863-864, 868
(1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 880-881 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment); id., at 889 (BURGER, C. J. , dissenting);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 681-682 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U. S. 565, 589-590 (POWELL, J., dissenting).
• However, their correctness surely is not clear beyond doubt. The
record tells us nothing about the duties or responsibilities of the vice-principal who searched TLO. For all we know, an important part of his job
was to refer students who have committed crimes to the authorities and to
ensure that they are successfully prosecuted. A number of States have
statutes requiring school officials to report certain kinds of criminal conduct by students to the authorities so that they may be prosecuted. See
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on anything in the record. Instead, they are premised on
five Justices' personal experiences and beliefs.
The problem with this approach has been candidly identified by JusTICE BLACKMUN: "Like all courts, we face institutional limitations on our ability to gather information about
'legislative facts,' and the exclusionary rule itself has exacerbated the shortage of hard data concerning the behavior of
police officers in the absence of such a rule." United States
v. Leon, ante, at-- (concurring opinion). This case illustrates the problem. I am unaware of how we have gathered
or could gather information about the relevant "legislative
facts." 5 That being the case, I think it unwise to make law
based on little more than our best guesses.
The rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), is perfectly
adequate to decide the case before us: "We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court." !d., at 655. It is true that this holding rested,
in part, on its deterrent effect, see id., at 656, and as a general matter it is tolerably clear to me, as it has been to the
Court, that the existence of an exclusionary remedy does deter the authorities from violating the Fourth Amendment by
Ala. Code § 16-1-24 (Supp. 1983); Cal. Educ. Code § 48902 (West Supp.
1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-233g (West Supp. 1983); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 296-71 (Supp. 1983); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, § 10-21.7 (1983); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 49-6-4301 (repl. 1983). Thus, in these States school officials have
been in effect assigned law enforcment duties. Informal policies to similar
effect may be widespread.
6
The Court seems to rely on "prior judicial experience" as the basis for
its empirical judgment. See ante, at 11, n. 6. However, the cases the
Court cites ante, at 4-6, n. 2, do not contain material that supplies a data
base for the Court's conclusion, nor even a consensus as to whether the exclusionary rule should apply to such searches. Until today, the Court had
proceeded with more caution in this area, recognizing the difficulty of gathering data and making empirical judgments as to the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976); United
States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 449-453 (1976).
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sharply reducing their incentive to do so. 6 But beyond that
generalized judgment I have little confidence in our ability to
gather "legislative facts" sufficient to engage in the kind of
exacting sociological analysis necessary to holdings like that
of today's majority. 7 For whatever the limitations on the
use of the exclusionary rule in collateral contexts, ante, at
7-8, until today, "[t]he Court has not questioned, in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application
of the rule to suppress evidence from the State's case where
the Fourth Amendment violation has been deliberate and
substantial." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171
(1978). 8 I would not start down the road of creating ad hoc
exceptions to the rule of M app v. Ohio.

III
It was no accident that in M app the Court harkened back
to Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent in explaining its holding. 9 The exclusionary rule does have an "overall educative
effect." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493 (1976). No5

See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v.
Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 453 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338,
347-348 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 174-175 (1969).
7
Moreover, one "legislative fact" overlooked by the majority is that its
holding may invite abuse and generate litigation, by tempting some law
enforcement officials to solicit covertly the aid of school authorities in obtaining evidence that can be used in criminal prosecutions. It was its experience with this same type of abuse-the danger that federal law enforcement officials would seek the aid of state officials not subject to the
exclusionary rule in order to obtain evidence-that induced this Court to
hold that state officials should be subject to the same exclusionary rule as
are federal authorities. See Mapp, 367 U. S., at 658. Cf. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960) (rejecting for similar reasons the "silver platter doctrine" which allowed federal courts to admit evidence obtained by state authorities in violation of the Constitution if done without
involvement of federal officers).
8
The Court has consistently held that there is no alternative remedy of
demonstrated efficacy to the suppression of evidence. See Franks, 438
U. S., at 169; Mapp, 367 U. S., at 652-653.
9
See 367 U.S., at 659.
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where would it be more anomalous to deprecate the importance of that effect than in our schools:
"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and
all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted.
These have, of course, delicate, and highly discretionary
functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes." West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943).
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential
to a self-governing citizenry that can responsibly exercise the
rights and responsibilities it has under our Constitution. 10 If
the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot
help but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly. 11 If
10
See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864-865 (1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 876, 880 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 221 (1982); Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 507, 511-513 (1969).
11
Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 26-27 (1967) (conviction of juveniles
through processes lacking in procedural regularity alienate them by creating an appearance of arbitrariness).
Justice Frankfurter, who did not advocate applying the exclusionary rule
to the States, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), nevertheless respected the warning in Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent. See Irvine v.
California, 347 U. S. 128, 149 (1954) (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted) ("Of course it is a loss to the community when a conviction is overturned because the indefensible means by which it was obtained cannot be
squared with the commands of due process. A new trial is necessitated,
and by reason of the exclusion of evidence derived from the unfair aspects
of the prior prosecution a guilty defendant may escape. But the people
can avoid such miscarriages of justice. A sturdy, self-respecting democratic community should not put up with lawless police and prosecutors.
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they or their companions are deprived of their liberty
through such methods, being left to a speculative and probably unrewarding civil remedy, they cannot but conclude that
the ideals of our Constitution are but "a form of words"; 12 the
belief that ours is a Government of laws and not men and that
the Constitution is a fundamental charter of human liberty
cannot but be sullied. 13
'Our people may tolerate many mistakes of both intent and performance,
but, with uneiTing instinct, they know that when any person is intentionally deprived of his constitutional rights those responsible have committed
no ordinary offense. A crime of this nature, if subtly encouraged by failure to condemn and punish, certainly leads down the road to totalitarianism.'"); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 173-174 (1952) ("It has long
since ceased to be true that due process of law is heedless of the means by
which otherwise relevant and credible evidence is obtained. . . . [T]he
general requirement [is] that States in their prosecutions respect certain
decencies of civilized conduct. . .. [T]o sanction the brutal conduct which
naturally enough was condemned by the court whose judgment is before
us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more
calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a
society'').
12
The M app Court wrote:
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as
is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as
. . . the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures
would be 'a form of words,' valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a
freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" 367 U. S., at 655.
13
JusTICE BRENNAN has written of an analogous case:
"We do not know what class petitioner was in when the police and dogs
burst in, but the lesson the school authorities taught her that day will undoubtedly make a greater impression than the one her teacher had hoped
to convey. I would grant certiorari to teach petitioner another lesson:
that the Fourth Amendment protects '[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures,' and that before police and local officers are permit-

-,
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If the validity of the Court's holding is to be judged entirely by its deterrent value, the result is a matter of small
importance. But if we look to the symbolic value of the holding-if we examine it as a statement about the Constitution's
importance to our Nation-then the Court is surely wrong.
This is a case in which the Court has an opportunity-at a relatively low cost-to teach our students "that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional
rights." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493 (1976). Because I consider that message more important than the preservation of this evidence for use in a criminal proceeding
against an errant child, I respectfully dissent.

ted to conduct dog-assisted dragnet inspections of public school students,
they must obtain a warrant based on sufficient particularized evidence to
establish probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed.
Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship
when the school authorities themselves disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional freedoms." Doe v. Renfrow, 451
U. S. 1022, 1027-1028 (1981) (BRENNAN, J ., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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[July-, 1984]

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
In its decision in this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court
addressed three distinct questions: (1) what is the proper
standard for judging the reasonableness of a school official's
search of a student's purse; (2) on the facts of this case, did
the school official violate that standard; and (3) whether the
exclusionary rule bars the use in a criminal proceeding of evidence that a school official obtained in violation of that standard. The Supreme Court held (1) that the correct standard
is one of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause; (2)
that the standard was violated in this case; and (3) that the
evidence obtained as the result of a violation may not be introduced in evidence against TLO in any criminal proceeding,
including this delinquency proceeding.
New Jersey's petition for certiorari sought review of only
the third question. 1 The reasons why it did not seek review
of either of the other two questions are tolerably clear.
There is substantial agreement among appellate courts that
the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the correct standard
and it is apparently one that the New Jersey law enforcement
authorities favor. As far as the specific facts of the case are
concerned, presumably New Jersey believed that this Court
The petition presented a single question for review: "Whether the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies to searches made by public
school officials and teachers in school."
1
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is too busy to take a case just for the purpose of reviewing
the State Supreme Court's application of this standard to the
specific facts of this case.
The single question presented to the Court has now been
briefed and argued. Evidently unable or unwilling to decide
the question presented by the parties, the Court, instead of
dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted,
orders reargument directed to the questions that New Jersey
decided not to bring here. This is done even though New
Jersey agrees with its Supreme Court's resolution of these
questions, and has no desire to seek reversal on those
grounds. 2 Thus, in this nonadversarial context, the Court
has decided to plunge into the merits of the Fourth Amendment issues despite the fact that no litigant before it wants
the Court's guidance on these questions. Volunteering unwanted advice is rarely a wise course of action.
Of late, the Court has acquired a voracious appetite for judicial activism in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at
least when it comes to restricting the constitutional rights of
the citizen. In United States v. Leon, ante at - - , and
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, ante, at--, the Court fashioned a new exception to the exclusionary rule despite its
acknowledgement that narrower grounds for decision were
available in both cases. 3 In United States v. Karo, ante, at
- - , in order to reverse a decision requiring the suppression
At oral argument, the following colloquy took place between counsel
for New Jersey and the bench:
"QUESTION: Well, do you think it is open to us to deal with the reasonableness of the search?
"MR. NODES: I believe that could be considered a question subsumed
within the"QUESTION: But it wasn't your intention to raise it?
"MR. NODES: It wasn't our intention to raise it because we agree with
the standard that was set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court. We
feel that that is a workable standard." Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.
8
See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, ante, a t - (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
2
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of evidence, the Court on its own initiative made an analysis
of a factual question that had not been presented or argued
by either of the parties and managed to find a basis for ruling
in favor of the Government. In Segura v. United States,
ante, at--, two creativejreached the surprising conclusion
that an 18-20 hour warrantl ess occupation of a citizen's home
was "reasonable," despite the fact that the issue had not been
argued and the Government had expressly conceded the unreasonableness of the occupation. And, as I have previously
observed, in recent Terms the Court has elected to use its
power of summary disposition exclusively for the benefit of
prosecutors. 4 In this case, the special judicial action is to
order the parties to argue a constitutional question that they
have no desire to raise, in a context in which a ground for decision that the Court currently views as nonconstitutional is
available, 5 and on which the State's chief prosecutor believes
no guidance from this Court is necessary.
I believe that the adversary process functions most effectively when we rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than
the activism of judges, to fashion the questions for review. I
respectfully dissent.

•see Florida v. Myers, 466 U . S . - , - (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
' We are told that questions concerning the remedies for a Fourth
Amendment violation are not constitutional in dimension. United States
v. Leon, ante, a t -. Apparently, this Court has imposed the exclusionary rule on the States as a result of the Fourth Amendment's "invisible radiations," Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U . S . - , - , n. 12
(1984), which act to somehow give the Court nonconstitutional supervisory
powers over the State courts.
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NEW JERSEY, PETITIONER v. T. L. 0.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW JERSEY
[July-, 1984]

JusTICE STEVENS, with whom JuSTICE MARSHALL joins, /
dissenting.
In its decision in this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court
addressed three distinct questions: (1) what is the proper
standard for judging the reasonableness of a school official's
search of a student's purse; (2) on the facts of this case, did
the school official violate that standard; and (3) whether the
exclusionary rule bars the use in a criminal proceeding of evidence that a school official obtained in violation of that standard. The Supreme Court held (1) that the correct standard
is one of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause; (2)
that the standard was violated in this case; and (3) that the
evidence obtained as the result of a violation may not be introduced in evidence against TLO in any criminal proceeding,
including this delinquency proceeding.
New Jersey's petition for certiorari sought review of only
the third question. 1 The reasons why it did not seek review
of either of the other two questions are tolerably clear.
There is substantial agreement among appellate courts that
the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the correct standard
and it is apparently one that the New Jersey law enforcement
authorities favor. As far as the specific facts of the case are
' The petition presented a single question for review: "Whether the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies to searches made by public
school officials and teachers in school."
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concerned, presumably New Jersey believed that this Court
is too busy to take a case just for the purpose of reviewing
the State Supreme Court's application of this standard to the
specific facts of this case.
The single question presented to the Court has now been
briefed and argued. Evidently unable or unwilling to decide
the question presented by the parties, the Court, instead of
dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted,
orders reargument directed to the questions that New Jersey
decided not to bring here. This is done even though New
Jersey agrees with its Supreme Court's resolution of these
questions, and has no desire to seek reversal on those
grounds. 2 Thus, in this nonadversarial context, the Court
has decided to plunge into the merits of the Fourth Amendment issues despite the fact that no litigant before it wants
the Court's guidance on these questions. Volunteering unwanted advice is rarely a wise course of action.
Of late, the Court has acquired a voracious appetite for judicial activism in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at
least when it comes to restricting the constitutional rights of
the citizen. In United States v. Leon, ante at - - , and
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, ante, at - - , the Court fashioned a new exception to the exclusionary rule despite its
acknowledgement that narrower grounds for decision were
available in both cases. 3 In United States v. Karo, ante, at
2
At oral argument, the following colloquy took place between counsel
for New Jersey and the bench:
"QUESTION: Well, do you think it is open to us to deal with the reasonableness of the search?
"MR. NODES: I believe that could be considered a question subsumed
within the"QUESTION: But it wasn't your intention to raise it?
"MR. NODES: It wasn't our intention to raise it because we agree with
the standard that was set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court. We
feel that that is a workable standard." Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.
' See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, ante, a t - (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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- - , in order to reverse a decision requiring the suppression
of evidence, the Court on its own initiative made an analysis
of a factual question that had not been presented or argued
by either of the parties and managed to find a basis for ruling
in favor of the Government. In Segura v. United States,
ante, at - - , two creative Justices reached the surprising
conclusion that an 18-20 hour warrantless occupation of a citizen's home was "reasonable," despite the fact that the issue
had not been argued and the Government had expressly conceded the unreasonableness of the occupation. And, as I
have previously observed, in recent Terms the Court has
elected to use its power of summary disposition exclusively
for the benefit of prosecutors. 4 In this case, the special judicial action is to order the parties to argue a constitutional
question that they have no desire to raise, in a context in
which a ground for decision that the Court currently views as
nonconstitutional is available, 5 and on which the State's chief
prosecutor believes no guidance from this Court is necessary.
I believe that the adversary process functions most effectively when we rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than
the activism of judges, to fashion the questions for review. I
respectfully dissent.

'See Florida v. Myers , 466 U.S.--,-- (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
5
We are told that questions concerning the remedies for a Fourth
Amendment violation are not constitutional in dimension. United States
v. Leon, ante, at--. Apparently, this Court has imposed the exclusionary rule on the States as a result of the Fourth Amendment's "invisible radiations," Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. - - , - - , n. 12
(1984), which act to somehow give the Court nonconstitutional supervisory
powers over the State courts. My own view is different. See Sheppard,
ante, at-- and n. 37 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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NEW JERSEY, PETITIONER v. T. L. 0.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW JERSEY
[July 6, 1984]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and
JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
In its decision in this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court
addressed three distinct questions: (1) what is the proper
standard for judging the reasonableness of a school official's
search of a student's purse; (2) on the facts of this case, did
the school official violate that standard; and (3) whether the
exclusionary rule bars the use in a criminal proceeding of evidence that a school official obtained in violation of that standard. The Supreme Court held (1) that the correct standard
is one of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause; (2)
that the standard was violated in this case; and (3) that the
evidence obtained as the result of a violation may not be introduced in evidence against TLO in any criminal proceeding,
including this delinquency proceeding.
New Jersey's petition for certiorari sought review of only
the third question. 1 The reasons why it did not seek review
of either of the other two questions are tolerably clear.
There is substantial agreement among appellate courts that
the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the correct standard
and it is apparently one that the New Jersey law enforcement
authorities favor. As far as the specific facts of the case are
' The petition presented a single question for review: "Whether the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies to searches made by public
school officials and teachers in school."
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concerned, presumably New Jersey believed that this Court
is too busy to take a case just for the purpose of reviewing
the State Supreme Court's application of this standard to the
specific facts of this case.
The single question presented to the Court has now been
briefed and argued. Evidently unable or unwilling to decide
the question presented by the parties, the Court, instead of
dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted,
orders reargument directed to the questions that New Jersey
decided not to bring here. This is done even though New
Jersey agrees with its Supreme Court's resolution of these
questions, and has no desire to seek reversal on those
grounds. 2 Thus, in this nonadversarial context, the Court
has decided to plunge into the merits of the Fourth Amendment issues despite the fact that no litigant before it wants
the Court's guidance on these questions. Volunteering unwanted advice is rarely a wise course of action.
Of late, the Court has acquired a voracious appetite for judicial activism in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at
least when it comes to restricting the constitutional rights of
the citizen. In United States v. Leon, ante at - - , and
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, ante, at - - , the Court fashioned a new exception to the exclusionary rule despite its
acknowledgement that narrower grounds for decision were
available in both cases. 3 In United States v. Karo, ante, at
2
At oral argument, the following colloquy took place between counsel
for New Jersey and the bench:
"QUESTION: Well, do you think it is open to us to deal with the reasonableness of the search?
"MR. NODES: I believe that could be considered a question subsumed
within the"QUESTION: But it wasn't your intention to raise it?
"MR. NODES: It wasn't our intention to raise it because we agree with
the standard that was set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court. We
feel that that is a workable standard." Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.
8
See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, ante, a t - (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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- - , in order to reverse a decision requiring the suppression
of evidence, the Court on its own initiative made an analysis
of a factual question that had not been presented or argued
by either of the parties and managed to find a basis for ruling
in favor of the Government. In Segura v. United States,
ante, at - - , two creative Justices reached the surprising
conclusion that an 18-20 hour warrantless occupation of a citizen's home was "reasonable," despite the fact that the issue
had not been argued and the Government had expressly conceded the unreasonableness of the occupation. And, as I
have previously observed, in recent Terms the Court has
elected to use its power of summary disposition exclusively
for the benefit of prosecutors. 4 In this case, the special judicial action is to order the parties to argue a constitutional
question that they have no desire to raise, in a context in
which a ground for decision that the Court currently views as
nonconstitutional is available, 5 and on which the State's chief
prosecutor believes no guidance from this Court is necessary.
I believe that the adversary process functions most effectively when we rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than
the activism of judges, to fashion the questions for review. I
respectfully dissent.

'See Florida v. Myers, 466 U.S.--, - - (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
•we are told that questions concerning the remedies for a Fourth
Amendment violation are not c9nstitutional in dimension. United States
v. Leon, ante, at--. Apparently, this Court has imposed the exclusionary rule on the States as a result of the Fourth Amendment's "invisible radiations," Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc ., 465 U. S. - - , - - , n. 12
(1984), which act to somehow give the Court nonconstitutional supervisory
powers over the State courts. My own view is different. See Sheppard,
ante, at-- and n. 37 (STEVENS, J. , concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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[December - , 1984]

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
Assistant Principal Choplick searched T. L. O.'s purse for
evidence that she was smoking in the girls' restroom. Because T. L. O.'s suspected misconduct was not illegal and did
not pose a serious threat to school discipline, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that Choplick's search of her purse was
an unreasonable invasion of her privacy and that the evidence
which he seized could not be used against her in criminal proceedings. The New Jersey court's holding was a careful response to the case it was required to decide.
The State of New Jersey sought review in this Court, first
arguing that the exclusionary rule is wholly inapplicable to
searches conducted by school officials, and then contending
that the Fourth Amendment itself provides no protection at
all to the student's privacy. The Court has accepted neither
of these frontal assaults on the Fourth Amendment. It has,
however, seized upon this "no smoking" case to announce
"the proper standard" that should govern searches by.school
officials who are confronted with disciplinary problems far
more severe than smoking in the restroom. Although I
agree with Part II of the Court's opinion, I continue to believe that the Court has unnecessarily and inappropriately
reached out to decide a consitutional question. More importantly, I fear that the concerns that motivated the Court's activism have produced a holding that will permit school admin-
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istrators to search students suspected of violating only the
most trivial school regulations and guidelines for behavior.
I
The question the Court decides today-whether Mr.
Choplick's search of T. L. O.'s purse violated the Fourth
Amendment-was not raised by the state's petition for writ
of certiorari. That petition only raised one question:
"Whether the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies
to searches by public school officials and teachers in school."'
The State quite properly declined to submit the former question because "it did not wish to present what might appear to
be solely a factual dispute to this Court." 2 By reaching the
merits of that factual dispute, the Court implicitly decides
the question raised by the State in its petition for certiorari.
This Court has no license to decide the merits of Fourth
Amendment questions unless they are relevant to a case before it. These questions typically arise in criminal cases
when a defendant challenges the admission of allegedly
tainted evidence. Unless the exclusionary rule applies,
there is no reason for the Court to go further and decide the
Fourth Amendment question. 3 Since this Court has twice
had the threshold question argued, since it does not disagree
with the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling that the exclusionary rule applies, and since it has addressed and decided
the merits of this particular case, it is fair to infer-notwithstanding its disclaimer-that the Court has implicitly decided
that the exclusionary rule applies in a case of this kind.
' Pet. for Cert. , at i.
' Supp. Br. for Petitioner, at 6.
3
Few cases have explicitly considered which question should be decided
first. Compare Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F . 2d 307, 309 n. 2 (CA2
1982) (Newman, J. , joined by Winter, J. ) ("Each issue is of constitutional
dimension," and exclusionary rule question may be decided first when a decision that it does not apply will completely dispose of the case), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1014 (1983) with id. , at 315 (Oakes, J ., concurring) (The
constitutionality of the search must logically be decided first).

.•.
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The Court's decision not to disturb the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding on this question is plainly correct. As
the state court noted, 1 this case does not involve the use of
evidence in a school disciplinary proceeding; the juvenile proceedings brought against T. L. 0. involved a charge that
would have been a criminal offense if committed by an adult. 4
Accordingly, the exclusionary rule issue decided by that
court and later presented to this Court concerned only the
use in a criminal proceeding of evidence obtained in a search
conducted by a public school administrator.
Having confined the issue to the law enforcement context,
the New Jersey court then reasoned that this Court's cases
have made it quite clear that the exclusionary rule is equally
applicable "whether the public official who illegally obtained
the evidence was a municipal inspector, See v. Seattle 387
U. S. 541 [1967]; Camara [v. Municipal Court,] 387 U. S.
523 [1967]; a firefighter, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499,
506 [1978]; or a school administrator or law.enforcement official." 5 It correctly concluded "that if an official search violates constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in
criminal proceedings." 6
When a defendant in a criminal proceeding alleges that she
was the victim of an illegal search by a school administrator,
the application of the exclusionary rule is a simple corollary of
the principle "that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same, authority, inadmissible in a state court." Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U. S.
643, 655 (1961). The practical basis for this principle is, in
part, its deterrent effect, see id., at 656, and as a general
matter it is tolerably clear to me, as it has been to the Court,
that the existence of an exclusionary remedy does deter the
authorities from violating the Fourth Amendment by sharply
• State in the Interest ofT. L. 0. , 94 N. J. 331, 337 nn. 1 & 2, 342 n. 5,
463 A. 2d 934, 937, nn. 1. & 2, 939, n. 5 (1983).
5
!d. , at 341, 463 A. 2d, at 939. ·
• ld., at 341-342, 463 A. 2d, at 939.
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reducing their incentive to do so. 7 In the case of evidence
obtained in school 'searches, the "overall educative effect" 8 of
the exclusionary rule (ldds important symbolic force to this
utilitarian judgment.
·
Justice Brandeis was both a great student and a great
teacher. It was he who wrote:
"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people
by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion)
Those of us who revere the flag and the ideals for which it
stands believe in the power of symbols. We cannot ignore
that rules of law also have a symbolic power that may vastly
exceed their utility.
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential
to the meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a
self-governing citizenry. 9 If the Nation's students can be
convicted through the use of arbitrary methods destructive of
personal liberty, they cannot help but feel that they have
been dealt with unfairly. 10
The application of the exclusion' See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v.
Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 453 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338,
347-348 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 174-175 (1969).
8
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 493.
9
See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864-865 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL & STEVENS, JJ); id., at 876, 880 (BLACKMUN, J ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U. S. 202, 221 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68, 76 (1979); Tinker
v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 507, 511-513 (1969); Brown v.
Board of Education , 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954); West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943).
1
°Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 26-27 (1967). JUSTICE BRENNAN has
written of an analogous case:
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ary rule in criminal proceedings arising from illegal school
searches makes an important statement to young people that
"our society attaches serious consequences to a violation of
constitutional rights," 11 and that this is a principle "of liberty
and justice for all." 12
Thus, the simple and correct answer to the question presented by the state's petition for certiorari would have required affirmance of a state court's judgment suppressing evidence. That result would have been dramatically out of
character for a court that not only grants prosecutors relief
from suppression orders with distressing regularity, 13 but

'------------------

"We do not know what class petitioner was in when the dogs burst in,
but the lesson the school authorities taught her that day will undoubtedly
make a greater impression than the one her teacher had hoped to convey.
I would grant certiorari to teach petitioner another lesson: that the Fourth
Amendment protects '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,' .... Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of
good citizenship when the school authorities themselves disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional freedoms." Doe v.
Renfrow, 451 U. S. 1022, 1027-1028 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
11
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 493.
12
36 U. S. C. § 172 (pledge of allegiance to the flag).
13
A brief review of the Fourth Amendment cases involving criminal prosecutions sinceOctober Term, 1982, support the proposition. Compare
Florida v. Rodriguez,-- U. S. - - (1984) (per curiam); United States
v. Leon, - - U. S. - - (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, - - U. S.
- - (1984); Segura v. United States,-- U. S. - - (1984); United States
v. Karo, - - U. S. - - (1984); Oliver v. United States,-- U.S.-(1984); United States v. Jacobsen,-- U. S. - - (1984); Massachusetts v.
Upton,-- U. S. - - (1984) (per curiam); Florida v. Meyers,-- U. S.
- - (1984) (per curiam); Michigan v. Long, - - U. S. - - (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, - - U. S. - - (1983); Illinois v. Lafayette, - - U. S.
- - (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, - - U. S. - - (1983);
Illinois v. Gates, - - U. S. - - (1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730
(1983); United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983); Illinois v.
Batchelder, 463 U. S. - - (1983) (per curiam); Cardwell v. Taylor, 461
U. S. 571 (1983) (per curiam) with Thompson v. Louisiana, - - U. S.
- - (1984) (per curiam); Welsh v. Wisconsin, - - U. S. - - (1984);

I

}
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also is prone to rely on grounds not advanced by the parties
in order to protect evidence from exclusion. 14 In characteristic disregard .of the doctrine of judicial restraint, the Court
avoided that result in this case by ordering reargument and
directing the parties to address a constitutional question that
the parties, with good reason, had not asked the Court to decide. Because judicial activism undermines the Court's
power to perform its central mission in a legitimate way, I
dissented from the reargument order. See-- U. S. - (1984). I have not modified the views expressed in that dissent, but since the majority has brought the question before
us, I shall explain why I believe the Court has misapplied the
standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth
Amendment.
II
The search of a young woman's purse by a school administrator is a serious invasion of her legitimate expectations of
privacy. A purse "is a common repository for one's personal
effects and therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 762
(1979). Although such expectations must sometimes yield to
the legitimate requirements of government, in assessing the
constitutionality of a warrantless search, our decision must
be guided by the language of the Fourth Amendment: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .... " In order to evaluate the reasonableness of such searches, "it is necessary 'first to focus upon
the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official inMichigan v. Clifford, U. S. (1984) ; United States v. Place, U. S. (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983).
14
E . g. United States v. Karo, U. S. , (1984); see also
United States v. Segura, U. S. - , - (1984) (Opinion of BURGER,
C. J . joined by O'CONNOR, J. ); cf. United States v. Gates., 459 U. S. , 1028,
1028 (1982) (STEVENS, J. , dissenting from reargument order, joined by
BRENNAN & MARSHALL, JJ.)
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trusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the
private citizen,' for there is 'no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
[or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure]
entails.' "Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534-535,
536-537 (1967)). 15
The "limited search for weapons" in Terry was justified by
the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not
armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against him.'' 392 U. S., at 23, 25. When viewed from
the institutional perspective, "the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the
schools," ante, at 14 (majority opinion), is no less acute. Violent, unlawful, or seriously disruptive conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the principal function of teaching
institutions which is to educate yo:ung people and prepare
them for citizenship. 16 When such conduct occurs amidst a
sizable group of impressionable young people, it creates an
explosive atmosphere that requires a prompt and effective
response.
Thus, warrantless searches of students by school administrators are reasonable when undertaken for those purposes.
But the majority's statement of the standard for evaluating
the reasonableness of such searches is not suitably adapted to
that end. The majority holds that "a search of a student by a
teacher or other school official will be 'justified at its incep·~ See also United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881-882 (1976);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U. S. 543, 567 (1976).
6
' Cf. ante, at 3 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either the
safety of school children and teachers or the educational process itself justifies the Court in excepting school searches from the warrant and probable
cause requirement"); ante, at 3 (POWELL, J., concurring, joined by O'CoNNOR, J.) ("Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order,
teachers cannot begin to educate their students."
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tion' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that
the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated
or is violating either the law or the rules of the school."
Ante, at 15. This standard will permit teachers and school
administrators to search students when they suspect that the
search will reveal evidence of even the most trivial school
regulation or precatory guideline for student behavior. The
Court's standard for deciding whether a search is justified "at
its inception" treats all violations of the rules of the school as
though they were fungible. For the Court, a search for curlers and sunglasses in order to enforce the school dress code 17
is apparently just as important as a search for evidence of
heroin addiction or violent gang activity.
The majority, however, does not contend that school administrators have a compelling need to search students in
order to achieve optimum enforcement of minor school regulations.18 To the contrary, when minor violations are in17 Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. (1979), Record
Doc. S-1, at 7. A brief survey of school rule books reveals that, under the
majority's approach, teachers and school administrators may also search
students to enforce school rules regulating:
(i) secret societies;
(ii) students driving to school;
(iii) parking and use of parking lots during school hours;
(iv) smoking on campus;
(v) the direction of traffic in the hallways;
(vi) student presence in the hallways during class hours without .a pass;
(vii) profanity;
(viii) school attendance of interscholastic athletes on the day of a game,
meet or match;
(ix) cafeteria use and cleanup;
(x) eating lunch off-campus; and
(xi) unauthorized absence.
See Id. , 7-18; Student Handbook of South Windsor [Conn.] H. S. (1984);
Fairfax County [Va.] Public Schools, Student Responsibilities and Rights
(1980); Student Handbook of Chantilly [Va.] H. S. (1984).
18
Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 535 ("There is unanimous agreement among those inost familiar with this field that the only effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards re-
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volved, there is every indication that the informal school disciplinary process, with only minimum requirements of due
process, 19 can function effectively without the power to
search for enough evidence to prove a criminal case. In arguing that teachers and school administrators need the power
to search students based on a lessened standard, the United
States as amicus curiae relies heavily on empirical evidence
of a contemporary crisis of violence and unlawful behavior
that is seriously undermining the process of education in
American schools. 20 A standard better attuned to this concern would permit teachers and school administrators to
search a student when they have reason to believe that the
search will uncover evidence that the student is violating the
law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of
school order, or the educational process.
This standard is properly directed at "[t]he sole justification for the [warrantless] search." 21 In addition, a standard
that varies the extent of the permissible intrusion with the
gravity of the suspected offense is also more consistent with
common law experience and this Court's precedent. Criminal law has traditionally recognized a distinction between essentially regulatory offenses and serious violations of the
quired by municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all
structures. . . . [l]f the probable cause standard ... is adopted, .. . the
reasonable goals of code enforcement will be dealt a crushing blow.")
•• See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 583-584 (1975).
20
"The sad truth is that many classrooms across the country are not temples of learning teaching the lessons of good will, civility, and wisdom that
are central to the fabric of American life. To the contrary, many schools
are in such a state of disorder that not only is the educational atmosphere
polluted, but the very safety of students and teachers is imperiled." Br.
for United States as Amicus Curiae 23.
See also Br. for National Education Ass'n as Amicus Curiae 21 ("If a suspected violation of a rule threatens to disrupt the school or threatens to
harm students, school officials should be free to search for evidence of it

. ... ").

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. , at 29; United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422
U. S. , at 881-882.
21
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peace, and graduated the response of the criminal justice system depending on the character of the violation. 22 The application of a similar distinction in evaluating the reasonableness of warrantless searches and seizures "is not a novel
idea." Welsh v. Wisconsin,-- U. S. - - , - - (1984). 23
In Welsh, police officers arrived at the scene of a traffic accident and obtained information indicating that the driver of
the automobile involved was guilty of a first offense of driving while intoxicated-a civil violation with a maximum fine
of $200. The driver had left the scene of the accident, and
the officers followed the suspect to his home where they arrested him without a warrant. Absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless invasion of the home was a clear violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980). In
22
Throughout the criminal law this dichotomy has been expressed by
classifying crimes as misdemeanors or felonies, malum prohibitum or
malum in se, crimes that do not involve moral turpitude or those that do,.
and major or petty offenses. See generally W. LaFave, Handbook on
Criminal Law § 6 (1972).
Some codes of student behavior also provide a system of graduated response by distinguishing between violent, unlawful or seriously disruptive
conduct, and conduct that will only warrant serious sanctions when the student engages in repetitive offenses. See, e. g. , Parent-Student Handbook
of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. (1979), Record Doc. S-1, at 15-16; Student
Handbook of South Windsor [Conn.] H. S. ~ E (1984); Rules of the Board of
Education of the District of Columbia Chap. IV, §§ 431.1-.10 (1982). Indeed, at Piscatawy H. S. a violation of smoking regulations that is "[a] student's first offense will result in assignment of up to three (3) days of after
school classes concerning hazards of smoking." Record Doc. S-1, at 15.
23
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 582-583 (1975) (emphasis added), the
Court noted that similar considerations require some variance in the requirements of due process in the school disciplinary context:
"[A]s a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal of the student from school. We agree ... , however, that there are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students
whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately removed from school. In such cases the necessary notice and rudimentary
hearing should follow as soon as practicable . . . ."
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holding that the warrantless arrest for the "noncriminal, traffic offense" in Welsh was unconstitutional, the Court noted
that "application of the exigent-circumstances exceptions in
the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when
there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense
. . . has been committed." - - U. S., at - - .
The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of school searches is
almost too clear for argument. In order to justify the serious intrusion on the persons and privacy of young people that
New Jersey asks this Court to approve, the State must identify "some real immediate and serious consequences." M cDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 460 (1948) (Jackson,
J., concurring, joined by Frankfurter, J.). 24 While school administrators have entirely legitimate reasons for adopting
school regulations and guidelines for student behavior, the
authorization of searches to enforce them "shows a shocking
lack of all sense of proportion." I d., 459. 25
2A In McDonald police officers made a warrantless search of the office of
an illegal "numbers" operation. Justice Jackson rejected the view that the
search could be supported by exigent circumstances:
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a
forced entry without a warrant, no such emergency was present in this
case. . .. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the
offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of
attempting to reach it. ... [The defendant's] criminal operation, while a
shabby swindle that the police are quite right in suppressing, was not one
which endangered life or limb or the peace and good order of the community .... "
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 459-460 (1948).
25
While a policeman who sees a person smoking in an elevator in violation
of a city ordinance may conduct a full-blown search for evidence of the
smoking violation in the unlikely event of a custodial arrest, United States
v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 236 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S.
260, 265-266 (1973), it is more doubtful whether a search of this kind would
be reasonable if the officer only planned to issue a citation to the offender
and depart, see Robinson, supra, 414 U. S., at 236, n. 6. In any case, the
majority offers no rationale supporting its conclusion that a student de-
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The majority offers weak deference to these principles of
balance and decency by announcing that school searches will
only be reasonable in scope "when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student,
and the nature of the infraction." Ante, at 15 (emphasis
added). The majority offers no explanation why a two-part
standard is necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the
ordinary school search. Significantly, in the balance of its
opinion the Court pretermits any discussion of the nature of
T. L. O.'s infraction of the "no smoking" rule.
The "rider" to the Court's standard for evaluating the
reasonableness of the initial intrusion apparently is the
Court's perception that its standard is overly generous and
does not, by itself, achieve a fair balance between the administrator's right to search and the student's reasonable expectations of privacy. The Court's standard for evaluating the
"scope" of reasonable school searches is obviously designed to
prohibit physically intrusive searches of students by persons
of the opposite sex for relatively minor offenses. The
Court's effort to establish a standard that is, at once, clear
enough to allow searches to be upheld in nearly every case,
and flexible enough to prohibit obviously unreasonable intrusions of young adults' privacy only creates uncertainty in the
extent of its resolve to prohibit the latter. Moreover, the
majority's application of its standard in this case-to permit a
male administrator to rummage through the purse of a female high school student in order to obtain evidence that she
was smoking in a bathroom-raises grave doubts in my mind
whether its effort will be effective. 26 Unlike the Court, I betained by school officials for questioning, on reasonable suspicion that she
has violated a school rule, is entitled to no more protection under the
Fourth Amendment than a criminal suspect under custodial arrest.
26
One thing is clear under any standard-the shocking strip searches
that are described in some cases have no place in the school house. See
Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F. 2d 91, 92-93 (CA7 1980) ("It does not require a
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lieve the nature of the suspected infraction is a matter of first
importance in deciding whether any invasion of privacy is
permissible.
III
The Court embraces the standard applied by the New J ersey Supreme Court as equivalent to its own, and then deprecates the state court's application of the standard as reflecting "a somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness." Ante,
at 16. There is no mystery, however, in the state court's
finding that the search in this case was unconstitutional; the
decision below was not based on a manipulation of reaonable
suspicion, but on the trivial character of the activity that promoted the official search. The New Jersey Supreme Court
wrote:
"We are satisfied that when a school official has reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity or activity that would interfere
with school discipline and order, the school official has
the right to conduct a reasonable search for such
evidence.
"In determining whether the school official has reasonable grounds, courts should consider 'the child's age, history, and school record, the prevalence and seriousness
of the problem in the school to which the search was directed, the exigency to make the search without delay,
and the probative value and reliability of the information
used as a justification for the search.' " 27
constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year-old child
is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude"), cert. denied,
451 U. S. 1022 (1981); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (ND N. Y. 1977);
People v. Scott D., 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 315 N. E. 2d 466, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 403
(1974); M. J. v. State, 399 So. 2d 996 (Fla. App. 1981). To the extent that
deeply intrusive searches are ever reasonable outside the custodial context, it surely must only be to prevent imminent, and serious harm.
27
94 N.J., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 943 (quoting State v. McKinnon, 88
Wash. 2d 75, 81, 558 P. 2d 781, 784 (1977)) (emphasis added).
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The emphasized language in the state court's opinion focuses
on the character of the rule infraction that is the predicate for
the search.
In the view of the state court, there is a quite obvious, and
material difference between a search for evidence relating to
violent or disruptive activity, and a search for evidence of a
smoking rule violation. This distinction does not imply that
a no smoking rule is a matter of minor importance. Rather,
like a rule that prohibits a student from being tardy, its occasional violation in a context that poses no threat of disrupting
school order and discipline offers no reason to believe that an
immediate search is necessary to avoid unlawful conduct, violence or a serious impairment of the educational process.
A correct understanding of the New Jersey court's standard explains why that court concluded in T. L. O.'s case that
"the assistant principal did not have reasonable grounds to
believe that the student was concealing in her purse evidence
of criminal activity or evidence of activity that would seriously interfere with school discipline or order." 28 The importance of the nature of the rule infraction to the New J ersey Supreme Court's holding is evident from its brief
explanation of the principal basis for its decision:
"A student has an expectation of privacy in the contents
of her purse. Mere possession of cigarettes did not violate school rule or policy, since the school allowed smoking in designated areas. The contents of the handbag
had no direct bearing on the infraction.
The assistant principal's desire, legal in itself, to
gather evidence to impeach the student's credibility at a
hearing on the disciplinary infraction does not validate
the search." 29
94 N. J. , at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942 (emphasis added).
Ibid . The court added:
"Moreover, there were not reasonable grounds to believe that the purse
contained cigarettes, if they were the object of the search. No one had
furnished information to that effect to the school official. He had, at best,
28

29
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Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, I would view this case
differently if the assistant principal had reason to believe
T. L. O.'s purse contained evidence of criminal activity, or of
an activity that would seriously disrupt school discipline.
There was, however, absolutely no basis for any such assumption-not even a "hunch."
In this case, Mr. Choplick overreacted to what appeared to
be nothing more than a minor infraction-a rule prohibiting
smoking in the bathroom of the Freshman's and Sophmores'
building. 30 It is, of course, true that he actually found evidence of serious wrongdoing by T. L. 0., but no one claims
that the prior search may be justified by his unexpected discovery. As far as the smoking infraction is concerned, the
search for cigarettes merely tended to corroborate a teacher's eyewitness account of T. L. O.'s violation of a minor
regulation designed to channel student smoking behavior into
designated locations. Because this conduct was neither unlawful nor significantly disruptive of school order or the educational process, the invasion of privacy associated with the
forcible opening of the T. L. O.'s purse was entirely unjustified at its inception.
A review of the sampling of school search cases relied on by
the Court demonstrates how different this case is from those
in which there was indeed a valid justification for intruding
on a student's privacy. In most of them the student was suspected of a criminal violation; 31 in the remainder either vioa good hunch. No doubt good hunches would unearth much more evidence
of crime on the persons of students and citizens as a whole. But more is
required to sustain a search. "
!d. , at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942-943.
It is this portion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning-a portion
that was not necessary to its holding-to which this Court makes its principal response. See ante, at 18.
30
See Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. 15, 18
(1979), Record Doc. S-1. See also Tr. of Mar. 31 , 1980 Hearing 13-14.
31
See, e. g. , Tarter v. Raybuck , 742F. 2d 977 (CA6 1984) (search for marijuana); M . v. Board of Education Ball-Chatham Community Unit School
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lence or substantial disruption of school order or the integrity
of the academic process was at stake. 32 Few involved matters as trivial as the no smoking rule violated by T. L. 0. 33
The rule the Court adopts today is so open-ended that it may
make the Fourth Amendment virtually meaningless in the
school context. Although I agree that school administrators
must have broad latitude to maintain order and discipline in
our classrooms, that authority is not unlimited.
IV
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have
to experience the power of government. Through it passes
every citizen and public official, from schoolteachers to policemen and prison guards. The values they learn there,
they take with them in life. One of our most cherished ideals
is the one contained in the Fourth Amendment: that the Government may not intrude on the personal privacy of its citizens without a warrant or compelling circumstance. The
Dist No.5, 429 F. Supp. 288 (SD Ill. 1977) (drugs and large amount of
money); D. R . C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982) (stolen
money); In re W. , 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973) (marijuana); In reG., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970) (amphetamine pills); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969)
(methedrine pills); State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971)
(drugs); State v. D. T. W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(drugs); In re J. A., 85 Ill. App. 567, 406 N. E. 2d 598 (1980) (marijuana);
People v. Ward , 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975) (drug pills);
Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (marijuana); State
v. McKinnon , 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P. 2d 781 (1977) ("speed").
32
See, e. g., In re L . L. , 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979)
(search for knife or razor blade); R . C. M. v. State , 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex.
App. 1983) (student with bloodshot eyes wandering halls in violation of
school rule requiring students to remain in examination room or at home
during mid-term examinations).
33
See, e. g. , State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S. E. 2d 586 (1975) (three
students searched when they made furtive gestures and displayed obvious
conciousness of guilt); Doe v. State, 88 N. M. 347, 540 P. 2d 827 (1975) (student searched for pipe when a teacher saw him using it to violate smoking
regulations).
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Court's decision today is a curious moral for the Nation's
youth. Although the search of T. L. O.'s purse does not
trouble today's majority, I submit that we are not dealing
with "matters relatively trivial to the welfare of the Nation.
There are village tyrants as well as village Hampdens, but
none who acts under color of law is beyond the reach of the
Constitution." West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943).
I respectfully dissent.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
From:

Justice O'Connor
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-712

NEW JERSEY, PETITIONER v. T. L. 0.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW JERSEY
[June-, 1984]
JusTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting.
In this case the Court decides that the exclusionary rule
does not bar the admission in a criminal proceeding of evidence illegally seized from students in public schools by public school officials. The Court's conclusion is premised on its
belief that public school officials cannot be deterred by application of the exclusionary rule in criminal juvenile proceedings. This empirical speculation cannot, in my view, be reconciled with the presumption consistently applied in this
Court's past cases: that exclusion of evidence from the prosecution's case-in-chief at criminal trials will tend to deter unlawful searches and seizures by any and all officials of the
State. The Court has relied on this presumption both because of the uncertainties inherent in assessing the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect and because of society's compelling
need for predictable rules to guide the administration of criminal trials. Since today's decision ignores that heretofore applied presumption, I respectfully dissent.
The proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment are not limited to "the paradigmatic entry into a private dwelling by a
law enforcement officer in search of the fruits or instrumentalities of a crime." Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 504
(1978). Rather, they extend to all unreasonable encroachments by the government, "whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches
of other statutory or regulatory standards." Marshall v.
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Barlow's Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 312-313 (1978). Accordingly,
the Court has found unreasonable, within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, actions of both police and non-police officers alike. See, e. g., Michigan v. Clifford, - - U. S.
- - (1984) (fire department investigators); Michigan v. Tyler, supra (firefighters); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., supra
(Occupational Health and Safety Administration inspectors);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967) (building
inspectors); Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493 (1958) (alcohol tax collectors).
Concomitantly, whenever the Court has found unreasonable government action, it has generally required, as one
remedy, that evidence derived therefrom be excluded from
the prosecution's case-in-chief at criminal trials. See Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232
U. S. 383 (1914). Though the empirical tests of the exclusionary rule are inconclusive, the Court has consistently "assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the Fourth
Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it."
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976) (emphasis added);
see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171 (1978). The
Court bases this deterrence theory on a more general systemic assumption: that exclusion will "encourage those who
formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into
their value system." Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492. On
this basis, the Court has applied the exclusionary rule to the
fruits of Fourth Amendment intrusions of both police and
non-police officer alike, reasoning that both police and nonpolice officials can and should be encouraged to incorporate
Fourth Amendment values into the conduct of their day-today activities. See, e. g., Dunaway v. New York , 442 U. S.
200 (1979) (police officers); Michigan v. Clifford, supra (nonpolice officers); Michigan v. Tyler, supra (non-police
officers).
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The Court has never before engaged in an analysis of
whether a particular class of government officials actually
will be deterred by application of the exclusionary rule. To
be sure, the Court has rejected application of the exclusionary rule in some cases because it would not, by that application, be likely appreciably to deter future police misconduct.
See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620 (1980) (illegally obtained evidence may be used to impeach defendant);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974) (use of illegally obtained evidence permitted at a grand jury proceeding); United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976) (evidence
illegally seized by state authorities may be used in civil suit
brought by federal tax authorities); Stone v. Powell, supra
(exclusionary rule questions cannot generally be considered
on federal habeas corpus); cf. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, - U. S. - - (1984) (exclusionary rule inapplicable in civil deportation proceedings because social costs outweigh the admitted marginal deterrent effect). Yet none of these cases
entailed, as does the instant matter, the introduction of illegally seized evidence into the State's case-in-chief at a criminal proceeding, where "the need for deterrence and hence the
rationale for excluding the evidence is the strongest . . . ."
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. In none of these
cases was application of the exclusionary rule rejected, as it
is in this case, because of a judicial intuition that the offending officials could not be deterred by application of the rule in
the criminal case-in-chief. Rather, these cases considered
and rejected proposals to extend the exclusionary rule's application beyond the prosecution's criminal case-in-chief because
the additional deterrent effect to be gained was insufficient
to outweigh the concomitant social costs to be incurred.
Nor does this case fit within the analytic framework articulated in cases such as Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S.
471 (1963), and United States v. Leon,-- U. S. - - (1984).
In Wong Sun, the Court held that illegally seized evidence of
crime will nevertheless be admissible whenever the official
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error complained of is sufficiently attenuated from the evidence thereby discovered. 371 U. S., at 484. In Leon, the
Court held that evidence of crime will nevertheless be admissible whenever the error making its seizure unconstitutional
is an objectively reasonable one. - - U. S., at--. In
short, relying on the experience it has gathered from years of
adjudicating police search and seizure problems, the Court
has concluded that deterrence of particular categories of
Fourth Amendment intrusions is unlikely to result from
application of the exclusionary rule to the evidence derived
therefrom. By striking contrast, in this case the Court has
categorically determined that deterrence of certain persons,
as opposed to the commission of certain errors, will not result
by excluding the evidence illegally seized from the prosecution's criminal case-in-chief at trial. That determination is,
in my view, irreconcilable with the Court's consistently applied assumption that all government officials can and should
be encouraged to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into
their value systems. Such a determination is especially unfortunate in this case, since the Court has so little experience
with public school official search and seizure problems.
The Court apparently proposes now to assess in every case
whether prohibiting "the use in the criminal-justice system of
evidence obtained in [non-police officer] searches [will] have
. . . the behavioral effects ... that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions generally is thought
to have on the typical law enforcement official." Ante, at
9-10. I fear this approach will not lead to principled decisionmaking. It makes little sense, in the absence of determinate empirical evidence, to expect judges in state and federal
courts to be able to draw reliable and consistent conclusions
about the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on various government officials. If social scientists thoroughly trained in
statistical analysis cannot reach consistent conclusions concerning the rule's deterrent effect, there is little reason to believe that trial judges trained only in legal analysis will be
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able to do any better. The difference, of course, is that
judges do not engage in mere academic debate; they must adjudicate real prosecutions and dispose of them in a principled
manner. The Court's new approach will unnecessarily complicate, and possibly undermine, their performance of this
task.
This case serves as a good example of the arbitrary distinctions that may very well attend the Court's new approach.
The Court suggests that public school officials cannot be deterred by application of the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings because they cannot fairly be classified as "law enforcement officers." Ante, at 9. Yet public school officials
are no less concerned with "law enforcement" than are other
regulatory agents to whom the exclusionary rule has already
been applied. Like firefighters, building inspectors, and alcohol tax collectors, public school officials are charged with
enforcing government regulations and with administering a
government program. School authorities are responsible for
enforcing compulsory attendance laws and for maintaining
order and good discipline in the schools. School officials, like
these other regulatory agents, are often obliged to seek out
and report to the police evidence of criminal conduct. See
post, at - - , n. 4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). If the presumption of deterrence properly applies to these other public
officials, then it should apply to public school officials as well.
All can fairly be characterized as engaging in "law enforcement." Nothing in today's decision provides the federal and
state courts with a principled basis for distinguishing among
them and arbitrary distinctions are bound to result.
I am sympathetic to the Court's disagreement with the Supreme Court of New Jersey's determination that the evidence seized from respondent has to be excluded from her
criminal trial, but my sympathy turns on a different ground.
School administrators must be given great discretion in their
efforts to maintain order and discipline in the public schools.
Students correspondingly can expect less privacy in the
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grade schools and high schools than can other persons in noneducational settings. In short, the intrusions that must be
tolerated in public schools necessarily extend beyond those
which would pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny in other environments. On this basis, it is more likely that various
searches conducted by school officials on school premises will
be characterized as "reasonable" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. However, since the State has not challenged the Supreme Court of New Jersey's contrary holding
on this issue, the judgment of that court must be affirmed. I
respectfully dissent from the Court's conclusion to the
contrary.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
From:

Justice O'Connor
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting.
In this case the Court decides that the exclusionary rule
does not bar the admission in a criminal proceeding of evidence illegally seized from students in public schools by public school officials. The Court's conclusion is premised on its
belief that public school officials cannot be deterred by application of the exclusionary rule in criminal juvenile proceedings. This empirical speculation cannot, in my view, be reconciled with the presumption consistently applied in this
Court's past cases: that exclusion of evidence from the prosecution's case-in-chief at criminal trials will tend to deter unlawful searches and seizures by any and all officials of the
State. The Court has relied on this presumption both because of the uncertainties inherent in assessing the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect and because of society's compelling
need for predictable rules to guide the administration of criminal trials. Since today's decision ignores that heretofore applied presumption, I respectfully dissent.
The proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment are not limited to "the paradigmatic entry into a private dwelling by a
law enforcement officer in search of the fruits or instrumentalities of a crime." Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 504
(1978). Rather, they extend to all unreasonable encroachments by the government, "whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches
of other statutory or regulatory standards." Marshall v.
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Barlow's Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 312-313 (1978). Accordingly,
the Court has found unreasonable, within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, actions of both police and non-police officers alike. See, e. g., Michigan v. Clifford, - - U. S.
- - (1984) (fire department investigators); Michigan v. Tyler, supra (firefighters); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., supra
(Occupational Health and Safety Administration inspectors);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967) (building
inspectors); Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493 (1958) (alcohol tax collectors).
Concomitantly, whenever the Court has found unreasonable government action, it has generally required, as one
remedy, that evidence derived therefrom be excluded from
the prosecution's case-in-chief at criminal trials. See Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232
U. S. 383 (1914). Though the empirical tests of the exclusionary rule are inconclusive, the Court has consistently "assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the Fourth
Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it."
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 492 (1976) (emphasis added);
see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171 (1978). The
Court bases this deterrence theory on a more general systemic assumption: that exclusion will "encourage those who
formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into
their value system." Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492. On
this basis, the Court has applied the exclusionary rule to the
fruits of Fourth Amendment intrusions of both police and
non-police officer alike, reasoning that both police and nonpolice officials can and should be encouraged to incorporate
Fourth Amendment values into the conduct of their day-today activities. See, e. g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S.
200 (1979) (police officers); Michigan v. Clifford, supra (nonpolice officers); Michigan v. Tyler, supra (non-police
officers).
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The Court has never before engaged in an analysis of
whether a particular class of government officials actually
will be deterred by application of the exclusionary rule. To
be sure, the Court has rejected application of the exclusionary rule in some cases because it would not, by that application, be likely appreciably to deter future police misconduct.
See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620 (1980) (illegally obtained evidence may be used to impeach defendant);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974) (use of illegally obtained evidence permitted at a grand jury proceeding); United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976) (evidence
illegally seized by state authorities may be used in civil suit
brought by federal tax authorities); Stone v. Powell, supra
(exclusionary rule questions cannot generally be considered
on federal habeas corpus); cf. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, - U. S. - - (1984) (exclusionary rule inapplicable in civil deportation proceedings because social costs outweigh the admitted marginal deterrent effect). Yet none of these cases
entailed, as does the instant matter, the introduction of illegally seized evidence into the State's case-in-chief at a criminal proceeding, where "the need for deterrence and hence the
rationale for excluding the evidence is the strongest . . . ."
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. In none of these
cases was application of the exclusionary rule rejected, as it
is in this case, because of a judicial intuition that the offending officials could not be deterred by application of the rule in
the criminal case-in-chief. Rather, these cases considered
and rejected proposals to extend the exclusionary rule's application beyond the prosecution's criminal case-in-chief because
the additional deterrent effect to be gained was insufficient
to outweigh the concomitant social costs to be incurred.
Nor does this case fit within the analytic framework articulated in cases such as Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S.
471 (1963), and United States v. Leon,-- U. S. - - (1984).
In Wong Sun, the Court held that illegally seized evidence of
crime will nevertheless be admissible whenever the official

83-712-DISSENT
4

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

error complained of is sufficiently attenuated from the evidence thereby discovered. 371 U. S., at 484. In Leon, the
Court held that evidence of crime will nevertheless be admissible whenever the error making its seizure unconstitutional
is an objectively reasonable one. - - U. S., at--. In
short, relying on the experience it has gathered from years of
adjudicating police search and seizure problems, the Court
has concluded that deterrence of particular categories of
Fourth Amendment intrusions is unlikely to result from
application of the exclusionary rule to the evidence derived
therefrom. By striking contrast, in this case the Court has
categorically determined that deterrence of certain persons,
as opposed to the commission of certain errors, will not result
by excluding the evidence illegally seized from the prosecution's criminal case-in-chief at trial. That determination is,
in my view, irreconcilable with the Court's consistently applied assumption that all government officials can and should
be encouraged to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into
their value systems. Such a determination is especially unfortunate in this case, since the Court has so little experience
with public school official search and seizure problems.
The Court apparently proposes now to assess in every case
whether prohibiting "the use in the criminal-justice system of
evidence obtained in [non-police officer] searches [will] have
... the behavioral effects . . . that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions generally is thought
to have on the typical law enforcement official." Ante, at
9-10. I fear this approach will not lead to principled decisionmaking. It makes little sense, in the absence of determinate empirical evidence, to expect judges in state and federal
courts to be able to draw reliable and consistent conclusions
about the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on various government officials. If social scientists thoroughly trained in
statistical analysis cannot reach consistent conclusions concerning the rule's deterrent effect, there is little reason to believe that trial judges trained only in legal analysis will be
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able to do any better. The difference, of course, is that
judges do not engage in mere academic debate; they must adjudicate real prosecutions and dispose of them in a principled
manner. The Court's new approach will unnecessarily complicate, and possibly undermine, their performance of this
task.
This case serves as a good example of the arbitrary distinctions that may very well attend the Court's new approach.
The Court suggests that public school officials cannot be deterred by application of the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings because they cannot fairly be classified as "law enforcement officers." Ante, at 9. Yet public school officials
are no less concerned with "law enforcement" than are other
regulatory agents to whom the exclusionary rule has already
been applied. Like firefighters, building inspectors, and alcohol tax collectors, public school officials are charged with
enforcing government regulations and with administering a
government program. School authorities are responsible for
enforcing compulsory attendance laws and for maintaining
order and good discipline in the schools. School officials, like
these other regulatory agents, are often obliged to seek out
and report to the police evidence of criminal conduct. See
post, at ___.__, n. 4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). If the presumption of deterrence properly applies to these other public
officials, then it should apply to public school officials as well.
All can fairly be characterized as engaging in "law enforcement." Nothing in today's decision provides the federal and
state courts with a principled basis for distinguishing among
them and arbitrary distinctions are bound to result.
I am sympathetic to the Court's disagreement with the Supreme Court of New Jersey's determination that the evidence seized from respondent has to be excluded from her
criminal trial, but my sympathy turns on a different ground.
School administrators must be given great discretion in therr
q
efforts to maintain order and discipline in the public schools.
Students correspondingly can expect less privacy in the
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grade schools and high schools than can other persons in noneducational settings. In, short, the intrusions that must be
tolerated in ublic schools necessaril extend be ona those
whic wou d pass Fourth Amendment scrutmy in other enviroiLmenM,. On this basis, it is more hkely that various
searches conducted by school officials on school premises will
be characterized as "reasonable" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. However, since the State has not challenged the Supreme Court of New Jersey's contrary holding
on this issue, the judgment of that court must be affirmed. I
respectfully dissent from the Court's conclusion to the
contrary.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I join Part II of the Court's opinion. Teachers, like all
other government officials, must conform their conduct to the
Fourth Amendment's protections of personal privacy and
personal security. As JUSTICE STEVENS points out, post, at
16-17, this principle is of particular importance when applied
to schoolteachers, for children learn as much by example as
by exposition. It would be incongruous and futile to charge
teachers with the task of embuing their students with an understanding of our system of constitutional democracy, while
at the same time immunizing those same teachers from the
need to respect constitutional protections. See Board of
Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864-865 (plurality opinion);
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
624, 637 (1943).
I do not, however, otherwise join the Court's opinion. Today's decision sanctions school officials to conduct full-scale
searches on a "reasonableness" standard whose only definite
content is that it is not the same test as the "probable cause"
standard found in the text of the Fourth Amendment. In
adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and unnecesary departure from generally ·applicable Fourth Amendment standards, the Court carves out a broad exception to standards
that this Court has developed over years of considering
Fourth Amendment problems. Its decision is supported nei-
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ther by precedent nor even by a fair application of the "balancing test" it proclaims in thi~ very opinion.
I

Three basic principles underly this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically delineated
and well-recognized exceptions. See, e. g., Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967); accord Welsh v. Wisconsin,
- - U. S. - - , - - (1984); United States v. Place, - U. S. - - , - - (1983); Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S.
204, 211-212 (1981); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 (1968); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). Second, full-scale
searches-whether conducted in accordance with the warrant requirement or pursuant to one of its exceptions-are
"reasonable" "in Fourth Amendment terms only on a showing
of probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed
and that evidence of the crime will be found in the place to be
searched. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 479 (1963); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175-176 (1949). Third, categories of intrusions that are substantially less intrusive than
full-scale searches or seizures may be justifiable in accordance with a balancing test even absent a warrant or probable
cause, provided that the balancing test used gives sufficient
weight to the privacy interests that will be infringed.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 210 (1979); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968).
Vice-Principal Choplick's thorough excavation ofT. L. O.'s
purse was undoubtedly a serious intrusion on her privacy.
Unlike the searches in Terry v. Ohio, supra, or Adams v.
Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), the search at issue here encompassed a detailed and minute examination of respondent's
pocketbook, in which the contents of private papers and let-
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ters were thoroughly scrutinized. 1 Wisely, neither petitioner nor the Court today attempt to justify the search of
T. L. O.'s pocketbook as a minimally intrusive search in the
Terry line. To be faithful to the Court's settled doctrine, the
inquiry therefore must focus on the warrant and probable
cause requirements.
A
I agree that school teachers or principals, when not acting
as agents of law enforcement authorities, generally may conduct a search of their students' belongings without first obtaining a warrant. To agree with the Court on this point is
to say that school searches may justifiably be held to that extent to constitute an exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement. Such an exception, however, is not to
be justified, as the Court apparently holds, by assessing net
social value through application of an unguided "balancing
test" in which "the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security" are weighed against "the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of
public order." Ante, at 10. The Warrant Clause is something more than an exhortation to this Court to maximize social welfare as we see fit. It requires that the authorities
must obtain a warrant before conducting a full-scale search.
The undifferentiated governmental interest in law enforcement is insufficient to justify an exception to the warrant requirement. Rather, some special governmental interest beyond the need merely to apprehend lawbreakers is necessary
to justify a categorical exception to the warrant requirement.
For the most part, special governmental needs sufficient to
override the warrant requirement flow from "exigency"that is, from the press of time that makes obtaining a warrant
'A purse typically contains items of highly personal nature. Especially
for shy or sensitive adolescents, it could prove extremely embarrassing for
a teacher or principal to rummage through its contents, which could include
notes from friends, fragments of love poems, caricatures of school authorities, ~nd items of personal hygiene.
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either impossible or hopelessly infeasible. See United States
v. Place,-- U.S., at--; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S.,
at 393-394; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S., at 15. Only
after finding an extraordinary governmental interest of this
kind have we-or ought we-engage in a balancing test to determine if a warrant should nonetheless be required. 2
To require a showing of some extraordinary governmental
interest before dispensing with the warrant requirement is
not to undervalue society's need to apprehend violators of the
criminal law. To be sure, forcing law enforcement personnel
to obtain a warrant before engaging in a search will predictably deter the police from conducting some searches that
they would otherwise like to conduct. But this is not an unintended result of the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy; rather, it is the very purpose for which the Amendment
was thought necessary. Only where the governmental interests at stake exceed those implicated in any ordinary law
enforcement context-that is, only where there is some extraordinary governmental interest involved-is it legitimate
to engage in a balancing test to determine whether a warrant
is indeed necessary.
In this case, such extraordinary governmental interests do
exist and are sufficient to justify an exception to the warrant
requirement. Students are necessarily confined for most of
the school day in close proximity to each other and to the
school staff. I agree with the Court that we can take judicial
notice of the serious problems of drugs and violence that
plague our schools. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN notes, teachers
must not merely "maintain an environment conducive to
' Administrative search cases involving inspection schemes have recognized that "if inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent,
unannounced, even frequent inspections are essential. In this context, the
prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection .... " United
States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311, 316 (1972); accord Donovan v. Dewey, 452
U. S. 594, 603 (1981). Cf. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 (1978)'
(holding that a warrant is nonetheless necessary in some administrative
search contexts).
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learning" among children who "are inclined to test the outer
boundaries of acceptable conduct," but must also "protect the
very safety of students and school personnel." Ante, at 3.
A teacher or principal could neither carry out essential teaching functions nor adequately protect students' safety if required to wait for a warrant before conducting a necessary
search. For these reasons, I agree with the Court's conclusion that Mr. Choplick did not need a warrant before searching T.L. O.'s purse.
B
I emphatically disagree with the Court's decision to cast
aside the constitutional probable cause standard when assessing the constitutional validity of a schoolhouse search. The
Court's decision jettisons the probable cause standard-the
only standard that finds support in the text of the Fourth
Amendment-on the basis of of its Rohrschach-like "balancing test." Use of such a "balancing test" to determine the
standard for evaluating the validity of a full-scale search represents a sizable innovation in Fourth Amendment analysis.
This innovation finds support neither in precedent nor policy
and portends a dangerous weakening of the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment to protect the privacy and security of
our citizens. Moreover, even if this Court's historic understanding of the Fourth Amendment were mistaken and a balancing test of some kind were appropriate, any such test that
gave adequate weight to the privacy and security interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment would not reach the
preordained result the Court's conclusory analysis reaches
today. Therefore, because I believe that the balancing test
used by the Court today is flawed both in its inception and in
its excecution, I respectfully dissent.
1

An unbroken line of cases in this Court have held that
probable cause is a prerequisite for a full-scale search. In
Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 (1925), the Court
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held that "[o]n reason and authority the true rule is that if the
search and seizure ... are made upon probable cause, ...
the search and seizure are valid." Under our past decisions
probable cause--which exists where "the facts and circumstances within [the officials'] knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that a criminal offense had occurred and the evidence
would be found in the suspected place, id., at 162-is the constitutional minimum for justifying a full-scale search, regardless whether it is conducted pursuant to a warrant or, as in
Carroll, within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 104 (1959)
(Carroll "merely relaxed the requirements for a warrant on
grounds of practicality," but "did not dispense with the need
for probable cause"); accord Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S.
42, 51 (1970) ("In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures; the Court
has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement
for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution."). 3
Our holdings that probable cause is a prerequisite to a fullscale search are based on the relationship between the two
clauses of the Fourth Amendment. The first clause ("The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .... ")states the purpose of the amendment and its coverage. The second clause (" ... and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ... ") gives con' In fact, despite the somewhat diminished expectation of privacy that
this Court has recognized in the automobile context, see South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 367-368 (1976), we have required probable
cause even to justify a warrantless automobile search, see United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 896 (1975) ("A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy. To protect that privacy from official arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum
requirement for a lawful search.") (footnote omitted); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51 (1970).
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tent to the word "unreasonable" in the first clause. "For all
but ... narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite 'balancing'
has been performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in the principle that seizures are 'reasonable' only if supported by probable cause." Dunaway v. New York, 442

u. s. 200, 214 (1979).

I therefore fully agree with the Court that "the underlying
command of the Fourth Amendment.is always that searches
and seizures be reasonable." Ante, at 10. But this "underlying command" is not directly interpreted in each category
of cases by some amorphous "balancing test." Rather, the
provisions of the warrant clause-a warrant and probable
cause-provide the yardstick against which official searches
and seizures are to be measured. The Fourth Amendment
neither requires nor authorizes the conceptual free-for-all
that ensues when an unguided balancing test is used to assess
sp~cific categories of searches.
If the search in question is
more than a minimally intrusive Terry-stop, the constitutional probable cause standard determines its validity.
To be sure, the Court recognizes that probable cause "ordinarily'' is required to justify a full-scale search and that the
existence of probable cause "bears upon" the validity of the
search. Ante, at 13-14. Yet the Court fails to cite any case
in which a full-scale intrusion upon privacy interests has been
justified on less than probable cause. The line of cases
begun by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1980), provides no support, for they applied a balancing test only in the context of
minimally intrusive searches that served crucial law enforcement interests. The search in Terry itself, for instance, was
a "limited search of the outer clothing." I d., at 30. The
type of border stop at issue in United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U. S. 873, 880 (1975), usually "consume[d] no
more than a minute"; the Court explicitly noted that "any further detention . . . must be based on consent or probable
cause." ld., at 881. See also United States v. Hensley,
- - U. S. - - , - - (1985) (momentary stop); United States
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v. Place,-- U. S. - - , - - (1983) (brief detention of luggage for canine "sniff"); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S.
106 (1978) (per curiam) (brief frisk after stop for traffic violation); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 560
(1976) (characterizing intrusion as "minimal"); Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972) (stop and frisk). In short, all of
these cases involved "'seizures' so substantially less intrusive
than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to
make Fourth Amendment 'seizures' reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test." Dunaway, supra, at 210.
Nor do the "administrative search" cases provide any comfort for the Court. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U. S. 523 (1967), the Court held that the probable cause
standard governed even administrative searches. Although
the Camara Court recognized that probable cause standards
themselves may have to be somewhat modified to take into
account the special n::!.ture of administrative ·searches, the
Court did so only after noting that "because [housing code]
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the
discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy." ld., at 537.
Subsequent administrative search cases have similarly recognized that such searches intrude upon areas whose owners
harbor a significantly decreased expectation of privacy, see,
e. g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 598-599 (1981), thus
circumscribing the injury to Fourth Amendment interests
caused by the search.
Considerations of the deepest significance for the freedom
of our citizens counsel strict adherence to the principle that
no search may be conducted where the official is not in possession of probable cause-that is, where the official does not
know of "facts and circumstances [that] warrant a prudent
man in believing that the offense has been committed."
Unted .States v. Henry, 361 U.S., at 102; see also id., at
100-101 (discussing history of probable cause standard).
The Fourth Amendment was designed not merely to protect
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against official intrusions whose social utility was less as
measured by some "balancing test" than its intrusion on individual privacy; it was designed in addition to grant the individual a zone of privacy whose protections could be breached
only where the "reasonable" requirements of the probable
cause standard were met. Moved by whatever momentary
evil has aroused their fears, officials-perhaps even supported by. a majority of citizens-may be tempted to conduct
searches that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage
the perceived evil. 4 But the Fourth Amendment rests on
the principle that a true balance between the individual and
society depends on the recognition of "the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277
U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). That right
protects the privacy and security of the individual unless the
authorities can cross a specific threshold of need, designated
by the term "probable cause." I cannot agree with the
Court's assertions today that a "balancing test" can replace
the constitutional threshold with one that is more convenient
for those enforcing the laws but less protective of the citizens'
liberty; the Fourth Amendment's protections should not be
defaced by "a balancing process that overwhelms the individual's protection against unwarranted official intrusion by a
governmental interest said to justify the search and seizure."
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 570 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
2
I thus do not accept the majority's premise that "[t]o hold
that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted
by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry into the
• As Justice Stewart said in Coolidge v. N ew Hampshire , 403 U. S. 443,
455 (1971), "In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict
or fear of internal subversion, this basic law and the values that it represents may appear unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some. But the values
were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts."
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standards governing such searches." Ante, at - - . For
me, the finding that the Fourth Amendment applies, coupled
with the observation that what is at issue is a full-scale
search, is the end of the inquiry. But even if I believed that
a "balancing test" appropriately replaces the judgment of the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment, I would nonetheless object to the cursory and short-sighted "test" that the Court
employs to justify its predictable weakening of Fourth
Amendment protections. In particular, the test employed
by the Court vastly overstates the social costs that a probable cause standard entails and, though it plausibly articulates
the serious privacy interests at stake, inexplicably fails to accord them adequate weight in striking the balance.
The Court begins to articulate its "balancing test" by observing that "the government's need for effective methods to
deal with breaches of public order" is to be weighed on one
side of the balance. Ante, at 10. Of course, this is not correct. It is not the ·government's need for effective enforcement methods that should weigh in the balance, for ordinary
Fourth Amendment standards-including probable causemay well permit methods for maintaining the public order
that are perfectly effective. If that were the case, the governmental interest in having effective standards would carry
no weight at all as a justification for departing from the probable cause standard. Rather, it is the costs of applying probable cause as opposed to applying some lesser standard that
should be weighed on the government's side. 5
I speak of the "government's side" only because it is the terminology
used by the Court. In my view, this terminology itself is seriously misleading. The government is charged with protecting the privacy and security of the citizen, just as it is charged with apprehending those who violate
the criminal law. Consequently, the government has no legitimate interest in conducting a search that unduly intrudes on the privacy and security
of the citizen. The balance is not between the rights of the government
and the rights of the citizen, but between opposing conceptions of the constitutionally legitimate means of carrying out the government's varied
responsibilities.
5
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In order to tote up the costs of applying the probable cause
standard, it is thus necessary first to take into account the
nature and content of that standard, and the likelihood that it
would hamper achievment of the goal-vital not just to
"teachers and administrators," see ante, at 12-of maintaining an effective educational setting in the public schools.
The seminal statement concerning the nature of the probable
cause standard is found in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S.
132 (1925). Carroll held that law enforcement authorities
have probable cause to search where "the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that a
criminal offense had occurred." !d., at 162. In Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949), the Court amplified this
requirement, holding that probable cause depends upon "the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Id., at
175.
Two Terms ago, in Illinois v. Gates, - - U.S. - (1983), this Court expounded at some length its view of the
probable cause standard. Among the adjectives used to describe the standard were "practical," "fluid," "flexible," "informal," "easily applied," and "nontechnical." See id., at
- - , - - , - - The probable cause standard was to be
seen as a "commonsense" test whose application depended on
an evaluation of the "totality of the circumstances." I d., at
Ignoring what Gates took such great pains to emphasize,
the Court today holds that a new "reasonableness" standard
is appropriate because it "will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their
conduct according to the dictates of reason and common
sense." Ante, at 16. I had never thought that our preGates understanding of probable cause defied either reason
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or common sense. But after Gates, I would have thought
that there could be no doubt that this "nontechnical," "practical," and "easily applied" concept was eminently serviceable
in a context like a school, where professional teachers require
the flexibility to respond quickly and decisively to
emergencies.
A consideration of the likely operation of the probable
cause standard reinforces this conclusion. Discussing the
issue of school searches, Professor LaFave has noted that the
cases that have reached the appellate courts "strongly suggest that in most instances the evidence of wrongdoing
prompting teachers or principals to conduct searches is sufficiently detailed and specific to meet the traditional probable
cause test." 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.11, at
459-460 (1978). 6 The problems that have caused this Court
difficulty in interpreting the probable cause standard have
largely involved informants, see, e. g., Illinois v. Gates,-U. S. (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410
(1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964); Draper v.
United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959). However, three factors
make it likely that problems involving informants will not
make it difficult for teachers and school administrators to
make probable cause decisions. This Court's decision in
Gates applying a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine whether an informant's tip can constitute probable
cause renders the test easy for teachers to apply. The fact
that students and teachers interact daily in the school building makes it more likely that teachers will get to know students who supply information; the problem of informants who
remain anonymous even to the teachers-and who are therefore unavailable for verification or further questioning-is
unlikely to arise. Finally, teachers can observe the behavior
6

I

It should be noted that Professor LaFave reached this conclusion in
1978, before this Court's decision in Gates made clear the "flexibility" of t.pe
probable cause concept.
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of students under suspicion to corroborate any doubtful tips
they do receive.
As compared with the relative ease with which teachers
can apply the probable cause standard, the amorphous
"reasonableness under all the circumstances" standard
freshly coined by the Court today will likely spawn increased
"litigation and greater uncertainty among teachers and administrators. Of course, as this Court should know, an essential
purpose of developing and articulating legal norms is to enable individuals to conform their conduct to those norms. A
school system conscientiously attempting to obey the Fourth
Amendment's dictates under a probable cause standard
could, for example, consult decisions and other legal materials and prepare a booklet expounding the rough outlines of
the concept. Such a booklet could be distributed to teachers
to provide them with guidance as to when a search may be
lawfully conducted. I cannot but believe that the same
school system faced with interpreting what is permitted
under the Court's new "reasonableness" standard would be
hopelessly adrift as to when a search may be permissible.
The sad result of this uncertainty may well be that some
teachers will be reluctant to conduct searches that are fully
permissible and even necessary under the constitutional
probable cause standard, while others may intrude arbitrarily and unjustifiably on the privacy of students. 7
A comparison of the language of the standard ("reasonableness under
all the circumstances") with the traditional language of probable cause
("facts sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that
a crime had been committed and the evidence would be found in the designated place") suggests that the Court's new standard may turn out to be
probable cause under a new guise. If so, the additional uncertainty caused
by this Court's innovation is surely unjustifiable; it would be naive to expect that the addition of this extra dose of uncertainty would do anything
other than "burden the efforts of school authorities to maintain order in the
schools," ante, at 15. If, on the other hand, the new standard permits
searches of students in instances when probable cause is absent-instances, according to this Court's consistent formulations, when a person of
7
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One further point should be taken into account when considering the desirability of replacing the constitutional probable cause standard. The question facing the Court is not
whether the probable cause standard should be replaced by a
test of "reasonableness under all the circumstances."
Rather, it is whether traditional Fourth Amendment standards should recede before the Court's new standard. Thus,
although the Court today paints with a broad brush and holds
its undefined "reasonableness" standard applicable to all
school searches, I would approach the question with considerably more reserve. I would not think it necessary to develop
a single standard to govern all school searches, any more
than traditional Fourth Amendment law applies even the
probable cause standard to all searches and seizures. For
instance, just as police officers may conduct a brief stop and
frisk on something less than probable cause, so too should
teachers be permitted the same flexibility. A teacher or administrator who had reasonable suspicion that a student was
carrying a gun would no doubt have authority under ordinary
Fourth Amendment doctrine to conduct a limited search of ·
the student to determine whether the threat was genuine.
The "costs" of applying the traditional probable cause standard must therefore be discounted by the fact that, where additional flexibility is necessary and where the intrusion is
minor, traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence itself
displaces probable cause when it determines the validity of a
search.
A legitimate balancing test whose function was something
more substantial than reaching a predetermined conclusion
acceptable to this Court's impressions of what authority
teachers need would therefore reach rather a different result
than that reached by the Court today. On one side of the
reasonable caution would not think it likely that a violation existed or that
evidence of that violation would be found-the new standard is genuinely
objectionable and impossible to square with the premise that our citizens
have the right to be free from arbitrary intrusions on their privacy.
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balance would be the costs of applying traditional Fourth
Amendment standards-the "practical" and "flexible" probable cause standard where a full-scale intrusion is sought, a
lesser standard in situations where the intrusion is much less
severe and the need for greater authority compelling.
Whatever costs were toted up on this side would have to be
discounted by the costs of applying an unprecedented and illdefined "reasonableness under all the circumstances" test
that will leave teachers and administrators uncertain as to
their authority and will encourage excessive fact-based
litigation.
On the other side of the balance would be the serious privacy interests of the student, interests that the Court admirably articulates in its opinion, ante, ae 10-12, but which
the Court's new ambiguous standard places in serious jeopardy. I have no doubt that a fair assessment of the two sides
of the balance would necessarily reach the same conclusion
that, as I have argued above, the Fourth Amendment's language compels-that school searches like that conducted in
this case are valid only if supported by probable cause.
II

Applying the constitutional probable cause standard to the
facts of this case, I would find that Mr. Choplick's search violated T. L. O.'s Fourth Amendment rights. After escorting
T. L. 0. into his private office, Mr. Choplick demanded to
see her purse. He then opened the purse to find evidence
whether she had been smoking in the bathroom. When he
opened the purse, he discovered the pack of cigarettes. At
this point, his search for evidence of the smoking violation
was complete.
Mr. Choplick then noticed, below the cigarettes, a pack of
cigarette rolling papers. Believing that such papers were
"associated," see ante, at 2, with the use of marijuana, he
proceeded to conduct a detailed examination of the contents
of her purse, in which he found some marihuana, a pipe, some
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money, an index card, and some private letters indicating
that T. L. 0. had sold marihuana to other students. The
State sought to introduce this latter material in evidence at a
criminal proceeding, and the issue before the Court is
whether it should have been suppressed.
On my view of the case, we need not decide whether the
initial search conducted by Mr. Choplick-the search for evidence of the smoking violation that was completed when Mr.
Choplick found the pack of cigarettes-was valid. For Mr.
Choplick at that point did not have probable cause to continue
to rummage through T. L. O.'s purse. Mr. Choplick's suspicion of marijuana possession at this time was based solely on
the presence of the package of cigarette papers. The mere
presence without more of such a staple item of commerce is
insufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in inferring both that T. L. 0. had violated the law by possessing
marijuana and that evidence of that violation would be found
in her purse. Just as a police officer could not obtain a warrant to search a home based solely on his claim that he had
seen a package of cigarette papers in that home, Mr.
Choplick was not entitled to search possibly the most private
possessions ofT. L. 0. based on the mere presence of a package of cigarette papers. Therefore, the fruits of this illegal
search must be excluded and the judgment of the New Jersey
Supreme Court affirmed.
III
In the past several Terms, this Court has produced a succession of Fourth Amendment opinions in which "balancing
tests" have been applied to resolve various questions concerning the proper scope of official searches. The Court has
begun to apply a "balancing test" to determine whether a
particular category of searches intrudes upon expectations of
privacy that merit Fourth Amendment protection. See
Hudson v. Palmer,-- U.S.--,-- (1984) ("Determining whether an expectation of privacy is 'legitimate' or 'reasonable' necessarily entails a balancing of interests.").. It ap-
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plies a "balancing test" to determine whether a warrant is
necessary to conduct a search. See ante, at - - ; United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 564-566 (1976). In
today's opinion, it employs a "balancing test" to determine
what standard should govern the constitutionality of a given
category of searches. See ante, at--. Should a search
turn out to be unreasonable after application of all of these
"balancing tests," the Court then applies an additional "balancing test" to decide whether the evidence resulting from
the search must be excluded. See United States v. Leon,

-

u. s. -

(1984).

All of these "balancing tests" amount to brief nods by the
Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while
the Court in fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial
will. Perhaps this doctrinally destructive nihilism is merely
a convenient umbrella under which a majority that cannot
agree on a genuine rationale- can conceal its differences.
Compare ante, at-- (WHITE, J., delivering the opinion of
the Court) with ante, at-- (POWELL, J., joined by O'CONNOR, J., concurring) and ante, at--, (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in the judgment). And it may be that real force underlying today's decision is the belief that the Court purports
to reject-the belief that the unique role served by the
schools justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment on
their behalf. If so, the methodology of today's decision may
turn out to have as little influence in future cases as will its
result, and the Court's departure from traditional Fourth
Amendment doctrine will be confined to the schools.
On my view, the presence of the word "unreasonable" in
the text of the Fourth Amendment does not grant a shifting
majority of this Court the authority to answer all Fourth
Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of
the social good. Full-scale searches unaccompanied by probable cause violate the Fourth Amendment. I do not pretend
that our traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine automatically answers all of the difficult legal questions that occasion-

-
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ally arise. I do contend, however, that this Court has an obligation to provide some coherent framework to resolve such
questions on the basis of more than a conclusory recitation of
the results of a "balancing test." The Fourth Amendment
itself supplies that framework and, because the Court today
fails to heed its message, I must respectfully dissent.
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New Jersey v. T.L.O.
Justice Powell, concurring.

I agree with

the result reached by the Court and with

most of its reasoning.

I write separately only to make clear my

disagreement with language in the Court's opinion that suggests
that exclusion of evidence from school disciplinary proceedings
may provide a

significant deterrent to Fourth Amendment viola-

tions by school officials.

That suggestion is unsubstantiated by
~ ·

the current record and is
As the Court

~~ecessary

to the question before us.

~ ante,

at 9, the only question

before us is whether evidence unlawfully seized by school officials during the course of an in-school search must be excluded
in

juvenile delinquency proceedings.

conclusion

that

it

need

not.

I

agree with the Court's

Application of

the

exclusionary

rule to criminal proceedings is warranted only where it is clear
that exclusion will

"result in appreciable deterrence."

United

..
,.

page 2.

States

d- pl aj

R.S,

v.

Janis,

428

u.s.

433,

454

(1976).

As

~

the Court ~

1\

school officials properly are concerned primarily with

enforcing school regulations and maintaining a safe and drug-free
learning enviornment.

Ante, at 9-10.

They, therefore, will have

strong incentives to perform in-school searches that will not be
diminished by the exclusion of evidence in a

subsequent delin-

quency proceeding.
This

explanation

sufficiently

answers

the

question

whether the exclusionary rule will "result in appreciable deterrenee."

Nevertheless,

the Court goes on to consider the likely

deterrent effect of excluding evidence seized by school officials
from school disciplinary proceedings.

See ante, at 10-11.

The

basis for the Court's speculation is the decision by the New Jersey Superior Court that evidence seized in this case must be exeluded from the disciplinary proceedings involving T.L.O.'s suspension from school.
The Court states

in a

footnote

that

"the propriety of

that decision is not before us in this case."

Ante, at 10 n. 6.

,J

page 3.

This disclaimer, however, is undermined by the Court's subsequent
statement to the effect that

"illegal searches and seizures by

school officials will be adequately deterred" by the exclusion of
evidence from school disciplinary proceedings.
only is this statement

~~

Ante, at 11.

Not

unsupported by the record in this

case, but it suggests an answer to a question that is not currently before us.

Moreover,

it suggests an answer that is con-

trary to our decisions concerning the exclusionary rule -- decisions that consistently have refused to extend the rule to civil
proceedings.

See,

e.g.,

United

States v.

Janis,

428

u.s.

433

(1976).
Although I join the Court's opinion, I disapprove of its
unnecessary musings concerning the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule in situtations that simply are not before us.
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~~lsWeigh
School Safety,
Student Rights

By Elsa Walsh
Waalllngton Post St.art Writer

A Baltimore County high school gym class was sent
back to school from a roller rink recently after 'the scent
of marijuana was detected in a rink restroqm and on
some of the students.
When they got back to Towson High, small groups of
students were taken to administrative offices and frisked
. by members of the school staff. Their purses, bags, shoes
and socks were searched and, in some cases, clothing was
removed and bras and underwear were checked.
School officials found a 51f2 -inch knife in one girl's
pocket arid marijuana in the purses of two other students. Juvenile charges were brought against the students..<;>ne ~as suspended and two were expelled.

~h{

tro~bling

~~ol

· · cident r fleets a
problem for
officials around the country: How do they balance the
mied for a safe school environment against a student's
right to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches?
That is the issue in a case pending before the Supreme
Court involving a New ~ersey vice principal's search of a
student's purse. Courts around the nation have ruled
erratically on student searches, and many school officials
are nervously awaiting the high court's decision, which is
expected before the court's term expires in July. The
decision, school officials say, could radically alter when
and how they may search students. '
"We could be in a heap of trouble," says Peter BlauSee RIGHT~, A23, Col. 1

At iaaue in the New Jersey case,
now on appeal to the high court, is
whether the evidence found by the
vice principal should have been permitted in court, even if the search
did not meet a legal standard of reasonableness or fairness. Attorneys
for the state argue that school administrators are not trained police
officers and should not have to meet
the same criminal law standards.
They say the purpose of school
searches is a pragmatic one: to maintain a safe and disciplined environment.
In friend-of-the-court briefs,
school board attorneys have urged
the court to permit broader discretion for school administrators in
searches.
"We are concerned about an overbroad decision that could endanger a
school's ability to llct in loco parentis," says Shannon. "It could hamstring administration efforts and
teachers' efforts to control what is
going on in the school."
Goodman and the girl's lawyers,
on the other hand, contend that children in school should be afforded
· the same guarantees they have elsewhere. They argue that because
smoking was allowed in other areas
of the Piscataway school building,
possession of cigarettes was not a
violation of school rules and was not
a reasonable in'dication that the
purse contained marijuana.
The "wholesale rummaging" of the
girl's purse was unreasonable, they
contended, adding that the marijuana found should not have been permitted as evidence in a criminal

RIGHTS, From AI
velt, chief of security for Prince
George's County schools, where officials collected about 100 weapons
from students this school year, some
during searches. "The decision could
be devastating."
"It's an issue of real concern to us.
We realize the tenuous legal grounds
much of this search business is based
upon," says Jim Fleming, an assistant superintendent with the Miami
schools, where drug trafficking has
been a major problem. Through December of this school year, Miami
school officials confiscated 98 weapons and processed 97 cases of drug
possession. "We are watching the
Supreme Court decision very, very
closely."
"Essentially, schools seem to expect students to shed their constitutional rights when they come into
school: says Barry Goodman, a New
Jersey lawyer with the American
Civil Liberties Union, who has filed
a brief in the Supreme Court case.
"They have the rights on the street,
but once they walk into school they
can forget il Their rights are lost."
Schools are different from the
streets, argues Tom Shannon, executive director of the National School
Boards Association in Alexandria.
"We are not at war with our children," says Shannon, but "this is not
the street. Certain rights people have
in school have to be subordinated to
the common good and safety of all
children." Shannon has also filed a
brief in Supreme Court case. ·
In the New Jersey case, a Pisca- '
taway, N.J., student, who is identified only as T.L.O. in court papers,
was seen smoking in the school bathroom on March 7, 1980. When the
girl denied the accusation, the vice
principal searched the girl's purse.
The administrator found cig~
rettes on top and rolling papers not ·
far below. A deeper look into the
purse yielded marijuana, empty plastic bags, a pipe and a list of names of
persons who owed th~ student money. The evidence was turned over to
police, and the girl was convicted of
possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute.
The conviction a overturned
last year by the New Jersey Supreme Court, which rul~ that students should be guaranteed the same
rights as adult offenders and that
the 8earch was improper. The evidence was suppressed.

\ court proceeding. Strict standards
are particularly important when impounded material is turned over for
a court proceeding.
,
"It would be ironic in the extreme," wrote the ACLU in 'its brief;
"if ln our schools, the institution
upon which we rely to teach our children the rights and responsibilities
of our constitutional form of government, violations of those rights are
.countenanced .... "
School officials are hoping the Su, preme Court will clear up some of
the confusion and set clearer guidelines as to when students can be
searched and when the evidence can
be used in court. At present, school
districts and courts around the coun-

l

try require standards varying from
suspicion to "probable cause.• Some,
such as in Maryland, Virginia and
the District, allow searches when
there appears to be "reasonable" belief that the student has drugs, a

weapon or stolen property. In others,
such as Miami, a student is asked if
he or she will permit a search; if the ,
student refuses the parent or police
will be called to judge if the stricter
standard of "probable cause" can be
met.
"Searches are shaky," says Miami's Fleming.
As a result of the differing interpretations, numerous problems have
arisen. In California, lawyers are expecting the high court's decision to
affect a similar case in the State Su. preme Court. In that case, a student
was standing in a hallway during
class time and a school staff memher, concerned that he might be
1
\ skipping class, searched his bag and
found marijuana.
A group of Northern Virginia parI ents are considering filing suit
against an elementary school because a group of boys recently were
required to strip to their shorts when
some material was milfsing from a _
classroom.
And, principals in Burbank, Calif.,
have strongly endorsed the use of
dogs to sniff out drugs, but the
ACLU has filed suit to block the
action.
For civil libertarians opposi~g the
searches, seme of their most surprising foes are parents. "At one time we
tried using publicity [about searches]
to shock the consciences of adults,
but we got the opposite response,"
says John Roemer, executive director
of the Maryland chapter of the
ACLU. "The parents clamored for
more."
· For the most part, parents sup. ported the search of the Towson
High students. ,They wanted their
children's schools safe and drug-free.
But some students were annoyed.
"I was mad," said 15-year-old Melanie Gore. "A lot of people felt it was
unfair that they put us through a lot
of
embarrassment .... People
shouldn't bring drugs into school in
the first place, but the teachers
weren't even sure who was smoking."

ACLR lawyers told two Towson
High students who contacted th~m
that they had a good shot at provmg
the students were searched unreasonably, but the girls did not purs~e
court action because most of the1r
classmates expressed disinterest.
After a rash of violence or a wellpublicized incident, the pleas become more emotional. Newspapers
were splashed with community demands for a crackdown last year
when a loaded gun was found in the
desk of a third grade student in the
Miami area.

.,
When a 14-year-old Baltimore
City student .was gunn~ down in a
junior high hallway after refusing to
turn his jacket over to two youths,
some parent. and members of the
news media called for school guards
to begin carrying metal detectors.
Guards in Detroit schools began
using metal detectol'tl this year after
local governm~nt officials and residents became incensed by a spate of
attacks on student., even though
niany of the assaults occurred off
school grounds. This year Detroit
guards, using the scanners, have
found 59 guns and 69 knives.
Fed up with the large volumes of
drugs floating around schools, students in Miami have formed Youth
Crime Watch teams in all 77 of the
system's secondary schools and 60 of
the 176 elementary schools. At Noriand Miami High, 11 varsity athletes
patrol the ha1la at lunch time and
between classes. School officials say

· ' ' EssentiaUy, schools seem to expeet
students to shed their constitutional rights
when they eome Into school. They have the
rights on -the street, but once they walk Into
school they can forget it. Their rights are
fust.

ff

the athletes provide information
about probable crimes and act as a
deterrent to attacks.
Last year, there were about a dozen necklace snatchings at Norland
Miami. This year, none have been
reported.
The forbidding size of the athletes
may be an influencing factor. The
.captain of the Varsity Patrol, Clyde
Montgom~ry. is a 6-foot-1, 200pound linebacker.
· '
'
"I believe I'm a civil libertarian,"
says Frank Blount, who heads the
Detroit security staff. "But I also
believe kids should go to school to
·learn. There · is no place in our
schools for weapons. We don't hand
them out at the school door."
The most troublesome and troubling of the search techniques used
by school systems appears to be strip
searches, the effect of which, say opponents, can be a lifetime of humiliation and fear.

Brooklyn school ~fficials ~t YMk
settled a case with the parents of
two P.S. 282 students who sued,
charging that most of the children in
a substitute teacher's class were
stripped after $50 was discovered to
be missing from the instructor's
purse, even though the money was
found on one of the first students
examined.
The parents of a 12-year-old Willingboro, N.J., child are in the pro- ·
cess of settling a case against school
officials. The parents said their
daughter was partially strip-searched
after some students were seen brushing close enough to her to have either given or received something. A 1
school nurse examined the girl but
found no evidence of drugs.
"It was really embarrassing and
we didn't know what was going on."
said one student who was late getting ~ her job after the Towson
skating incident. "We didn't )mow
why it was happening. It was really
weird and awful. I don't know why
they had to search all of us." .
But ·Towson High Assistant Principal Ray Gross defends the search.
"We had both probable cause and
reasonable belief to think some of
our students were using drugs. We
had a number of different sources
supporting this assumption," said
Gross. "Some of the girls did complain to me that their bras and underwear were checked. If that happened, that shouldn't have."
School officials concede that
searches sometimes go too far but
generally say most staff members involved in searches have no Wish to
infringe on students' rights or privacy-only a need to protect the
majority.
"In strip searches th_e rule of
thumb is, 'What is reasonable?' "
says Prince George'~ security chief
Blauvelt. "There are times when actions taken are just not reasonable
.... But principals have never received any training in this area of
school security.
"They fly by the seats of their
pants, and what's a good idea today
may not be a good idea tomorrow,"
says Blauvelt.
·
"But if the Supreme Court were to
rule school administrators do not
have their current rights to search
. and seizur~. I think the .schools
. would have a tendency to become
open territory, if, you will. I don't
think anyone wants that."
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Justice Powell, concurring.
I

agree with the decision

and with most of its reasoning.
with

the

language

in

the

I

reached by the Court
do not agree, however,

opinion

that

suggests

that

exclusion of evidence from school disciplinary proceedings
may provide a deterrent to Fourth Amendment violations by
school officials.
record and

This suggestion has no support in the

is unnecessary to a decision of the question

before us.
As

the

Court

question presented
by

school

search

be

ante,

at

9,

the

only

is whether evidence unlawfully seized

officials

must

states,

during
excluded

the
in

course

of

juvenile

an

in-school

delinquency

2.

proceedings.

I agree with the Court's conclusion that the

exclusionary

rule

officials,

in

not

is

searching

applicable.

respondent's

purse,

The

school

were

acting

pursuant to their duty to enforce school regulations and
maintain a safe and drug-free learning environment.
had

no

responsibility

Application
correctly
appreciable

of

the

reasons,

for

enforcing

exclusionary
would

deterrence. 1

be
My

the

rule,

unlikely
difficulty

criminal
as
to

the

They
laws.
Court

result

concerns

in
the

1 The courts below found an absence of probable
cause for the search that revealed the drugs and evidence
that T.L.O. was selling drugs to her youthful schoolmates.
Determination of what constitutes "probable cause" is a
question on which lawyers and judges, as well as police
officials, frequently differ.
It would be unrealistic
to extend the subtleties of the Fourth Amendment the
school classroom.
I therefore do not agree with the
statement in the Court's opinion that "school boards may
and should have both the incentive and the means to foster
an understanding [of federal constitutional standards]".
See, ante, at 10. Decisions of the courts, including this
Court, frequently decide close questions of alleged Fourth
Amendment violations and applications of the exclusionary
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

portion of the Court's opinion,
goes

on

to

excluding

consider

evidence

the

seized

see ante, at 10-11, that

likely
by

deterrent

school officials

effect

of

in school

disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from delinquency
proceedings.
this respect
Court,

The

basis

for

the

Court's

speculation

in

is the decision by the New Jersey Superior

in the disciplinary proceedings,

that the evidence

found in T.L.O. 's purse must be excluded.
The Court is careful to state in a footnote that
the "propriety of that decision is not before us in this
case . "

Ante ,

at 1 0 ,

n • 6•

This disclaimer, however,

is

rule.
Keeping
abreast of,
and
understanding,
these
developments has been a problem for
law enforcement
officials who are briefed regularly on Court decisions.
School officials rarely possess legal training, and few
schools could provide adequate briefing.
It would be
unreasonable on its face to suggest that they should be
held to the same standards that the law expects of police
officials.

4.

undermined
effect

by

that

the

Court's

"illegal

subsequent

seizures

and

statement

searches

by

to

the

school

officials will be adequately deterred" by the exclusion of
evidence
This

from

disciplinary

statement

is

proceedings.

unsupported

in

the

Ante,

at

record,

11.

and

it

suggests or implies an answer to a question not before us.
Moreover,

it suggests an answer

decisions

concerning

the

that is contrary to our

exclusionary

rule

decisions

that consistently have refused to extend the rule to civil
proceedings.

See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428

u.s.

433 (1976).
Although

I

join

the

part of the Court's opinion,
of

it

that

effect of

speculates

judgment
I

the

greater

dissent from that portion

unnecessarily

th~ituations

and

as

to

a

deterrent

2
that are not before us.

Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

5.

2 If,

indeed,
the decision of the New Jersey
Superior Court were before us, or if I am permitted also
to speculate, I would say with some confidence that the
judgment of that court should be reversed.
There is no
evidence of overreaching conduct on the part of the school
officials, and the seven-day suspension of T.L.O. for
selling drugs to 14-year-old children in school, was a
singularly modest penalty.
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POWELL,J., concurring:
After balancing the interests of students against
those of

the government,

searches

need

that

fourth

the

not

the majority holds

that school

be based on probable cause.

amendment

I

should not prohibit a

agree

teacher

from conducting a search when "reasonable grounds" exist
to

suspect

that

violation of

the

school

search will
rules

or

the

turn
law.

up evidence of

a

Nevertheless,

I

write separately to emphasize that our departure from the
probable cause standard

--------

set

forth

(1967) ,

in

which

Camara

c ~nn~ t

v.

balances

be justified under the test

Municipal
the

Court,

interests

of

387
the

u.s.

523

student

2.

against

those

premised

on

only

of

the

those

should

be

that students are entitled

to

constitutional
and

requirements

of

substantially

v.

holding

protections

appropriate

Tinker

Our

school.

principle

"materially

schools."

the

that

interfere

will
with

Des Moines

the

in

discipline
School Dist.,

not

the

393 U.s.

503 (1969).

I.

In Camara,
test

for

balancing

determining
the

need

the search entails."
the

we held

majority

that

"there can be no ready

reasonableness

to search against

other
the

than

by

invasion which

Identifying the competing interests,

recognizes

that

teachers

and

school

3.

a

"substantial

discipline

in

the

maintain

order

administrators
maintaining
ability

to

have

classroom.

will

be

in

interest"
A

teacher's

frustrated

by

requirement that searches be based on probable cause.

a
The

majority recognizes, however, that the government's "need"
for a departure from the probable cause standard must be
balanced against the concomitant intrusion on the privacy
interests

of

schoolchild's

students.

The

"subjective"

Court

expectation

finds
of

that

the

privacy,

at

least with respect to his person and personal effects, is
as

great

as

that

of

an

adult.

Furthermore,

the

Court

states that the student's expectation is one that society
recognizes as "legitimate."
The majority apparently finds

that

the school's

need to maintain discipline outweighs any intrusion upon

4.

the

acknowledges

the

substantiality

represented by a search.

of

though

even

interest,

privacy

student's

the

privacy

it

invasion

I cannot understand this finding

since in other cases where the Court has approved a search
or

seizure

resulting
States

on

the

intrusion

v.

basis
has

reasonable

been

Brignoni-Ponce,

quite
422

suspicion,

limited.

u.s.

873

In

the

United

(1975),

for

example, we held that a roving border patrolman may stop a
car that he "reasonably suspects" contains illegal aliens.
Despite the government's substantial interest in limiting
the

influx

of

illegal

aliens,

this

departure

from

the

probable cause standard was sanctioned only after we found
that

the

"modest"

,,

brief

stop

intrusion.

of
This

an

automobile

case,

unlike

constitutes

a

Brignoni-Ponce,

5.

involves

a

privacy

interest

so

substantial

that

results

under the Camara "balancing test" are inconclusive.

II.

Only

by

schoolchild's
departure

recognizing

constitutional

from

the

limited

nature

of

the

justify

our

---------------

rights

can

we

the standard of probable cause.

Although

this Court has recognized that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights •.• at the schoolhouse gate," Tinker
v.
has

Des Moines School Dist.,
been

teachers
refused

reluctant
and
to

to

school
afford

393

u.s.

interfere

with

officials.

We

students

503,
the

506

(1969),

it

discretion

of

consistently

constitutional

have

protections

6.

which would materially interfere with the operation of the
public schools.
In
amendment

Tinker,

protected

the
high

Court
school

held

that

students'

the

right

black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.

first
to wear

Although the

students' conduct was "closely akin to 'pure speech,'" the
Court did not intimate that the school policy forbidding
the

armbands

could

"compelling state

u.s.

45,

that

school

conduct

53-54

officials

and

sustained

interest."

(1982).

because

"materially

be

the

Cf.

Instead,
could

not

wearing

substantially

only

if

Brown v.

it

Hartlage,

the v;;: nker
restrict

the

armbands

of

served

interfere

Court

a
456

held

students'
did

not

with

the

requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
the

'·~

school. "

The

Court's

analysis

thus

indicates

that

7.

schoolchildren
amendment

are

rights

not

enjoyed

entitled
by

to

adults.

the

same

The

first

decision

to

afford students only limited constitutional protection was
based

on

the

Court's

affirming

the

comprehensive

officials

to

recognition

prescribe

of

authority
and

the

"need

school

of

control

for

conduct

in

the

school."

u.s.

In Goss v. Lopez, 417
held

that

students could

not

even

for

less

days,

hearing.
of

the

than

ten

be

565 (1975), the Court

suspended
without

a

from

school,

notice

and

a

Again, the Court was careful to limit the nature
student's

interfering

with

constitutional

right

the

of

operation

so

the

as

to

avoid

schools.

The

"notice" to which the student was entitled could be given
orally,

immediately prior

to

the

hearing.

The decision

8.

did not grant the student a
examination,

or

to

call

right to counsel,

witnesses.

The

to cross-

teacher

was

required only to give the student an explanation of the
evidence against him and
side

of

the

"an opportunity to present his

The

story."

Court

recognized

that

these

procedures were "rudimentary;" nevertheless it stated that
requiring
make

the

more
short

than

this

"informal

suspension

tool and would destroy

give-and-take"

too costly

as

a

would

disciplinary

its effectiveness as part of the

teaching process.
While Tinker

and Goss recognized

limitations on

the constitutional rights of students, Ingraham v. Wright,
430

u.s.

amendment

651

(1977),

further

inapplicable

Ingraham decision was

,,

went

to

and
the

held

the

schools.

based primarily on our

eighth
The

conclusion

9.

that

the

eighth

amendment was

those convicted of crimes.
state

that

context

of

even

if

only

Nevertheless,

it had

criminal

intended

to protect

we went on to

some application outside

pubishments,

the

eighth

the

amendment

should not prohibit corporal punishment of public school
students.
Tinker,
the

rights of

Goss,

and

Ingraham do not indicate that

students are

unimportant.

Instead,

these

decisions reflect an awareness that school officials must
be

given

broad

operation

of

reluctance

to

rights,

we

protected,
with

a

are

discretionary
the

public

afford

substantial

But

schools.

schoolchildren

confident

because:

authority

(1)

that

those

interest

in

full

their
members
the

f

i

the

of

daily

despite

our

constitutional

interests

public

I

in

the

will

be

community

schools

will

~

10.

supervise their operation; and (2)

there is a "commonality

of interest" between teachers and students.

The public school is an open and highly visible
institution

in

the

community.

Although

attendance

is

compelled, students leave school at the end of the day and
return

to

their

families.

.

Instances of m1streatment

Ingraham,

u.s.

430

~4
a~e reported

~o~ally

.I\

Therefore,
knows

that

if

he

acts

unfairly,

he

faces

prospect of irate parents in his office.

at

to parents

the

the

670.

teacher

unwelcome

Wilkinson, Goss

v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School Superintendant, 1975
The Supreme Court Rev.
explanation fails

..

may

approach

official.

a

Given

25,

70.

If the school official's

to satisfy them,
school
the

board
usual

the concerned parents

member

or

geographic

another

elected

concentration

of

l

11.

/

parents around the schools in which they are interested,
their ability to influence the school's operation through
political channels will be substantial.
Our

refusal

constitutional

protection

"commonality of
Goss v.

Lopez,

to

interest"
419

u.s.

grant
can

schoolchildren

also

be

justified

full
by

the

between teachers and students.

565, 593 (Powell,J., dissenting).

The constitution articulates individual liberties because
of

an

underlying

assumption

that

citizens

officials officials have conflicting interests.

and

state

Since the

teacher serves as an educator, adviser, and friend to the
student, the interests of the two usually coincide. Id. at
594.

Hence,

it is unnecessary to give schoolchildren the

same constitutional protection afforded to some others.
policeman who

is

"engaged

A

in the competitive process of

l

i

12.

ferreting
(1968),

out
may

crime,"
have

Terry

little

v.

Ohio,

regard

for

u.s.

392
the

rights

1,
of

12
a

criminal suspect.

The same cannot be said about a teacher

who

his

thinks

regulation;
concerned

that
in

many

with

the

student
cases,

welfare

has
the

of

the

violated
teacher

a

will

offending

school
be

as

student as

with that of his classmates.

III.

The ability of concerned parents to supervise the
schools, as well as the "commonality of interest" between
teachers

and

students,

protections

constitutional
Students
rights

should
which

make

be

will

granted
not

it appropriate to relax the
schoolchildren.

afforded
only

those

"materially

and

constitutional
substantially

13.

interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in ••• the school."
substantially
authorities

The probable cause requirement would

interfere
to

maintain

with

the

discipline

efforts
in

of

the

school

classroom.

Requiring a teacher to wait until there is probable cause
to search would frustrate his efforts to act quickly so as
to prevent not only infractions of school rules, but also
injuries to other students.

Moreover, teachers often are

unfamiliar with the legal technicalities of the probable
cause

standard.

classroom

setting

They would

find

impossiblly

its application to the

difficult.

Allowing

the

search of a student on the basis of "reasonable grounds,"
however,

gives school officials the discretion that they

need to maintain discipline in the schools.

It is on this

basis that I join Part III of the majority opinion.
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TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Lee
RE: No. 83-712, New Jersey v. T.L.O., Justice White's first draft
Justice White's draft opinion certainly reaches the
right result.

It seems to me, however, that he skips one step in

the analysis.

He correctly recognizes that the determination of

---------------

what is "reasonable" requires "balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails."
Municipal Court, 387

u.s.

at 536-537 (page 10).

the equation, he states that:

Camara v.
In setting up

(1) a student has a substantial

expectation of privacy that is infringed by a search of her
person or purse (pages 10-12): and

(2)

there is a great need to

maintain discipline in the classroom. (pages 12-13) •

He then

announces that the search of a student may be based on
"reasonable grounds."(page 15).

The analysis is very conclusory:

after identifying a severe intrusion and a weighty governmental
need, Justice White simply picks a standard less demanding than
probable cause.
It seems that a decision to depart from the probable

------

cause standard should be justified in either of two ways.
----------------~

First,

the Court could hold that schoolchildren have restricted privacy
interests.

Unfortunately, it would be difficult to limit the use

of this rationale to the school setting.

If juveniles have such

limited privacy interests, why not allow policemen to search
children in the park without probable cause?

A better approach

would be to rely upon the reasoning in your opinion in Ingraham
v. Wright.

In Ingraham, you stated that the "openness of the

public school and its supervision by the community afford
significant safeguards against" abuses of corporal punishment.
That same openness will tend to prevent unreasonable searches.
With the exception of his failure to discuss the
relevance of your opinion in Ingraham, Justice White's draft
appears to be satisfactory.

He was wise to avoid deciding

whether a school search would ever be appropriate in the absence
of individualized suspicion.

(page 15, note 7).

I therefore

recommend that you join Justice White's opinion.

I am not sure

whether you will want to write a short concurring opinion.

~t
~

'
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I agree with the Court's decision,
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special
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ot
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place
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of

cases,
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have

recognized

special characteristics of the

school . ~nvironmQnt,

sure,

said

the

Court

properly has

that

the

To oe

students do not

"shed their constitutional rights • • . at the schoolhouse

1 The Court's op1n1on states that "[a] search
of a [school] child's person or of a closed purse or of a
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar searcn
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation
of subjective expectations of privacy". Ante, at 10, 11.
This expectation also is said to be "legitimate".
Ante,
at 12.
If indeed a school child's expectation of privacy
is "no les "
n adult, it is not clear to me
how
Court can conclude that a standard less ,:::;than
p
able cause is appropriate.
In cases in which a lesser
standard has been applied - quite properly I think - there
have been circumstances that lessened the reasonableness
of o
ectation of riv
e.g., United States
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cite other
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familiar with the criminal laws and their applicability.~
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3 The Court's holding is that "when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search wilJ.
turn up evidence that the student has violated or 1s
violating either the law or the rules of the school", a
search of the student or his person or belongings 1s
justified. Ante, at ____
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I agree with the Court's decision, and much
its

opinion.

special

I

would

character is tics

place
of

greater

the

school

emphasis

~ne

on

environment

OJ.

-

an

environment in which students necessarily have a lessenea
expectation of privacy than the population generally. 1
In a

number

of

cases,

we

have

recognized

special characteristics of the school environment.
sure,

the

Court properly has

said

the

To oe

that students do not

"shed their constitutional rights • • • at the schoolhouse

1 The Court's opinion states that "[a] search
of a [school] child's person or of a closed purse or of a
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar searcn
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation
of subjective expectations of privacy". Ante, at 10, ~~.
This expectation also is said to be "legitimate".
Ante,
at 12.
If indeed a school child's expectation of privacy
is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me
how the Court can conclude that a standard less than
probable cause is appropriate.
In cases in which a lesser
standard has been applied - quite properly I think - there
have been circumstances that lessened the reasonableness
of one's expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873 (1975) (Lee:
cite other
cases.)
The age of a child may be relevant, as the ~aw
applies different standards based upon age even in a nonschool environment (Lee, cite cases).

~.

gate".
503,

Tinker
506

afford

v.

(1969).

Des Moines
But

we

School

have

District,

refused

393

U.ti.

consistently

students constitutional protections

tv

that normally

are enjoyed by junveniles as well as adults in non-school
environemnts.

In Goss v.

constitutional

right

Lopez,

417

u.s.

to due process was

565

(1975),

recognized,

a

ana

yet the Court was careful to limit the exercise of tn1s
right

by

a

suspension.

student

"the

discuss[ing]

extend

the

after

!graham v.

a

disciplinary

described as "rudimentary", amounting to no

than

minutes

challenged

The only process found to be "due" was not1ce

and a hearing
more

who

it

Wright,

the

Eighth

disciplinarian
alleged
has
430

*

misconduct

occurred".

u.s.

Amendment

651

to

*
with

Id.,

at

(1977),

the

informally

*

the

student

581-582.

ln

we declined

use

of

to

corporal

punishment of school children authorized by Florida law.
We emphasized that there are constraints in the school ana
community that provide substantial protection against the
violation of constitutional rights by school authorities.

* * *

at

the end of the school day, the child is invariably free

~o

The

"public school remains an open institution

return home.

Even while at school, the child brings witn

him the support of family and friends, and is rarely

apar~

3.

from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protect
any instances of mistreatment".
further
school

pointed
and

out

its

that

supervision

safeguards"

significant

the

Id., at 670.
"openness

by

the

against

of

The Court:
the

community

public
afforas

violation

the

or

constitutional rights. Id., at 670.
It is necessary also to bear in mind the unique
nature

of

teachers.

the

responsibility

Unlike

police

of

school

officers,

officials

ana

have

law

they

no

enforcement responsibility or indeed any obligation to be
familiar with the criminal laws and their
The

primary

duty

of

school

officials

applicability.~

and

course, is to educate and train young people.

teachers,

ot

A state nas

a compelling interest in assuring that this responsibility
is met.
and

As a predicate even to undertaking the teaching

training

maintained.

of

children,

order

and

And apart from education,

discipline
there

must

be

is the duty

2 of course, as illustrated by this case,
school authorities are familiar - unhappily - with the
types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools: tne
distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence
against teachers as well as fellow students.
[Lee, see
SG' s Biref for studies of crime problem, and add those
that BRW does not cite.]

.
':to

to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, ana
also to protect teachers from the type of violence that In
recent years has prompted

national concern.

For me,

it

simply makes little sense to argue that the full panop.Ly
of constitutional rules apply in the schoolhouse with the
same force and effect as
the

enforcement

agree

with

reach

these

though

I

the

of

acknowlege

laws.

In

conclusion

and

criminal

Court's

results

these rules apply generally to

by
that

somewhat
the

sum,

although

its

holding,j

different

reasoning

difference

may

be

one

l
1.

or

modest degree.

3 The Court's holding is that "when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search wiLL
turn up evidence that the student has violated or IS
violating either the law or the rules of the school", a
search of the student or his person or belongings IS
justified. Ante, at

I cl- I
.fhe_

L.

i

c:. k

0

~ L.~e
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much
-

bu-t not cH.l-

of its opinion.

I would place greater

emphasis on the special characteristics of the school, and
on the status of pupils in the elementary and secondary
grades.

This case concerns a fourteen-year-old girl, and

the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to a
search of her purse by a school official.
school environment, pupils certainly have a

Within the
.4rJo•

:>~};

less~ ~ ~

expectation of privacy than members of the population
generally.

They spend the school hours in close

association with each other, both in the classroom and at
play.

The children in a particular class come to know

2.

a-'C.4l

~

each othe 5{ well as well a$ their teachers.

It is

1\

~tu:.

my:ea»'dRabi-e to think that they have the same subjective

expectation of privacy as adults in the population at
large. 1
In this case,

o:Iol-lil4t~a~\~
~~3~rJk~fo~~~~,hF
~;~:.tt.bbL.aa..tt;. . .!'JI'~a..J:Ii:r.s~O~"./F'w'4i.tt.l:ll:l~-; <: : 1r: : : : r-"_ .:;>

r. L. ,o

~

/rj' ~

1\ marijuana and $40 in her purse ~ was anxious not to have
~

~

t>fr/-4-~
contents revealed to school officials.

This sort of

"'\

states

that

"[

search
se or of a
lar search
violation
t 10, 11.
Ante,

3.

generally prevailing disposition of children to share
freely with each other whatever they happen to have with
them.

But for purposes of deciding this case, I can

assume that children in school reasonably may have - no
less than adults - subjective expectations of privacy.

at •

Supra, n. 1.

1\

In a broader sense, I view this case as one to
be decided in light of the special characteristics of a
school.

No one now doubts that students have

constitutional rights.

In an often quoted statement, the

Court properly said that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights . . • at the schoolhouse gate".
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393
(1969).

u.s.

503, 506

The Court in Tinker also "emphasized the need for

4.

affirming the comprehensive authority of the states and of
school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional standards, to prescribe and control conduct
in the schools".
Arkansas, 393

Id., at 507.

u.s.

See also Epperson v.

97, 104 (1968}.

In addressing the

assertion of particular constitutional rights by a
student, the Court has found qualitative differences
between juveniles and adults in entitlement to remedies.
In Goss v. Lopez, 417

u.s.

565 (1975}, the Court

recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet
was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a
student who challenged a disciplinary suspension.

The

only process found to be "due" was notice and a hearing
described as "rudimentary": it amounted to no more than
"the disciplinarian

* * *

informally discuss[ing] the

5.

alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has
occurred".

u.s.

!d., at 581-582.

In Ingraham v. Wright, 430

651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth

Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment

&4/

authorized by Florida law of school childre •

A

emphasized in that opinion that familiar

constraints in

the school, and also in the community, provide substantial
protection against the violation of constitutional rights
by school authorities.

"At the end of the school day, the

child is invariably free to return home.

Even while at

school, the child brings with him the support of family
and friends, and is rarely apart from teachers and other
pupils who may witness and
mistreatment".

~

prote~ t

!d., at 670.

any instances of

The Ingraham Court further

pointed out that the "openness of the public school and

6.

its supervision by the community afford significant
safeguards" against the violation of constitutional
rights. Id., at 670.
The school environment and its special
characteristics distinguish the setting within which
school children operate from the adult world.

Law

enforcement officers function as adversaries of persons
who commit crimes.

Such officers have the responsibility

to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest
those who violate our laws, and to charge and bring to
trial persons thought to be guilty.

Rarely is there this

type of adversarial relationship betwen school authorities
and pupils.

Traditionally, there has been and is a

commonality of interests particularly between teachers and
their pupils.

This is not to say that the former act in

7•
•

loco parentis in relationships with students in a sense
that would exempt teachers and officials from the
application of the Fourth Amendment.

The point is that

~~

the attitude of the teacher is one of personal

"
responsibility for the pupil's welfare as well as for his
education.

Unlike police officers, school authorities

have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any
obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws and their
applicability. 2
The primary duty of school officials and

~~ ~.4-.-~/
teachers, e£
young people.

~~ e,

is the education and training of

A state has a compelling interest in

2 of course, as illustrated by this case,
school authorities have a layman's familiarity with the
types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools:
the
distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence
against teachers as well as fellow students.

8•
•

assuring that the schools meet this responsibility.
Without first establishing discipline and maintaining
order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students.
And apart from education, the school has the obligation to
protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and

.UrJ.
also to protect teachers themselves from violence by
students

~

few

~~~--

~

in recent years has prompted national

I\

concern.

For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds

with history to argue that the full panoply of
constitutional rules apply in the schoolhouse with the
same force and effect that these rules have when applied
generally in the enforcement of criminal laws. 3

3 As noted above, decisions of this Court
have never held to the contrary.
The law recognizes a
host of constitutional distinctions between the rights and
duties of children and those of adults.
See Goss v.
Lopez, supra, at 591 (Powell, J., dissenting.}

9.

In sum, although I agree with mu'
Court's opinion and its holding, 4 my emphas
different.

4 The Court's holding is that "when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search will
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school", a
search of the student or his person or belongings is
justified. Ante, at J:f' •

L

~~

lfp/ss 11/14/84

NJ SALLY-POW
73-712 New Jersey v. T.L.O.

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much
- but not all - of its opinion.
emphasis ~ ~wev.er,.l

I would place greater

on the special character is tics of the

school, and on the status of pupils in the elementary and
secondary grades.

This case concerns a fourteen-year-old

girl, and the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies
to a search of her purse by a school official.

Within the

school environment, pupils certainly have a lesser
expectation of privacy than members of the population
generally.

They spend the school hours in close

association with each other, both in the classroom and at
play.

The children in a particular class come to know

each other

~~
~1

as well as their teachers.

It is

unreasonable to think that they have the same subjective
expectation of privacy as adults in the population at
large. 1
In this case, I have no doubt that T.L.O. with
marijuana and $40 in her purse, was anxious not to have
its contents revealed to school officials.

This sort of

1 The Court's opinion states that "[a) search
of a [school] child's person or of a closed purse or of a
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation
of subjective expectations of privacy". Ante, at 10, 11.
This expectation also is said to be "legitimate".
Ante,
at 12.
If indeed a school child's expectation of privacy
is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me
how the Court can conclude that a standard less stringent
than probable cause is appropriate.
I would not have
thought that an adult visiting in a schoolhouse could be
detained and his pockets search in the absence of probable
cause.
In cases in which a lesser standard has been
applied
quite properly I think
there have been
circumstances that lessened the reasonableness of one's
expectation of privacy.
See, e.g., United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce,
422 u.s.
873
(1975)
(brief stop of
automobile involved a "modest" intrusion; Terry v. Ohio,
392 u.s. 1 (1968) (search for weapons was "limited); United
States v. Martinez-Fuer te, 428 U.S. 543 ( 1976) (intrusion
cause by routine checkpoint stop is "quite limited").

3.

or-~

expectatio~ of privacyJ_ M

is quite different from the

r.

<:Qurs.,,

=:::.:J.,....,

genera~~ttMee

"

of children

ff(
j' t._
r/1::2to share freely with each other whatever they happen to

1J

I

II

j

2

have with them.

But for purposes of deciding this case, I

,

can assume that children in school reasonably

~

may ~-

nJ'

less than adults - subjective expectations of privacy.
Supra, n. 1.

~~,L.o~~
In a broader sense, I view this cas j(w~thin ~~e

~ LujtJ-

~amework

of the special characteristics of a school.

No

one now doubts that students have constitutional rights.
In an often quoted statement, the Court properly said that
students do not "shed their constitutional rights • • • at
the schoolhouse gate".
District, 393

u.s.

Tinker v. Des Moines School

503, 506 (1969).

The Court in Tinker

also "emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive

4.

autho~ ity

of the states and of school officials,

consistent with fundamental constitutional standards, to
prescribe and control conduct in the schools".
507.

See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393

(1968) •

In

u.s.

Id., at
97, 104

addre~ing the assertion of particular
~

constitutional rights by a student, the Court has
recognized qualitative differences between juveniles and
adults in entitlement to remedies.
In Goss v. Lopez, 417

reee~i~~titutional
~

u.s.

565 (1975), the Court

right to due process, and yet

was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a
student who challenged a disciplinary suspension.

The

only process found to be "due" was notice and a hearing
described as "rudimentary"; it amounted to no more than
"the disciplinarian

* * *

informally discuss[ing] the

5.

alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has
occurred".

u.s.

Id., at 581-582.

In Ingraham v. Wright, 430

651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth

Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment

---

authorized by Florida law of school children.)

~e

emphasized

i~

that opinion

~
that~b9£C
ar~ ~

~· ~ r"'-'~
#"
...r£1
constraints in the school and community provide
_.,/

;

.

J

fff

substantial protection against the violation of
constitutional rights by school authorities.

"At the end

of the school day, the child is invariably free to return
home.

Even while at school, the child brings with him the

support of family and friends, and is rarely apart from
teachers and other pupils who may witness and protect any
instances of mistreatment".

Id., at 670.

The Ingraham

Court further pointed out that the "openness of the public

6.

school and its supervision by the community afford
significant safeguards" against the violation of
constitutional rights. Id., at 670.
The school environment and its special
characteristics distinguish the setting within which
school children operate from the adult world.

Law

enforcement officers function as adversaries of persons
who commit crimes.

Such officers have the responsibility

~

investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those

.1\
who violate our laws, and to charge and bring to trial
persons thought to be guilty.

Rarely is there this type

of adversarial relationship betwen school authorities and
pupils.

Traditionally, ther ~ ?een a~~ :

s/~~:!~~-~

commonality of interes ~ be. tween_teecheLS~ and s~ool

t

7.

This is not to say that the former act in loco parentis in
relationships with students in a sense that would exempt
teachers and officials from the application of the Fourth
Amendment.
in

The point is that the attitude of the teacher

~e~ ~ ~±•r

is one of personal responsibility for the

Jpupil's welfare

~5

~-

. ~~ ~
as" for~n.
See

rgp~

~a.tA-~

Unlike police officers, t~ have no law __..

enforcement responsibility or indeed

~z·

€aaiii r:;

,

an~!:li~a~i~~·~
s k.f ~2

s :'z:u...>..

familiar with the criminal laws and their applicability.

~

]S(The primary duty of school officials and teachers, of
course, is the education and training of young people.

A

k4·'-~~~'r ~

2of

cour~,

as illustrated by this case,
school authorities
r-€'
famili at - +'nhappilywith the
types of crimes tha occur frequently in our schools:
the
distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence
against teachers as well as fellow students. -Ue~W, see
SG's.... ....S.iz.e.f. . f.o ~.i:..JJ.dies of crime problem, and a.Qg th>ose
t~ BRW

€Ices -aQ.t cj ..t.e -L

1

8.

state has a compelling interest in assuring that the
~
schoo ~ meetj

this responsibility.

Without first

~~~
establishing discipline, teachers cannot begin to educate
/\
their students.

And apart from education, the school has

the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by
other children, and also to protect teachers themselves

/J•t
from

I

.hr

a,...

~tft
he
e ~~~~e~>~~~ violence~ that

prompted national concern.

~1'2-~
in recent years has

For me, it would be

unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the
full panoply of constitutional rules

appl ~

in the

schoolhouse with the same force and effect that these
rules have when applied generally in the enforcement of

criminal

laws~In sum,

although I agree with much of the

'I-

Court's opinion and its

.

holding, ~my ~

somewhat

pages.

f

t

9.

different.

Court's holding is tha~ "when there are
reasonable gr unds for suspecting that [a] search will
turn up evid nee that the student has violated or is
violating ei t er the law or the rules of the school", a
search of th
student or his person or belongings is
Ate at'
--r-~_
,·
•
~
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much
of its opinion.

I would place greater emphasis on the

special characteristics of the school, and on the status
of pupils in the elementary and secondary grades.

This

case concerns a fourteen-year-old girl, and the extent to
which the Fourth Amendment applies to a search of her
purse by a school official.

Within the school

environment, pupils certainly have a lesser expectation of
privacy than members of the population generally.

They

spend the school hours in close association with each
other, both in the classroom and at play.

The children in

a particular class come to know each other and their

2.

teachers quite well.

It is unrealistic to think that they

have the same subjective expectation of privacy as adults
in the population at large. 1
In this case, with

marijuana and $40 in her

purse, T.o.o., of course, was anxious not to have the
contents of the purse revealed to school officials.

This

sort of expectation or hope of privacy is quite different
from the generally prevailing disposition of children to
share freely with each other whatever they happen to have
with them.

But for purposes of deciding this case, I can

1 The

Court's op1n1on states that "(a] search
of a [school] child's person or of a closed purse or of a
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe - violation
of subjective expectations of privacy". Ante, at 10, 11.
This expectation also is said to be "legitimate".
Ante,
at 12.
If indeed a school child's expectation of privacy
is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me
how the Court can conclude that a standard less stringent
than probable cause is appropriate.
An adult visiting in
a schoolhouse hardly could be detained lawfully and his
pockets searched in the absence of probable cause.

3.

assume that children in school reasonably may have - no
less than adults - subjective expectations of privacy.
Cf. supra, n. 1.
In a broader sense, I view this case as one to
be decided in light of the special characteristics of a
school.

No one now doubts that students have

constitutional rights.

In an often quoted statement, the

Court properly said that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights • • • at the schoolhouse gate".
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393
(1969) •

u.s.

503, 506

The Court in Tinker also "emphasized the need for

affirming the comprehensive authority of the states and of
school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional standards, to prescribe and control conduct
in the schools".

!d., at 507.

See also Epperson v.

!

4.

Arkansas, 393

u.s.

97, 104 (1968).

In addressing the

assertion of particular constitutional rights by a
student, the Court has found qualitative differences
between juveniles and adults in entitlement to remedies.
In Goss v. Lopez, 417

u.s.

565 (1975), the Court

recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet
was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a
student who challenged a disciplinary suspension.

The

only process found to be "due" was notice and a hearing
described as "rudimentary": it amounted to no more than
"the disciplinarian

* * *

informally discuss[ing] the

alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has
occurred".

u.s.

Id., at 581-582.

In Ingraham v. Wright, 430

651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth

Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment of

5.

school children as authorized by Florida law.
emphasized in that opinion that familiar

We

constraints in

the school, and also in the community, provide substantial
protection against the violation of constitutional rights
by school authorities.

"At the end of the school day, the

child is invariably free to return home.

Even while at

school, the child brings with him the support of family
and friends, and is rarely apart from teachers and other
pupils who may witness and protest any instances of
mistreatment".

Id., at 670.

The Ingraham Court further

pointed out that the "openness of the public school and
its supervision by the community afford significant
safeguards" against the violation of constitutional
rights. Id., at 670.

'

6.

The school environment and its special
characteristics distinguish the setting within which
school children operate from the adult world.

Law

enforcement officers function as adversaries of persons
who commit crimes.

Such officers have the responsibility

to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest
those who violate our laws, and to charge and bring to
trial persons thought to be guilty.

Rarely is there this

type of adversarial relationship betwen school authorities
and pupils.

Traditionally, there has been and is a

commonality of interests particularly between teachers and
their pupils.

This is not to say that the former act in

loco parentis in relationships with students in a sense
that would exempt teachers and officials from the
application of the Fourth Amendment.

The point is that

7.

the attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal
responsibility for the pupil's welfare as well as for his
education.

Unlike police officers, school authorities

have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any
obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws and their
applicability. 2
The primary duty of school officials and
teachers, as the Court states, is the education and
training of young people.

A state has a compelling

interest in assuring that the schools meet this
responsibility.

Without first establishing discipline and

maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their

2 of course, as illustrated by this case,
school authorities have a layman's familiarity with the
types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools:
the
distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence
against teachers as well as fellow students.

8.

students.

And apart from education, the school has the

obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from
violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years
has prompted national concern.

For me, it would be

unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the
full panoply of constitutional rules apply in the
schoolhouse with the same force and effect that these
rules have when applied generally in the enforcement of
criminal laws. 3
In sum, although I agree with much of the
Court's opinion and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat

3 As noted above, decisions of this Court
have never held to the contrary.
The law recognizes a
host of constitutional distinctions between the rights and
duties of children and those of adults.
See Goss v.
Lopez, supra, at 591 (Powell, J., dissenting.)
Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pages.

9.

different.

4 The Court's holding is that "when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search will
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school", a
search of the student or his person or belongings is
justified.
Ante, at 15.
This is in acord with the
Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state
and federal courts that have addressed this issue.
See
ante, n. 2, p. 6 •

.,
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much
l-\ow211'4f",

,A I would place greater emphas }s...fn the
w~t.k ""4t ·,t-I.U\1\A<.c.SS~V'i
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~~ ~~
\
I f,...,;ttd;a--s 7fi..,J,.t..J.
J""~'"-S ..... a. ..._ •

of its opinion.

special characteristicsJ/f £ the sche!l. and on Hte ~Lat!1:1s
Gf pupils in tAe eleffiefti!ary aftd seeonelary §raeleo r
cas~

~~AioA

concerns a fourteen year old 9irl,

an~

~~-

~

tAe entent

to ~
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.purse by a seAool
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environment, pupils .QCFtaiR1¥· have a lesser expectation of
privacy than members of the population generally.

They

spend the school hours in close association with .each
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But for purposes of deciding this case, I can

assume that children in school reaseRahJy rna¥ have - no
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school..
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now doubts that students have
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constitutional
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In an often quoted statement, the

said that students do not "shed their

constitutional rights • • • at the schoolhouse gate".
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393
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(1969). j ,the Court
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503, 506
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In Goss v. Lopez, 417

u.s.

565 (1975), the Court

recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet
was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a
student who challenged a disciplinary suspension.

The

only process found to be "due" was notice and a hearing
described as "rudimentary": it amounted to no more than
"the disciplinarian

* * *

informally discuss[ing] the

alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has
occurred".

u.s.

Id., at 581-582.

In Ingraham v. Wright, 430

651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth

Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment of
school children as authorized by Florida law.
emphasized in that opinion that familiar

We

constraints in

the school, and also in the community, provide substantial
protection against the violation of constitutional rights

5.

by school authorities.

"At the end of the school day, the

child is invariably free to return home.

Even while at

school, the child brings with him the support of family
and friends, and is rarely apart from teachers and other
pupils who may witness and protest any instances of
mistreatment".

Id., at 670.

The Ingraham Court further

pointed out that the "openness of the public school and
its supervision by the community afford significant
safeguards" against the violation of constitutional
rights. Id., at 670.
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~ eCCteu-~
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have the responsibility

6.

to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest
those who violate our laws, and to charge and bring to
trial persons thought to be guilty.

Rarely

is~~

this

y;sl-

type of adversarial

relationship,betw~

L~~)

Praeieie~all~,

commonality of interests
their pupils.

~is

there has

~

school authorities

b~~R

aRe is a

between teachers and

is not to say that the £oFmer act iR

loco parentis in relationships with students in a sense
that wQ.l.lls exe!ftpt teachers and officials rtom the ·
'application of the Fo1:1reh .".menemeRt

The

~eiRe

i• that

the attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal

responsibility for
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welfare as well as for his

police officers, school authorities
have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any
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-schoelbe1::1se with the same force and effec ~ that these__
~ · 1 lQ~

have when

applie~

~efierall~

in the enforcement of

criminal laws. 3
In sum, although I agree with much of the
Court's opinion and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat
different.

7.

"")..,

obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws . aH9 thai¥

applirabilit~
The primary duty of school officials and
teachers, as the Court states, is the education and
training of young people.

A state has a compelling

interest in assuring that the schools meet this
responsibility.

Without first establishing discipline and

maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their
students.

And apart from education, the school has the

~

obligation to protect) pupils €fom mi:!Jtreatme:At by oth~r
~ildren,

aRe al:!Jo to

·~

proteet ~teachers

~h~m:!Jel~es

from

violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years
has prompted national concern.

For me, it would be

unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the

;tJ
full panoply of constitutional rules appy.{ in the
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much
of its opinion.

However, I would place greater emphasis

on the special characteristics, which make it necessary to
afford students the same constitutional protections
granted adults and juveniles in a non-school setting.
Within the school environment, pupils have a
lesser expectation of privacy than members of the
population generally.

They spend the school hours in

close association with each other, both in the classroom
and during recreation periods.

The students in a

particular class often know each other and their teachers
quite well.

of necessity, teachers have a degree of

2.

familiarity with, and authority over thier students which
is unparalleled, save perhaps in the relationship between
parent and child.

It is thus unrealistic to think that

studentshave the same subjective expectation of privacy as
population. 1

But for purposes of deciding this case, I

can assume that children in school have - no less than
adults - privacy interests that society is prepared to
recognize as legitimate ••

Cf. supra, n. 1.

No one now doubts that students are afforded
someconstitutional protections.

In an often quoted

1 The Court's op1n1on states that .. [a] search
of a [school] child's person or of a closed purse or of a
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation
of subjective expectations of privacy ... Ante, at 10, 11.
This expectation also is said to be "legitimate ...
Ante,
at 12.
If indeed a school child's expectation of privacy
is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me
how the Court can conclude that a standard less stringent
than probable cause is appropriate.
An adult visiting in
a schoolhouse hardly could be detained lawfully and his
pockets searched in the absence of probable cause.

"'.··

3.

statement, the Court said that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights • • . at the schoolhouse gate".
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393
(1969).

u.s.

503, 506

Noevertheless, the Court also has "emphasized the

need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
states and of school officials • • • to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools."
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393

u.s.

!d., at 507.

97, 104 (1968).

See also
The Court

has balanced the interests of the student against the
school officials' need to maintain discipline by
recognizing qualitative differences between the
constitutional remedies to which students and adults are
entitled.
In Goss v. Lopez, 417

u.s.

565 (1975), the Court

recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet

4.

was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a
student who challenged a disciplinary suspension.

The

only process found to be "due" was notice and a hearing
described as "rudimentary"; it amounted to no more than
"the disciplinarian

* * *

informally discuss[ing] the

alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has
occurred".

u.s.

!d., at 581-582.

In Ingraham v. Wright, 430

651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth

Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment of
school children as authorized by Florida law.
emphasized in that opinion that familiar

We

constraints in

the school, and also in the community, provide substantial
protection against the violation of constitutional rights
by school authorities.

"At the end of the school day, the

child is invariably free to return horne.

.

,.

Even while at

5.

school, the child brings with him the support of family
and friends, and is rarely apart from teachers and other
pupils who may witness and protest any instances of
mistreatment".

Id., at 670.

The Ingraham Court further

pointed out that the "openness of the public school and
its supervision by the community afford significant
safeguards" against the violation of constitutional
rights. Id., at 670.
The special relationship between teacher and
student also distinguishes the setting within which school
children operate.

Law enforcement officers function as

adversaries of criminal suspects.

These officers have the

responsibility to investigate criminal activity, to locate
and arrest those who violate our laws, and to charge and
bring to trial persons thought to be guilty.

Rarely does

6.

this type of adversarial relationship betwen school
authorities and pupils. 2

Instead, there is a commonality

of interests between teachers and their pupils.

The

attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal
responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for
his education.
The primary duty of school officials and
teachers, as the Court states, is the education and
training of young people.

A state has a compelling

interest in assuring that the schools meet this
responsibility.

Without first establishing discipline and

2 unlike police officers, school authorities
have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any
obligatioin to be familiar with the criminal laws.
Of
course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities
have a layman's familiarity with the types of crimes that
occur frequently in our schools: the distribution and use
of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as
well as fellow students.

7.

maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their
students.

And apart from education, the school has the

obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from
violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years
has prompted national concern.

For me, it would be

unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the
full panoply of constitutional rules apply in the with the
same force and effect in the schoolhouse as it does in the
enforcement of criminal laws. 3
In sum, although I agree with much of the
Court's opinion and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat

3 As

noted above, decisions of this Court
have never held to the contrary.
The law recognizes a
host of constitutional distinctions between the rights and
duties of children and those of adults.
See Goss v.
Lopez, supra, at 591 (Powell, J., dissenting.)
Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pages.

8.

different.

4 The Court 1 s holding is that "when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search will
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school", a
search of the student or his person or belongings is
justified.
Ante, at 15.
This is in acord with the
Court 1 s summary of the views of a majority of the state
and federal courts that have addressed this issue.
See
ante, n. 2, p. 6.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much
of its opinion.

I would place greater emphasis, however,

on the special characteristics of elementary and secondary

{.

.

~

I

j

schools which make
I

i~essary

to afford students the

same constitutional protections granted adults and

/

juveniles in a non-school setting.
Within the school environment, pupils have a
lesser expectation of privacy than members of the
population generally.

They spend the school hours in

close association with each other, both in the classroom
and during recreation periods.

The students in a

particular class often know each other and their teachers

; '

2.

quite well.

Of necessity, teachers have a degree of

familiarity with, and authority over their students thatis
unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between
parent and child.

It is simply unrealistic to think that

students have the same subjective expectation of privacy

~population generally. 1

But for purposes of deciding

this case, I can assume that children in school have - no
less than adults - privacy interests that society is
prepared to recognize as legitimate ••

Cf. supra, n. 1.

However one may characterize their privacy
expectations, students properly are afforded some
constitutional protections.
~e

In an often quoted statement,

Court said that students do not "shed their

constitutional rights • • • at the schoolhouse gate".
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393

u.s.

503, 506

3.

(1969).

Nevertheless, the Court also has "emphasized the

need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
states and of school officials • • • to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools."
EPPerson v. Arkansas, 393

u.s.

Id., at 507.

97, 104 (1968).

See also
The Court

has balanced the interests of the student against the
school officials' need to maintain discipline by
recognizing qualitative differences between the
constitutional remedies to which students and adults are
entitled.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419

u.s.

565 (1975), the Court

recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet
was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a
student who challenged a disciplinary suspension.

The

only process found to be "due" was notice and a hearing

4.

described as

"rudimentary"~

"the disciplinarian

* * *

it · amounted to no more than

informally discuss[ing] the

alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has
occurred".

u.s.

Id., at 581-582.

In Ingraham v. Wright, 430

651 (1977}, we declined to extend the Eighth

Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment of
school children as authorized by Florida law.
emphasized in that opinion that familiar

We

constraints in

the school, and also in the community, provide substantial
protection against the violation of constitutional rights
by school authorities.

"At the end of the school day, the

child is invariably free to return home.
~hool,

Even while at

the child brings with him the support of family

and friends, and is rarely apart from teachers and other
pupils who may witness and protest any instances of

5.

mistreatment".

Id., at 670.

The Ingraham Court further

pointed out that the "openness of the public school and
its supervision by the community afford significant
safeguards" against the violation of constitutional
rights. Id., at 670.
The special relationship between teacher and
student also distinguishes the setting within which school
children operate.

Law enforcement officers function as

adversaries of criminal suspects.

These officers have the

responsibility to investigate criminal activity, to locate
and arrest those who violate our laws, and to charge and
bring to trial persons thought to be guilty.

Rarely does

this type of adversarial relationship exit between school
authorities and pupils. 2

Instead, there is a commonality

of interests between teachers and their pupils.

The

6.

attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal
responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for
his education.
The primary duty of school officials and
teachers, as the Court states, is the education and
training of young people.

A state has a compelling

interest in assuring that the schools meet this
responsibility.

Without first establishing discipline and

maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their
students.

And apart from education, the school has the

obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from
violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years
has prompted national concern.

For me, it would be

unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the

7.

full panoply of constitutional rules apply with the same
force and effect in the schoolhouse as it does in the
enforcement of criminal laws. 3
In sum, although I agree with much of the
Cburt's opinion and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat
different.

1The Court's opinion states that "[a] search
of a [school] child's person or of a closed purse or of a
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation
of subjective expectations of privacy". Ante,
- - at 10, 11.
'!his expectation also is said to be "legitimate".
at 12.

Ante,

If indeed a school child's expectation of privacy

is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me
how the Court can conclude that a standard less stringent
than probable cause is appropriate.

An adult - even one

visiting in a schoolhouse - hardly could be detained
forcibly and his pockets searched in the absence of
probable cause.

2.

2unlike police officers, school authorities
have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any
obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws.

Of

course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities
have a layman's familiarity with the types of crimes that
occur frequently in our schools:

the distribution and use

of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as
well as fellow students.

3As noted above, decisions of this Court have
never held to the contrary.

The law recognizes a host of

distinctions between the rights and duties of children and
those of adults.

See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591

(Powell, J., dissenting.)

3.

4The Court's holding is that "when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search will
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school", a
search of the student or his person or belongings is
justified.

Ante, at 15.

This is in acord with the

Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state
and federal courts that have addressed this issue.
ante, n. 2, p. 6.
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I

also find the Court's reference to the

potential liability of public school teachers under 42

u.s.c.

§1983 unnecessary and disturbing.

§1983 claim at issue here.

There is no

Moreover, I think that it is

important to emphasize that school officials must be given
great discretion in their efforts to maintain order and
discipline in the unique enviornment of the schoolground
and the classroom.

For this reason, the conduct of school

officials in enforcing school rules should not be held to
the same high standards applicable to law enforcement
officials under the Fourth Amendment.

While §1983

remedies may be available against school officials in the

,,

2.

appropriate case, I suspect that conduct that would
support a claim under §1983 against a police official
rarely will support a claim under §1983 against a school
official.
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concurring.
I agree with the de
n reached by the Court and with
most of its reasoning. I do not agree, however, with the language in the opinion that suggests that exclusion of evidence
from school disciplinary proceedings may provide a deterrent to Fourth Amendment violations by school officials.
This suggestion has no support in the record and is unnecessary to a decision of the question before us.
As the Court states, ante, at 9, the only question presented
is whether evidence unlawfully seized by school officials during the course of an in-school search must be excluded in juvenile delinquency proceedings. I agree with the Court's
conclusion that the exclusionary rule is not applicable. The
school officials, in searching respondent's purse, were acting
pursuant to their duty to enforce school regulations and
maintain a safe and drug-free learning environment. They
had no responsibility for enforcing the criminal laws. Application of the exclusionary rule, as the Court correctly reasons, would be unlikely to result in appreciable deterrence. 1
JUSTICE POWELL

'The courts below found an absence of probable cause for the search
that revealed the drugs and evidence that T. L. 0. was selling drugs to her
youthful schoolmates. Determination of what constitutes "probable
cause" is a question on which lawyers and judges, as well as police officials,
It would be unrealistic to extend the subtleties of the
frequently differ.
Fourth Amendment the school classroom. I therefore do not agree with
the statement in the Court's opinion that "school boards may and should

l

I

-

83-712--CONCUR
2

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

My difficulty concerns the portion of the Court's opinion, see
ante, at 10-11, that goes on to consider the likely deterrent
effect of excluding evidence seized by school officials in school
disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from delinquency
proceedings. The basis for the Court's speculation in this respect is the decision by the New Jersey Superior Court, in
the disciplinary proceedings, that the evidence found in
T. L. O.'s purse must be excluded.
The Court is careful to state in a footnote that the "propriety of that decision is not before us in this case." Ante, at
10, n. 6. This disclaimer, however, is undermined by the
Court's subsequent statement to the effect that "illegal seizures and searches by school officials will be adequately deterred" by the exclusion of evidence from disciplinary proceedings. Ante, at 11. This statement is unsupported in
the record, and it suggests or implies an answer to a question
not before us. Moreover, it suggests an answer that is contrary to our decisions concerning the exclusionary rule-decisions that consistently have refused to extend the rule to civil
proceedings. See, e. g., United States v. Janis, 428 U. Sn

t::::_

433 (1976).
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3

that the judgment of that court should be reversed. There is no evidence
of overreaching conduct on the part of the school officials, and the sevenday suspension of T. L. 0. for selling drugs to 14-year-old children in
school, was a singularly modest penalty.
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concurring'[
()
I agree with the decision reached by the Court and with
most of its reasoning. I do not agree, however, with the language in the opinion that suggests that exclusion of evidence
from school disciplinary proceedings may provide a deterrent to Fourth Amendment violations by school officials.
This suggestion has no support in the record and is unnecessary to a decision of the question before us.
As the Court states, ante, at 9, the only question presented
is whether evidence unlawfully seized by school officials during the course of an in-school search must be excluded in juvenile delinquency proceedings. I agree with the Court's
conclusion that the exclusionary rule is not applicable. The
school officials, in searching respondent's purse, were acting
pursuant to their duty to enforce school regulations and
maintain a safe and drug-free learning environment. They
had no responsibility for enforcing the criminal laws. Application of the exclusionary rule, as the Court correctly reasons, would be unlikely to result in appreciable deterrence. 1
JUSTICE POWELL,
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The courts below found an absence of probable cause for the search
that revealed t he drugs and evidence that T. L. 0. was selling drugs to her
youthful schoolmates. Determination of what constitutes "probable
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My difficulty concerns the portion of the Court's opinion, see
ante, at 10-11, that goes on to consider the likely deterrent
effect of excluding evidence seized by school officials in school
disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from delinquency
proceedings. The basis for the Court's speculation in this respect is the decision by the New Jersey Superior Court, in
the disciplinary proceedings, that the evidence found in
T. L. O.'s purse must be excluded.
The Court is careful to state in a footnote that the "propriety of that decision is not before us in this case." Ante, at
10, n. 6. This disclaimer, however, is undermined by the
Court's subsequent statement to the effect that "illegal seizures and searches by school officials will be adequately deterred" by the exclusion of evidence from disciplinary proceedings. Ante, at 11. This statement is unsupported in
the record, and it suggests or implies an answer to a question
not before us. Moreover, it suggests an answer that is contrary to our decisions concerning the exclusionary rule-decisions that consistently have refused to extend the rule to civil
proceedings. See, e. g., United States v. Janis, 428 U. S.
433 (1976).

Although I join the judgm~t and the greater part of the
Court's opinion, I dis~ent f1 o 11 that portion of it that speculates unnecessarily as to a deterrent effect of the rule in situations that are not before us._.-L.
have both the incentive and the means to foster an understanding [of federal constitutional standards]." See, ante, at 10. Decisions of the courts,
including this Court, frequently decide close questions of alleged Fourth
Amendment violations and applications of the exclusionary rule. Keeping
abreast of, and understanding, these developments has been a problem for
law enforcement officials who are briefed regularly on Court decisions.
School officials rarely possess legal training, and few schools could provide
adequate briefing. It would be unreasonable on its face to suggest that
they should be held to the same standards that the law expects of police
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10, n. 6. This disclaimer, however, is undermined by the
Court's subsequent statement to the effect that "illegal seizures and searches by school officials will be adequately deterred" by the exclusion of evidence from disciplinary proceedings. Ante, at 11. This statement is unsupported in
the record, and it suggests or implies an answer to a question
not before us. Moreover, it suggests an answer that is contrary to our decisions concerning the exclusionary rule-decisions that consistently have refused to extend the rule to civil
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disciplinary proceedings as distinguished from delinquency
proceedings. The basis for the Court's speculation in this respect is the decision by the New Jersey Superior Court, in
the disciplinary proceedings, that the evidence found in
T. L. O.'s purse must be excluded.
The Court is careful to state in a footnote that the "propriety of that decision is not before us in this case." Ante, at
10, n. 6. This disclaimer, however, is undermined by the
Court's subsequent statement to the effect that "illegal seizures and searches by school officials will be adequately deterred" by the exclusion of evidence from disciplinary proceedings. Ante, at 11. This statement is unsupported in
the record, and it suggests or implies an answer to a question
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concurring.
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much of its
op1mon. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the
special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools
-wftteh make it unecessary to afford students the same con~ stitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting.
Within the school environment, pupils have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally.
They spend the school hours in close association with each
other, both in the classroom and during recreation periods.
The students in a particular class often know each other and
their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers have a degree of familiarity with, and authority over their students
tha; s unparallele<Jsiexcept perhaps in the relationship between parent and1ii'ild. It is simply unrealistic to think that
students have the same subjective expectation of privacy as
population generally. ' But for purposes of deciding this
JUSTICE POWELL,

1

The Court's opinion states that "[a] search of a [school] child's person or
of a closed purse or of a bag carried on her person, no less than a similar
search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy". Ante, at 10, 11. This expectation also is
said to be "legitimate". Ante, at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation
of privacy is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me how the
Court can conclude that a standard less stringent than probable cause is
appropriate. An adult-even one visiting in a schoolhouse-hardly could

•
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case, I can assume that children in school have-no less than
adults-privacy interests that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate.# Cf. supra, n. 1.
However one may characterize their privacy expectations,
students properly are afforded some constitutional protections. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that students do not "s ed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate . Tinker v. Des Moines School District,
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Nevertheless, the Court also has
"emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of .the states and of school officials . . . to prescribe
and control conduct in the schools." Id., at 507. See also
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court
has balanced the interests of the student against the school
officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative differences between the constitutional remedies to which
students and adults are entitled.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as "rudimentary"; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian '*-*-*-.....
informally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred . Id., at 581-582. In
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law.
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in
the school, and also in the community, provide substantial
protection against the violation of constitutional rights by
school authorities. "At the end of the school day, the child is
invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the
child brings with him the support of family and friends, and is
be detained forcibly and his pockets searched in the absence of probable
cause.
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rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness
and protest any instances of mistreatmen
I d., at 670.
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness
of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitutional rights. Id., at 670.
The special relationship between teacher and student also
distinguishes the setting within which school children operate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who
violate our laws, and to~n~ff:Ofii~:lliittJ p9l!S
t
· y. Rarely does this type of adversarial
relationship e between school authorities and pupils. 2 Instead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers
and their pupils. .The attitude of the typical teacher is one of
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for
his education.
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the
Court states, is the education and training of young people.
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate
their students. And apart from education, the school has
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of
constitutional rules apply \vith the same force and effect in
2
Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement
responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal
laws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a layman's familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our
schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against
teachers as well as fellow students.
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the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal
laws. 3
In sum, although I agree with much of the Court's opinion
and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat different.

3
As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the contrary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591
(POWELL, J., dissenting.)
'The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school", a search of
the student or his person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is
in acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state
and federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, n. 2, p. 6.
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deciding this case I can assume that children in school
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Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court
has balanced the interests of the student against the school
officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative differences between the constitutional remedies to which
students and adults are entitled.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as "rudimentary"; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian . . . informally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student
minutes after it has occurred". !d. , at 581-582. In
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law.
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the
school, and also in the community, provide substantial protection against the violation of constitutional rights by school
authorities. "At the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the
child brings with him the support of family and friends , and is
be detained forcibly and his pockets searched in the absence of probable
cause.
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rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness
and protest any instances of mistreatment." Id., at 670.
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness
of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitutional rights. I d., at 670.
The special relationship between teacher and student also
distinguishes the setting within which school children operate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who
violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of
such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial
relationship ex~ between school authorities and pupils. 2 Instead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for
his education.
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the
Court states, is the education and training of young people.
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate
their students. And apart from education, the school has
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of
constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in
2
Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement
responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal
laws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a layman's familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our
schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against
teachers as well as fellow students.
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the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal
laws. 3
In sum, although I agree with much of the Court's opinion
and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat different.

3

As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the contrary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591
(POWELL, J., dissenting.)
• The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," a search of
the student's person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is in
acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state and
federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, at 6, n. 2.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much of its
opm10n. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the
special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools
that make it unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool sett ·
ithin the school environment tudents ,have a lesser
expectation of privacy than members o e population generally. They spend the school hours in close association with
each other, both in the classroom and during recreation periods. The students in a particular class often know each
other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers
have a degree of familiarity with, and authority oveypieir
students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between parent and child. It is simply unrealistic to
think that students have the same subjective expectation of
privacy as the population generally.' But for purposes of
'The Court's opinion states that "[a] search of a [school] child's person or
of a closed purse or of a bag carried on her person, no Jess than a similar
search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy." Ante, at 10, 11. This expectation also is
said to be "legitimate." Ante, at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation
of privacy is "no Jess" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me how the
Court can conclude that a standard Jess stringent than probable cause is
appropriate. An adult-even one visiting in a schoolhouse-hardly could
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deciding this case, I can assume that children in school
~no less than adults ~rivacy interests that society is
prepared to recognize as legitimate. Cf. n. 1, supra.
However one may characterize their privacy expectations,
students properly are afforded some constitutional protections. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that students do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School District,
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Nn , •h !less.-;liie Court also has
"emphasized the need for affinning the comprehensive authority of the states and of school officials . . . to prescribe
and control conduct in the schools." Id., at 507. See also
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court
has balanced the interests of the student against the school
officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative differences between the constitutional remedies to which
students and adults are entitled.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as "rudimentary''; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian ... informally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student
minutes after it has occurred". Id., at 581-582. In
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law.
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the
school, and also in the community, provide substantial protection against the violation of constitutional rights by school
authorities. "At the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the
child brings with him the support of family and friends, and is
be detained forcibly and his pockets searched in the absence of probable
cause.
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rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness
and protest any instances of mistreatment." I d., at 670.
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness
of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitutional rights. ld., at 670.
The special relationship between teacher and student also
distinguishes the setting within which school children operate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who
violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of
such persons ~ trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial
relationship eXJ- between school authorities and pupils. 2 Instead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for
his education.
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the
Court states, is the education and training of young people.
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate
their students. And apart from education, the school has
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of
constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in
2
Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement
responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal
laws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a layman's familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our
schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against
teachers as well as fellow students.
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4

the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal
laws. 3
In sum, although I agree with much of the Court's opinion
and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat different.

As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the contrary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591
(POWELL, J. , dissenting.)
'The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," a search of
the student's person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is in
acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state and
federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, at 6, n. 2.
3
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concurring.
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much of its
op1mon. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the
special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools
that make it unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setti
ithin the school environment tudents ,have a lesser
expectation of privacy than members o e population generally. They spend the school hours in close association with
each other, both in the classroom and during recreation periods. The students in a particular class often know each
other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers
&A.J.d
have a degree of familiarity with, and authority ove~ ~
students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between parent and child. It is simply unrealistic to
think that students have the same subjective expectation of
privacy as the population generally. 1 But for purposes of
JUSTICE POWELL,

1

The Court's opinion states that "[a] search of a [school] child's person or
of a closed purse or of a bag carried on her person, no less than a similar
search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy." Ante, at 10, 11. This expectation also is
said to be "legitimate." Ante, at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation
of privacy is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me how the
Court can conclude that a standard less stringent than probable cause is
appropriate. An adult-even one visiting in a schoolhouse-hardly could
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deciding this case, I can assume that children in school
have=-no less than adults ~rivacy interests that society is
prepared to recognize as legitimate. Cf. n. 1, supra.
However one may characterize their privacy expectations,
students properly are afforded some constitutional protections. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that students do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School District,
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Naurtheiess.: l'he Court also has
"emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the states and of school officials . . . to prescribe
and control conduct in the schools." !d., at 507. See also
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court
has balanced the interests of the student against the school
officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative differences between the constitutional remedies to which
students and adults are entitled.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as "rudimentary"; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian ... informally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student
minutes after it has occurred". Id., at 581-582. In
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law.
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the
school, and also in the community, provide substantial protection against the violation of constitutional rights by school
authorities. "At the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the
child brings with him the support of family and friends, and is
~e detained forcibly and his pockets searched in the absence of probable
cause.
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rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness
and protest any instances of mistreatment." I d., at 670.
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness
of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitutional rights. I d., at 670.
The special relationship between teacher and student also
distinguishes the setting within which school children operate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who
violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of
such persons 1j> trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial
relationship exf. between school authorities and pupils. 2 Instead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for
his education.
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the
Court states, is the education and training of young people.
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate
their students. And apart from education, the school has
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of
constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in
2
Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement
responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal
laws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a layman's familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our
schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against
teachers as well as fellow students.
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the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal
laws. 3
In sum, although I agree with much of the Court's opinion
and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat different.

3
As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the contrary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591
(POWELL, J., dissenting.)
• The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," a search of
the student's person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is in
acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state and
federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, at 6, n. 2.
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JUSTICE POWELL, )concurring.
I agree with the Court's decision, and with much of its
op1mon. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the
special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools
that make it unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting.
Students within the school environment have a lesser
expectation of privacy than members of the population generally. They spend the school hours in close association with
each other, both in the classroom and during recreation periods. The students in a particular class often know each
other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers
have a degree of familiarity with, and authority over, their
students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between parent and child. It is simply unrealistic to
think that students have the same subjective expectation of
privacy as the population generally. 1 But for purposes of
1
The Court's opinion states that "[a] search of a [school] child's person or
of a closed purse or of a bag carried on her person, no less than a similar
search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy." Ante, at 10, 11. This expectation also is
said to be "legitimate." Ante, at 12. If indeed a school child's expectation
of privacy is "no less" than that of an adult, it is not clear to me how the
Court can conclude that a standard less stringent than probable cause is
appropriate. An adult-even one visiting in a schoolhouse-hardly could
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deciding this case, I can assume that children in school-no
less than adults-have privacy interests that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate. Cf. n. 1, supra.
However one may characterize their privacy expectations,
students properly are afforded some constitutional protections. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that students do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School District,
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). The Court also has "emphasized
the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
states and of school officials . .. to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Id., at 507. See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court has balanced
the interests of the student against the school officials' need
to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative differences ·
between the constitutional remedies to which students and
adults are entitled.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as "rudimenta¢?it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian ... informally discuss[ing] the alleged ptisconduct with the student
minutes after it has occurre<!". Id., at 581-582. In
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law.
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the
school, and also in the community, provide substantial protection against the violation of constitutional rights by school
authorities. "At the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the
child brings with him the support of family and friends, and is
be detained forcibly and his pockets searched in the absence of probable
cause.
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rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness
and protest any instances of mistreatment." I d., at 670.
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness
of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitutional rights. lid., at 670.
The speciai'relationship between teacher and student also
distinguishes the setting within which school children operate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who
violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of
such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial
relationship exist between school authorities and pupils. 2
Instead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for
his education.
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the
Court states, is the education and training of young people.
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate
their students. And apart from education, the school has
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of
constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in
2
Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement
responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal
la:ws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a layman's familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our
schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against
teachers as well as fellow students.

#
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the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal
laws. 3
In sum, although I agree with much of the Court's opinion
and its holding, 4 my emphasis is somewhat different.

3
As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the contrary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591
(POWELL, J., dissenting.)
• The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," a search of
the student's person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is in
acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state and
federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, at 6, n. 2.
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins,
concurring.
I agree with the Court's decision, and generally with its
opm10n. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the
special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools
that make it unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting.
In any realistic sense, students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of
the population generally. They spend the school hours in
close association with each other, both in the classroom and
during recreation periods. The students in a particular class
often know each other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers have a degree of familiarity with, and authority over, their students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between parent and child. It is
simply unrealistic to think that students have the same subjective expectation of privacy as the population generally.
But for purposes of deciding this case, I can assume that children in school-no less than adults-have privacy interests
that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate. CI. n.S'Wp'l"a.

However one may characterize their privacy expectations,
students properly are afforded some constitutional protec.tions. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that stu-
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dents do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School District,
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). The Court also has "emphasized
the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
states and of school officials . . . to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools." Id., at 507. See also Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court has balanced
the interests of the student against the school officials' need
to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative differences
between the constitutional remedies to which students and
adults are entitled.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as "rudimentary"; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian ... informally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student
minutes after it has occurred". Id., at 581-582. In
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law.
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the
school, and also
. in the community, provide substantial protection against the violation of constitutional rights by school
authorities. "At the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the
child brings with him the support of family and friends, and is
rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness
and protest any instances of mistreatment." Id., at 670.
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness
of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitutional rights. Id., at 670.
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The special relationship between teacher and student also
distinguishes the setting within which school children operate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who
violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of
such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial
relationship exist between school authorities and pupils. 1
Instead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for
his education.
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the
Court states, is the education and training of young people.
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate
their students. And apart from education, the school has
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of
constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in
the schoolhoase as it does in the enforcement of criminal
laws. 2
Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws.
Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a layman's
familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools: the
distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as
well as fellow students.
'As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the contrary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591
(POWELL, J., dissenting.)
1
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In sum, although I join the Court's opinion and its holding,3 my emphasis is somewhat different .

.

The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," a search of
the student's person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is in
acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state and
federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, at 6, n. 2.
3
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JusTICE POWELL, with whom JusTICE O'CONNOR joins,
concurring.
I agree with the Court's decision, and generally with its
oplDlon. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the
special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools
that make it unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting.
In any reali~tic sense, students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of
the population generally. They spend the school hours in
close association with each other, both in the classroom and
during recreation periods. The students in a particular class
often know each other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers have a degree of familiarity with, and authority over, their students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between parent and child. It is
simply unrealistic to think that students have the same subjective expectation of privacy as the population generally.
But for purposes of deciding this case, I can assume that children in school-no less than adults-have privacy interests
that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate.
However one may characterize their privacy expectations,
students properly are afforded some constitutional protections. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that students do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
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schoolhouse gate". Tinker v. Des Moines School District,
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). The Court also has "emphasized
the need for affinning the comprehensive authority of the
states and of school officials . . . to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools." I d., at 507. See also Epperson v.
. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968). The Court has balanced
the interests of the student against the school officials' need
to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative differences
between the constitutional remedies to which students and
adults are entitled.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to
be "due" was notice and a hearing described as ''rudimentary''; it amounted to no more than ''the disciplinarian ... informally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student
minutes after it has occurred". Id., at 581-582. In
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal
punishment of school children as authorized by Florida law.
We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints in the
school, and also in the community, provide substantial protection against the violation of constitutional rights by school
authorities. ~At the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the
child brings with him the support of family and friends, and is
rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness
and protest any instances of mistreatment." I d., at 670.
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness
of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitutional rights. I d., at 670.
The special relationship between teacher and student also
distinguishes the setting within which school children oper-
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ate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who
violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of
such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial
relationship exist between school authorities and pupils. 1
Instead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers
and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for
his education. .
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the
Court states, is the education and training of young people.
A state has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools
meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate
their students. And apart from education, the school has
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other
children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has
prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of
constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in
the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal
laws. 2
In sum, altQough I join the Court's opinion and its holding, 3 my emphasis is somewhat different.
1
Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws.
Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a layman's
familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools: the
distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as
well as fellow students.
1
As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the contrary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the rights and
duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 591
(POWELL, J., dissenting.)
• The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds for
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suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," a search of
the student's person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 15. This is in
acord with the Court's summary of the views of a majority of the state and
federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, at 6, n. 2.

